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ABSTRACT 
 
A THEORETICAL AALYSIS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE VIEWS OF 
REPUBLICA AD ISLAMIC WOME’S CIVIL SOCIETY ORGAIZATIOS 
I TURKEY:  
DIVERGIG CLAIMS AD COTEDIG TRADITIOS 
 
 
 
KADĐR AYDIN GÜNDÜZ 
 
Program of Political Science , M.A. Thesis, 2010 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
Key Words: Social Justice, Civil Society Organizations, Socioeconomic Justice, 
Symbolic Justice, community, tradition 
 
This study attempts to explain diverging claims of justice generating from two major 
movements within women’s civil society, namely republican and Islamic women’s 
activism. Given that purpose, empirical data obtained from semi-structured interviews 
and secondary sources is analyzed under the light of social justice literature which is 
marked by socioeconomic justice - symbolic justice dichotomy and liberalism – 
communitarianism debate.  
 
The results of the study suggest that although both movements intend to formulate their 
own claims of justice within a liberal perspective, the impact of Kemalism and Islam on 
republican and Islamic civil society organizations is decisive. The power of Islam and 
Kemalism against liberalism can particularly be better observed in the arguments which 
they formulate for opposing the claims of other groups.  
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKĐYE’DEKĐ CUMHURĐYETÇĐ VE ĐSLAMĐ KADI SĐVĐL TOPLUM 
ÖRGÜTLERĐĐ SOSYAL ADALET GÖRÜŞLERĐĐ TEORĐK AALĐZĐ: 
FARKLI TALEPLER VE RAKĐP GELEEKLER  
 
 
 
KADĐR AYDIN GÜNDÜZ 
 
Siyaset Bilimi Programı , Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Adalet, Sivil Toplum Örgütleri, Sosyoekonomik Adalet, 
Sembolik Adalet, topluluk, gelenek 
 
 
Bu çalışma, kadın sivil toplumunda yer alan iki büyük hareketin – cumhuriyetçi ve 
Đslami kadın sivil toplum örgütlerinin -  birbirinden farklılık gösteren adalet taleplerini 
açıklamayı hedefler. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlardan ve 
ikincil kaynaklardan edinilen veriler, sosyoekonomik adalet – sembolik adalet ihtilafı ve 
liberalizm – toplulukçuluk tartışması doğrultusunda şekillenmiş olan sosyal adalet 
literatürü ışığında incelenmektedir.  
 
Çalışmanın sonuncunda, her iki grubun da kendi taleplerini ifade ederken liberal 
perspektiften faydalanma isteklerine karşın, Kemalizm’in ve Đslam’ın bu gruplar 
üzerindeki etkisinin belirleyici olduğu öneriliyor. Özellikle, Kemalizm’in ve Đslam’ın 
liberalizm karşısındaki gücü, cumhuriyetçi ve Đslami sivil toplum kuruluşlarınının, 
başka grupların taleplerine karşı çıkarken öne sürdükleri argümanlarda belirgin biçimde 
ortaya çıkmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
ITRODUCTIO 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Scope and Aim of the Study 
 
 
 
 
 In the aftermath of 1980 military coup, Turkey has witnessed the emergence of 
an active and vibrant civil society. In particular, women’s organizations have not only 
increased in number but also have undergone an intensive diversification. The major 
causes of this diversification were on the one hand the rise of a feminist stance which 
has never been that strong before, on the other hand the emergence of an Islamic 
women’s activism out of the male-dominated Islamic milieu which was revitalized by 
the new Islamist movement. From 1990s onwards, in line with that diversification, it is 
possible to talk about a fragmentation due to the deep divergence among the world view 
adopted by women’s movements which generate three separate groups1 within women’s 
civil society: first, republican/Kemalist civil society organizations as the successors of a 
sort of ‘state feminism’ which focuses on the emancipation of women in parallel with 
the modernization and the westernization of Turkish society; second, Islamic civil 
society organizations which argue that a rightly-understood Islamic way of life would 
guarantee the happiness of women; third, feminist women’s movements in general, 
which particularly focus on the gender question.  
 
All of these abovementioned groups agree that women are victims of several 
injustices; however the priorities emphasized in their claims diverge significantly. 
Particularly, while republican CSOs seem to focus on the betterment of women’s status 
in socioeconomic sphere and underline the importance of women’s participation and 
                                                 
1 Đlkkaracan describes them as ‘three conflicting wings’. (Đlkkaracan, 1997, p. 8) 
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representation in public sphere; Islamic CSOs usually underline that a large group of 
women suffer from the ban on Islamic headscarf in public institutions and such 
limitations cause an injury to them. At first sight, the difference between these claims 
seems to be generating from two different parameters; first one is about the gender 
distribution of income and power, the second one which cannot be understood in 
socioeconomic terms, requires a non-material approach to social justice. Besides, in 
political theory literature, these two different sorts of claims are often elaborated 
separately. 
 
 Since 1970s, social justice has been a hot topic in political theory. Under “the 
dominance of Marxism in Europe, and the widespread influence of Rawls in the USA” 
redistribution -in other words socioeconomic justice- was what people mostly 
understand from ‘social justice’ concept until late 1980s. (Honneth, 2001, p. 43) Then, 
the priorities of social justice in political theory started to shift from socioeconomic 
inequalities to identity claims, which are calling for ‘recognition’. (Benhabib, 2002) 
Some brilliant works such as Will Kymlicka's Liberalism, Community and Culture 
(Kymlicka, 1989) and Charles Taylor's The Politics of Recognition (Taylor, 1992) 
became the forerunners of a mainstream recognition literature and they dominated 
political philosophy field, as John Rawls' A Theory of Justice did throughout 1970s.  
 
 Towards the end of 1990s, some political philosophers started to dwell upon 
both material sufferings and symbolic injuries, in order to overcome the theoretical 
schism between the theories of socioeconomic and symbolic justice. Nancy Fraser was 
one of the most important thinkers who underlined the importance of the equal 
consideration for ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’, and she pointed out that this was 
particularly necessary for the analysis of complex injustices which stem from both 
socioeconomic inequalities and sociocultural injuries. According to Fraser, the injustices 
generating from gender and race are of that sort. (Fraser, 1997) 
 
  In this study, I intend to use contemporary social justice literature, which I 
summarized above, in order to understand how the question of social justice is treated 
by two women’s movements, with reference to republican CSOs and Islamic CSOs, 
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which have an open conflict regarding the headscarf controversy2. Based on a detailed 
analysis of social justice literature, on the one hand I will elaborate the way in which 
these movements respond to the question of social justice in general, by focusing on 
both their own claims of justice and their responses to the claims of other groups; on the 
other hand I will try to make a tentative explanation in order to understand the major 
factors which shape the justice views of both groups. Although it seems as if republican 
women’s CSOs merely focus on socioeconomic injustice and ignore symbolic 
injustices, and Islamic women’s CSOs emphasize the symbolic injustice generating 
from the ban on headscarf without any consideration for welfare distribution; I will give 
equal importance to socioeconomic and symbolic justice views of both groups in order 
to avoid shortcuts which would hinder a satisfactory analysis representing the reality as 
fully as possible.  
 
 
 
1.2.  Constructing an Appropriate Research Design  
under the Light of Previous Studies 
 
 
 
 The rapid growth and diversification of women’s civil society has been a curious 
topic for social scientists in Turkey. Majority of the studies conducted since late 1980s 
can be grouped under two groups; first those which intend to analyze the women’s civil 
society in general, (Sirman, 1989) (Kandiyoti, 1991) (Tekeli, 1995) (Đlkkaracan, 1997) 
second those which focus on the particularities of each movement. (Arat Y. , 1991) 
(Arat Z. F., 1994) (Đlyasoğlu, 1994) (Saktanber, 1994) (Çayır, 1997) (Durakbaşa, 2000) 
(Kadıoğlu, 2005) Given the purpose of the study, time constraints, and financial 
restrictions; focusing on peculiarities within two distinct movements is an impossible 
target. Therefore, the study was designed in a way that it reveals the common 
characteristics which reveal the mainstream social justice view of each movement.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Republican/Kemalist CSOs respond very negatively to the claims about the lift of the 
ban on headscarf, which actually is topping the agenda of Islamic women’s CSOs.  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
 
 
 As previously mentioned, the broad research question of the study is: How do 
republican and Islamic women’s civil society organizations assess the question of social 
justice in general, and how can their social justice views be interpreted regarding the 
contemporary social justice literature? However the broad research question is linked to 
the following sub-questions, the answering of which would provide a solid ground for 
the development of the study: 
- What are the major networks and platforms which republican and Islamic 
women’s civil society organizations are affiliated with? 
- What are the major issues and priorities emphasized by republican and 
Islamic women’s movement in general? 
- Do they cooperate with actors and organizations outside the women’s 
movement? 
- What are their propositions for struggle against injustices which women 
face? 
- How do they respond to the question of socioeconomic justice? 
- How do they respond to the question of symbolic justice? 
- What kind of activities do they suggest and run in order to struggle against 
injustice? 
- How do they respond to the claims of other groups?  
- What do they refer to in their objections against the claims of others? 
 
 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
 
 
 As previously mentioned, republican and Islamic women’s civil societies are not 
actually monolithic. As Seçkinelgin puts it clearly with reference to Bora, it is possible 
to distinguish republican civil society organizations into two groups: traditional CSOs 
which are built on the Kemalist ideals and newer CSOs which are formed to defend 
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Kemalist ideals. (Seçkinelgin, 2006, p. 760) On the otherhand, Göle explains the 
contrast within Islamic movement as the dichotomy between traditionalism and 
radicalism, while Özdalga and Kadıoğlu refer to the tension between community 
orientation and liberalism. (Göle, 1996) (Özdalga & Persson, 1999) (Kadıoğlu, 2005) 
Although this study does not aim at an elaborate analysis of the diversity within each 
movement due to the constraints indicated above, it is intended to avoid any sort of 
misrepresentation by taking following measures: 
 
- The study focuses on the activities of two umbrella organizations which 
unite the CSOs within each group. While Đstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği 
(ĐKKB) - Đstanbul Union of Women’s Organizations unite republican CSOs 
and works as a transmission channel for the common messages and activities 
of member organizations, Gökkuşağı Đstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu 
(GĐKAP) - Rainbow Istanbul Women Organizations’ Platform has a quite 
similar role and it organizes common activities and disseminates messages 
which member CSOs agree upon. 
 
- Besides as platforms did not provide enough representation for the 
interviews, additional interviews were held. However, selection of the 
participants for the supplementary interviews was performed in a way that 
represents the diversity as much as possible. Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar 
Derneği (TÜKD) Association of Turkish University Women which was 
founded in 1949 is one of the oldest organizations can be taken as an 
example of traditional republican women’s CSOs built on the Kemalist 
ideals, while Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği (CKD) Association of 
Republican Women which was founded in 1997, in the aftermath of a large 
protest called ‘Women against Sharia’ is a typical example of the women’s 
CSOs founded for the protection of the Kemalist order. In Islamic Women’s 
movement Başak Grubu - Başak Group is a group which intends to foster 
solidarity among women, predominantly housewives; Ayrımcılığa Karşı 
Kadın Hakları Derneği (AKDER) Women’s Rights Association Against 
Discrimination is a highly politicized group which actively struggles for the 
lift of ban on headscarf. 
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The bulk of data for the assessment of republican and Islamic women’s 
movements’ views of social justice is generated from three main sources. First, semi-
structured interviews3 held with the representatives of organizations indicated above;  
second, activity reports, publications, press releases, web pages, and bulletins of 
umbrella organizations and member CSOs; third, previous studies in the field a part of 
which was indicated previously. Despite my preference for using primary sources, it is 
important to note that bibliography available on both republican and Islamic women’s 
movements was very helpful to enrich the analysis and to support the data generated 
from interviews.  
 
 
1.5. Design of the Study 
 
 
 In line with the purpose of the study, the following chapter will be a thorough 
analysis of contemporary social justice literature. Given the fact that the literature of 
social justice is a vast one, the present review focuses on the major works of post-
Rawlsian theories. However, selected theories and approaches will provide enough 
ground for the empirical analysis of social justice views of republican and Islamic 
women’s movements, regarding the dichotomy of socioeconomic justice and symbolic 
justice. Moreover, these theories will be useful for the theoretical interpretation of 
empirical findings in the following chapter. 
 
Chapter Three is built on three sections. The first one includes a general 
presentation of ĐKKB and GĐKAP, in terms of their function, members, and major 
activities. The second one is the empirical analysis of republican and Islamic 
movements’ social justice views. Finally, the third one proposes a tentative explanation 
for the predominant social justice views of each movement in line with MacIntyre’s 
emphasis on ‘tradition’ as the major source of normativity according to which 
individuals and groups construct their point of view of justice. 
 
                                                 
3 Interviewees: Representatives of ĐKKB (1) and GĐKAP (1); Representatives of 
member CSOs: TÜKD (1), CKD (2), Başak Grubu (1), AKDER (1). 
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Finally, Chapter Four is the conclusion which ties the present study to the 
existing literature on women’s movements in Turkey, in terms of its findings and 
propositions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
COTEMPORARY LITERATURE O SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
REDISTRIBUTIO, RECOGITIO, AD BEYOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quest for justice has always been one of the perennial questions for normative 
systems, and from religion to law, each normative system introduces a justice view in 
order to regulate individuals' behaviors and interactions. Apart from conventional 
normative systems and debates on them, justice has been one of the focal points of 
political philosophy as well. Although we may trace theoretical inquiries about justice 
back to major works of classical Greek philosophers, such as Plato's Republic and 
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, our present effort requires us to focus on a very 
specific portion of this huge literature. Given the objectives of this study which intends 
to observe diverging discourses of justice in a contemporary democratic society, 
classical and modern theories of justice will fall short of providing a satisfactory 
theoretical framework. In that sense, the present literature review will consist of post-
Rawlsian justice theories. This limitation is legitimate in two ways. On the one hand 
Rawls' “justice as fairness” which has provoked many critiques and reactions from 
various political theoreticians opened up a new justice debate that has gone on 
uninterruptedly since the first publication of ‘A Theory of Justice’ in 1971, on the other 
hand a serious analysis of post-Rawlsian literature succeeds in reflecting the major 
questions of social justice in contemporary liberal democratic societies.  
 
 The literature to be covered in this chapter will be presented under three 
headings: first, Rawls' distributive justice and reactions to it; second, recognition 
theories which deal with symbolic injustice; third, different attempts to overcome 
redistribution-recognition schism in social justice literature. The latter has a particular 
importance for the following sections of this study, as it will provide us an insight for 
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understanding how two justice approaches -namely, socioeconomic and symbolic justice 
views- can be accommodated in a single perspective focusing on gender injustice.  
 
 
2.1.   Rawlsian Socioeconomic Justice and Critiques Against Distributive Justice 
 
 
 Distributive justice aims at laying the essential rules for arranging the fruits and 
burdens of economic activity at society level, and this is the main objective of Rawls' 
‘justice as fairness’ as well. Rawls, adopting major assumptions of liberalism, embraces 
distributive concerns for socioeconomic justice within mainstream liberal literature. A 
Theory of Justice, which triggered the ongoing justice debate since its first publication 
in 1971, has received many critiques from different traditions of political theory. In this 
part, not only fundamental ideas asserted by Rawls, but also major critiques against his 
theory will be presented. These critiques are grouped under two main headings: first, 
those generated from libertarianism; second, those which are introduced by 
communitarian theoreticians.  
 
 
2.1.1.  Rawlsian Distributive Justice: Justice as Fairness 
 
 
 According to Rawls, justice is essentially about the basic structure of the society, 
more precisely, “about the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 6) Setting forth an original justice theory, he defines 
where his theory can be placed in the whole literature. Rawls associates himself with the 
social contract tradition, and he attempts to derive principles of justice by using social 
contract as the major theoretical instrument for the construction of a universal theory of 
justice. 
“My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a 
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say 
in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant... [T]he guiding idea, is that the principles of 
justice for the basic structure of society are object of the original agreement.” 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 10) 
 
More precisely, social contract is a theoretical instrument to imagine a hypothetical and 
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rational deliberation process, which is expected to provide the basic rules for a just 
society.  Rawls thoroughly describes the circumstances of this hypothetical decision 
process which he calls ‘original position’: 
 “In justice as fairness, the original position of equality corresponds to the state of 
 nature in the traditional theory of social contract. This original position is not, of 
 course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive 
 condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation 
 characterized so as to lead to a certain conceptions of justice [...] The principles 
 of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is 
 advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of 
 natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. The principles of 
 justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 10) 
 
Rawls builds the backbone of his theory on this very idea of original position, which is 
an ‘initial choice situation’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 16) bringing rational individuals together 
who leave all personal contingencies behind the ‘veil of ignorance’. By this means, he 
intends to “nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt 
them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.” (Rawls, 1999, 
p. 118) Therefore, the first purpose of introducing veil of ignorance is overcoming 
people's egoism by abstaining them from all information which defines who they 
actually are. By the same token, he seeks to attain a fair decision procedure, where he 
takes pure procedural justice as model, among equally free rational beings, in order to 
eliminate all influence that would prevent people's free deliberation on justice in case 
they were cognizant of the identity of their collocutor during original position. Apart 
from maintaining favorable conditions for the debate, he intends to reveal universal 
precepts of justice which everyone would comply with at the end. (Rawls, 1999, p. 119) 
As it is the case for many other liberal theories, universality of decisions requires 
neutrality, and in ‘justice as fairness’ it is attained by the anonymity of the participants 
during this hypothetical decision-making process. 
 
 Rawls admits that his theoretical formula, which combines social contract with 
veil of ignorance, is a Kantian inspiration, and he proposes “veil of ignorance” in order 
to elucidate Kant's obscurity, giving references to  his discussion of the topic of practical 
judgment in the Critique of Practical Reason: 
“The veil of ignorance is so natural a condition that something like it must have 
 occurred to many. The formulation in the text is implicit, in Kant’s doctrine of 
the categorical imperative, both in the way this procedural criterion is defined 
and the use Kant makes of it. Thus when Kant tells us to test our maxim by 
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 considering what would be the case were it a universal law of nature, he must 
suppose that we do not know our place within this imagined system of nature.” 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 118) 
 
In that sense, “original position” can be conceived as a laboratory which elucidates the 
way in which a fully rational account of justice can be determined. 
 
 Rawls' contact with literature is not limited to Kantian social contract theory. 
Apart from associating himself with the latter, he wants to contrast his theory vis-à-vis 
two intellectual traditions, namely utilitarianism and intuitionism, both of which had a 
considerable impact on justice literature since 19th century. In this critical endeavor, 
Rawls prefers focusing on the main assumptions and propositions of each philosophical 
perspective, rather than making a thorough analysis of particular texts. His major 
critique against classical utilitarianism is about its lack of consideration for different 
perceptions of good life, which leads to a severe problem while evaluating justice 
demands of individuals having diverse conceptions of utility. Regarding intuitionism, he 
points out its incapability for providing solid theoretical criteria to determine and sort 
principles of justice that it proposes.4 
 
 Rawls defines the fundamental aim of utilitarian justice as to attain a properly 
arranged society with institutions maximizing the net balance of satisfaction, (Rawls, 
1999, p. 21), then he elucidates that he is to “understand the principle of utility in its 
classical form as defining the good as the satisfaction of desire, or perhaps better, as the 
satisfaction of rational desire.” (Rawls, 1999, pp. 22-23). As these theories are built on 
the idea of satisfaction of desire, they tend to focus on the way in which the desires of 
people are arranged and filtered, in order to suggest a view on justice. At this point, 
utilitarianism assumes an impartial spectator figure, a sort of referee to decide on the 
basic rules of justice which set the boundaries for satisfaction of desire.  
“[T]he spectator who is conceived as carrying out the required organization of 
the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire; it is by this 
construction that many persons are fused into one. Endowed with ideal powers 
of sympathy and imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational 
individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these 
desires were his own [...]The nature of this decision made by the ideal legislator 
                                                 
4 Rawls refers to some major works of utilitarian and intuitionist justice theories in his 
critique. (Barry, 1965) (Brandt, 1959) (Sidgwick, 1907) (Mill, 1863) 
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is not, therefore, materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how 
to maximize his profit by producing this or that commodity, or that of a 
consumer deciding how to maximize his satisfaction by the purchase of this or 
that collection of goods.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 24) 
 
This intellectual process, which is conceived to be undertaken by the impartial and 
sympathetic spectator, seeks to lay the ground rules of just and coherent system of 
desire. In that sense, the outcome of this imaginative act assumed to be performed by 
one person, extends to society and becomes a final rule binding everyone. According to 
Rawls, utilitarianism is not individualistic at all, because by “conflating all systems of 
desires, it applies to society the principle of choice for one man.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 26) 
Hence, the blindness of utilitarianism regarding the plurality of ends that one might be 
interested in pursuing may well end up with some sort of a tyrannical convention on the 
principles of social justice. 
“In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which 
must be taken into account in deciding what is right. In calculating the greatest 
balance of satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are 
for. We are to arrange institutions so as to obtain the greatest sum of 
satisfactions; we ask no questions about their source or quality but only how 
their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being. Social welfare depends 
directly and solely upon the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of 
individuals. Thus if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one 
another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty as a means of enhancing their 
self-respect, then the satisfaction of these desires must be weighed in our 
deliberations according to their intensity, or whatever, along with other desires. 
If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to suppress them, it is because 
they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in 
other ways.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 26) 
 
Rawls, arguing for utilitarianism’s inadequacy for preventing possible harms that might 
occur in the name of promoting the overall satisfaction, reveals a major shortcoming 
that utilitarians fail to perceive. Utilitarianism is unable to guarantee rights for everyone 
due to its extreme emphasis on aggregate satisfaction which prioritizes ‘good’ over 
‘right’. Following these critiques, Rawls describes major characteristics of his own 
theory, which he formulates in response to utilitarianism.  
“We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is 
prior to that of the good [...] This priority of the right over the good in justice as 
fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception.”  (Rawls, 1999, p. 27) 
 
As a result, Rawls intends to overcome major flaws that a merely utilitarian justice 
theory would have: on the one hand by adopting contractarian ‘original position’ as 
opposed to utilitarian ‘impartial spectator’ which ignores diversity of systems of desires, 
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on the other hand by recognizing the priority of ‘right’ over ‘good’ 5in order to avoid 
limitations of individuals’ freedom under the pretext of attaining overall satisfaction. 
  
  Even though Rawls recognizes a limited impact of intuitionism6 in his own 
theory of justice7, he underlines that purely intuitionist theories “consist of a plurality of 
first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular types of 
cases; and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these 
principles against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what 
seems to us most nearly right.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 30) Therefore, without any 
consideration for justifying origins and methods of a justice theory, intuitionism falls 
short of a satisfactory endeavor towards providing a substantive theoretical framework. 
More an intellectual inquiry makes use of intuitions, less it pertains to the understanding 
of the third party, hence it falls into obscurity. 
 
 Rawls, distancing himself from two traditions of thought, namely utilitarianism 
and intuitionism, seeks to build an open and rational theory of justice which recognizes 
the priority of rights. Precepts of Rawlsian justice theory are acquired through a 
meditation on the hypothetical initial choice situation called ‘original position’8, in other 
words they are the expected outcome of a deliberation on justice among individuals 
leaving all self-knowledge behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, and the definitive 
formulations of these principles are as follows: 
                                                 
5 Rawls elaborates the differences between a right-based and a good-based justice 
theory thoroughly in the following sections of ‘A Theory of Justice’. (p. 393 – 396) 
This distinction will be covered in the empirical analysis of our case.  
 
6 “No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree. [...] 
In justice as fairness the role of intuition is limited in several ways.” 
    (Rawls, 1999, p. 36) 
 
7 Some philosophers emphasize that A Theory of Justice is more intuitionistic than 
Rawls assumes. “I also argue, in the second part of the essay, that Rawls’ theory, in 
one of its most important parts, is itself intuitionistic, for it provides no method for 
weighing distinct principles of justice, and the ‘natural duties’ they impose, in certain 
contexts of conflict in ‘nonideal world’” (Feinberg, 1989, p. 108) However, these 
critiques are beyond the scope of this review, which seeks to cover only major axes 
of contemporary social justice literature. 
 
8  Major characteristics and theoretical background of  ‘original position’ have already 
been presented earlier in this chapter. 
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 “FIRST PRINCIPLE 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
    SECOND PRINCIPLE 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 266) 
 
Rawls, by these principles, on the one hand intends to establish a scheme of social 
structure where every individual is entitled to equal rights with everyone; on the other 
hand supports sustainable and tolerable inequality which is to the benefit of the least 
advantaged members of the society. The most remarkable point about the way in which 
these principles are presented is a clear and hierarchical distinction between the first and 
second principle. The former has a priority over the latter and this ranking has been 
justified on the basis of liberal assumption about the primacy of rights.  
 
Second principle of justice aims at betterment of the worst-off. This objective is 
a direct outcome of the deliberation held behind the veil of ignorance. According to 
Rawls, people who have no idea about their present and future belongings and 
circumstances which they may fall into, tend to be risk averse, because it is possible for 
everyone to be in the position of the worst-off. As a result, they are expected to go for a 
social deal which maximizes what the least advantaged gets. This choice rule based on 
the assumption of risk aversion is called ‘maximin rule’. (Rawls, 1999, pp. 132-133)  
According to Rawls, fair distribution gives the maximum possible to the least 
advantaged regardless its relative value to what better-off gets. In that sense, ‘unequal 
distribution of wealth’ becomes a crucial component of socioeconomic aspect of justice 
as fairness.9 However, Rawls’ favorable approach to socioeconomic inequalities is not 
unsupported. ‘Just savings principle’ which is closely linked to ‘difference principle’ 
has a crucial role in the justification of ‘difference’. 
 
                                                 
9 Difference principle which opposes strict egalitarianism has received many harsh 
criticisms, especially from left-leaning theoriticians. Although these criticisms are 
beyond the scope of the present literature review, it is important to note that 
criticisms are not limited to those. For instance, Crocker criticizes Rawlsian maximin 
rule for not considering solidarity dispositions, which might provoke a more 
egalitarian sense of justice than ‘justice as fairness’ does. (Crocker, 1977) 
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Rawls underlines that participants of original position do not have a snapshot 
view for justice, in other words they do not merely focus on the distribution at a 
particular moment. Social cooperation and interaction among individuals are dynamic, 
so an elaborate justice theory is expected to take ‘intergenerational differences’ into 
account as well. Fair distribution of wealth should be maintained for all generations, and 
that is possible by a social pre-commitment which sets the rules for just savings. 
(Rawls, 1999, pp. 253-255) In that sense, ‘just savings principle’ provides a structure 
for a fair course of wealth accumulation. Through a well-established and 
institutionalized accumulation process, socioeconomic differences are justified but their 
negative effects are kept under control.  
 
Having presented the key concepts and arguments which constitute the backbone 
of ‘justice as fairness’, it is now possible to outline the way in which Rawlsian justice 
theory describes the operationalization of distribution. According to Rawls a fair 
scheme of distribution necessitates the implementation of suitable political and legal 
institutions. (Rawls, 1999, p. 243)  His emphasis on the importance of institutions 
carries Rawlsian theory of justice beyond the limits of its idealistic framework. More 
precisely, leaving purely hypothetical setting which gave birth to the principles of 
justice, Rawls begins to provide even some basic concerns about the governmental 
structure which would be responsible for the just distribution. He defines four major 
functions that a government should perform. These functions are performed by four 
branches of government10, namely allocation, stabilization, transfer and distribution. 
The first one focuses on keeping “the price system workably competitive and to prevent 
the formation of unreasonable market power.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 244), The second one 
“strives to bring about reasonably full employment in the sense that those who want 
work can find it and the free choice of occupation and the deployment of finance are 
supported by strong effective demand.”  (Rawls, 1999, p. 244) In that sense these two 
branches together control the fairness and efficiency of the market economy, therefore 
they keep the exchange process intact, and in case no other mechanism of redistribution 
is implemented, people get what they could get in these economic interactions. Hence, it 
is up to remaining two branches to maintain the fairness of the distribution. 
 
                                                 
10 Rawls underlines that these branches do not overlap with the usual organization of 
governments. 
16 
 
 ‘Transfer branch’ determines and guarantees the social minimum, as market does 
not take needs into account. After attributing different weights to basic needs, this 
branch provides for these basic needs. However, the function which this branch 
performs requires resources to be used for its purpose. The major task of ‘distributive’ 
branch is to secure for the transfer branch. In other words it yields funding for social 
justice. Distributive branch provides funding by means of taxation. Rawls takes taxation 
as the fundamental tool for his socioeconomic justice and he defines two different roles 
for distributive branch. On the one hand, in line with what we said so far about 
providing funding for social needs, “it raises revenues that justice requires” (Rawls, 
1999, p. 246), on the other hand  “it imposes a number of inheritance and gift taxes, and 
sets restrictions on the rights of bequest” (Rawls, 1999, p. 245). While the former is 
closely linked with the second principle of justice obviously, the latter should be read 
together with the first principle of justice because taxation is intended to maintain the 
equal distribution of rights. 
 
 To sum up, Rawls’ theory of justice is a milestone which brought the question of 
distributive justice in mainstream liberal literature. In terms of theoretical assumptions, 
it is clearly in line with liberalism, because ‘justice as fairness’ is built on the primacy of 
rights and individuality. Besides, the need for socioeconomic justice, although its 
consequences such as taxation receives harsh criticisms from other liberal thinkers and 
especially from libertarians, stems from the general assumptions of liberalism such as 
rationality and risk aversion as well. 
  
 
2.1.2 ozick’s Libertarian Critique Against Redistributive Justice 
 
 
 Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick, 1974) had a serious impact both in 
political theory literature and in global politics. (Harvey, 2005). In fact, Nozick does not 
intend to build a justice theory and his major purpose is to argue for a particular state 
theory, namely for a minimal state, clearly presented right at the beginning of his book. 
"Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the 
narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of 
contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate 
persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that 
the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are 
that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some 
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citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own 
good or protection.” (Nozick, 1974, p. ix) 
 
Obviously, Nozick is against distributive justice views, as ‘getting some citizens to aid 
others’ is well beyond the functions of the minimal state which he argues for. In other 
words, a scheme of distributive justice is clearly not compatible with his understanding 
of state. Although Anarchy, State, and Utopia is not a book of justice; Nozick on the one 
hand responds to Rawlsian distributive justice, on the other hand explicates the way in 
in which a justice concern can be accommodated within his state theory. 
 
 Nozick’s major criticisms towards ‘justice as fairness’ can be grouped under 
three headings: first its assumptions, second its focal point, and third its propositions. 
According to Nozick, ‘distributive justice’ theories are not neutral at all and they are 
built on some false perceptions of the reality. He claims that there is no central 
distribution that can be observed, interpreted or rectified.  
“[I]t is an open question, at least, whether redistribution should take place; 
whether we should do again what has already been done once, though poorly. 
However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of 
pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless 
cutting. There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all 
the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 
149) 
 
Therefore, any attempt for distributive justice is a manipulative intervention to free 
society. Nozick underlines that this false assumption is related to another one. 
Distributive justice claims stem from the idea of social cooperation. Nozick admits that 
there exists a social cooperation but the outcome of that cooperation, namely benefits 
generated by social cooperation, is not indivisible at all.  
“[E]ach person works singly to transform some input he receives, contracting 
with others who further transform or transport his product until it reaches its 
ultimate consumer. People cooperate in making things but they work separately; 
each person is miniature firm. The products of each person are easily 
identifiable, and exchanges are made in open markets with prices set 
competitively, given informational constraints, and so forth. In such a system of 
social cooperation, what is the task of a theory of justice? [T]herefore the task of 
a theory of justice is to set criteria for 'fair prices'.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 186) 
 
As a result, distributive justice theories misread the market, which is mere aggregation 
of exchanges between individuals indeed. Justice in the market, having no central 
distribution scheme, can only be obtained by laying ground rules for fair pricing. 
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 Nozick claims that incorrect assumptions of ‘justice as fairness’, go in line with 
a wrong way of thinking about justice. Distributive justice theories in general, by 
focusing merely on the outcome of economic interactions among individuals, fail to 
follow how the outcome they consider to be unjust occurs. Every distributive justice 
view is interested to see who takes how much in a society, and in particular Rawls is 
attracted to provide the highest share for the worst-off. In that sense, distributive justice 
theories lean on ‘end-result principles’ and according to Nozick they tend to ignore the 
processes themselves which the end-results do actually stem from. In Nozick’s view, a 
plausible theory of justice should focus on the processes, and such theories are to be 
built on ‘historical principles’. These principles do not seek justice with reference to 
income differences or welfare distribution among individuals, because they “hold that 
past circumstances or actions can create differential entitlements or differential deserts 
to things.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 155) According to Nozick, apart from ‘end-result 
principles’, distributive justice theories fall into another trap, which he calls 
‘patterning’. Patterned theories of justice define a specific criterion –or a complex 
system of multiple criteria- for distribution and all distribution in the society is expected 
to be performed accordingly. Nozick underlines that distribution patterns may vary from 
‘intelligence’ to ‘usefulness to society’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 156); however efficient 
application of these patterns brings a serious question about the individual liberty. Even 
we take for granted that a distribution pattern was embraced by all individuals at a given 
time, in other words each and every member of the society gave his/her consent on the 
very same system of distribution; maintenance of that distribution would require 
‘continuous interference with people’s life’. (Nozick, 1974, p. 163)  Nozick tries to 
support his claim by using two different examples, in the first one he takes a sports 
celebrity, Wilt Chamberlain, who is agreed to be paid 25 cents for each ticket sold 
throughout season. In case one million spectators attend home games in one year, 
Chamberlain receives 250.000 dollars. Obviously this is a high income which no 
distributive system can support, however individuals who go to see the game “chose to 
give 25 cents of their money to Chamberlain”. (Nozick, 1974, p. 161) In that sense 
personal liberty to spend one’s money as one wishes and maintenance of the distributive 
pattern do not go together. The second example Nozick gives which is about socialist 
societies. Socialist societies, in order to protect their distributive patterns are bound “to 
forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 163) Having 
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elucidated the reasons why pattered distributive justice structures would contradict with 
individual rights, Nozick attempts to avoid all criticisms which would assert that 
individuals might have consented to refrain from actions that risk impairing the pattern. 
For Nozick such a presumption is not realistic at all, as it is even absurd to think about a 
society where all individuals would want to maintain the distributive pattern more than 
anything else. Besides, not everyone can have the required information about what kind 
of actions can upset the pattern.  
 
 When talking particularly about propositions of Rawls’ justice theory, Nozick’s 
arguments focus on two major kinds of shortcomings, first those which are related to 
unrealistic interpretations of social life, second those which intervene to individual 
liberties. For instance, according to Nozick, ‘difference principle’ which is the backbone 
of Rawlsian socioeconomic distribution is totally unrealistic. He underlines that 
individuals who constitute a social unity, do not accept to devote their resources to 
maximizing the position of the least well-off and the opposite is unthinkable even for 
families.  
“... [I]ts (difference principle’s) inappropriateness as a governing principle even 
within a family of individuals who love one another. Should a family devote its 
resources to maximizing the position of its least well off and least talented child, 
holding back the other children or using resources for their education and 
development only if they will follow a policy through their life-times of 
maximizing the position of their least fortunate sibling? Surely no. How then can 
this even be considered as the appropriate policy for enforcement in the wider 
policy?” (Nozick, 1974, p. 167) 
 
Besides, taxation which is considered to be a legitimate tool for supplying funds to 
redistributive system is against individual liberties, especially taxation of earnings from 
labor, for Nozick, is on a par with forced labor. (Nozick, 1974, p. 168) 
 
As presented so far, Nozick is against all sort of distributive justice view, 
Rawlsian ‘justice as fairness’ included. On the other hand, he proposes a minimal justice 
view which complies with his ‘minimal state theory’. According to him, justice is about 
the way in which exchanges take place among free individuals (Nozick, 1974, p. 150), 
and it is so simple to check if justice is intact. He calls his theory as “theory of justice in 
holdings’ and it is built on three principles which are formulated rather intuitively. First 
is about the ways in which things that were not previously possessed by anyone can be 
acquired, second is about the legitimate transfer of possessions among different parties, 
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and the last one is about the necessity to rectify injustices that occur due to violation of 
the terms laid down by the first two principles. Then Nozick adds, “if each person's 
holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 
150) However, a detailed explanation of these principles and criticisms towards them 
will not be presented in our present study. The key point here is the reduction of justice 
issue to inter-individual actions, hence to micro level. In post-Rawlsian era, Nozick’s 
view had a significant impact on the champions of libertarianism, who intend to 
minimize macro-level interventions for the sake of individual freedoms.  
 
 
2.1.3 Communitarian Critiques of Liberal Justice 
 
 
Political theory literature encompasses many different views pointing out the  
shortcomings of the liberal theory, which is assumed to represent the mentality of world 
order, or even provide rational justifications for it. From 1980s onwards, these criticisms 
had a change in character. Amy Gutmann describes the change that anti-liberal critiques 
underwent as follows:  
“Whereas the earlier critics were inspired by Marx, the recent critics are 
inspired by Aristotle and Hegel. The Aristotelian idea that justice is rooted in "a 
community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for 
man and the good of that community" explicitly informs Alasdair Maclntyre in 
his criticism of John Rawls and Robert Nozick for their neglect of desert; I and 
Charles Taylor in his attack on "atomistic" liberals who "try to defend ... the 
priority of the individual and his rights over society.” (Gutmann, 1985, p. 308) 
 
Regarding the change presented above, this section has a twin-foci: on the one hand a 
compact review of communitarian critiques against liberal justice theories; on the other 
hand a brief presentation of an alternative distributive justice theory which is well aware 
of the major communitarian critiques directed to preceding liberal distributive justice 
theories. The former will be built on the writings of MacIntyre and Sandel, two 
protagonists of communitarian camp in liberal-communitarian camp; while the latter 
will denote the key points of Walzer’s idea of ‘complex equality’. 
 
 
2.1.3.1 Alasdair MacIntyre 
 
 MacIntyre’s critique of liberal justice theories can be presented in two sections: 
first one is about what these theories neglect, and second one is about what they fall 
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short of realizing despite their objectives. According to MacIntyre, both Rawls’ and 
Nozick’s theories represent and reproduce two views which we can hear from opponents 
of a fiscal debate in our daily lives. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 249) In that sense these 
theories reflect the mentality of two different citizens having two different justice views 
in line with their life plans. The first one, who is expected to go for Nozick’s justice 
theory is described as follows: 
“A, who may own a store or be a police officer or a construction worker, has 
struggled to save enough from his earnings to buy a small house, to send his 
children to the local college, to pay for some special type of medical care for his 
parents. He now finds all of his projects threatened by raising taxes. He regards 
this threat to his projects as unjust, he claims to have a right to what he has 
earned and that nobody else has a right to take away what he acquired 
legitimately and to which he has a just title.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 244) 
 
The second one, B, whom Nozick considers to be defender of Rawls’ ‘justice as 
fairness’ is probably a social worker or someone with inherited wealth and he is 
assumed to be struck by the inequalities in the distribution of wealth, income and 
opportunity. Besides, he is particularly worried about the poor, who is unable to take 
actions to overcome the hardships that they face due to this unjust distribution. As a 
result, 
“He believes more generally that all inequality stands in need of justification and 
that the only possible justification for inequality is to improve the condition of 
the poor and the deprived – by, for example, fostering economic growth. He 
draws the conclusion that in present circumstances redistributive taxation which 
will finance welfare and the social services is what justice demands.” 
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 245) 
 
According to MacIntyre, present pluralist cultures are devoid of any rational criterion 
for deciding between these two claims. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 246) What Rawls and 
Nozick do is merely reproducing these incompatible views of justice through some 
internally consistent theories and therefore they fail to provide a legitimate justification 
for what they propose to be preferred over any other view. Their common failure is the 
fact that they refuse to make any reference to desert11 in their account of justice. 
                                                 
11 “Nonetheless there is something important, if negative, which Rawls’s account shares 
with Nozick’s. Neither of them make any reference to desert in their account of 
justice, nor could they consistently do so. […] What A complains of on his own 
behalf is not merely that he is entitled to what he has earned, but that he deserves it in 
virtue of his life of hard work, what B complains of on behalf of the poor and 
deprived is that their poverty and deprivation is undeserved and therefore 
unwarranted.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 249) 
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However, MacIntyre underlines that A and B’s justice claims do actually stem from 
specific understandings of desert and no theory can bridge the gap between such claims 
of justice which diverge substantially, in case it does not take into account the moral 
foundations which they originate from. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 249) 
 
 MacIntyre emphasizes that common assumptions and premises of both Nozick’s 
and Rawls’ theories are related to a particular conception of ‘society’. In both accounts, 
society is considered merely as the aggregation of individuals. Despite some differences 
about the way in which the attributes of ‘individual’ affect the outcome of their theories 
–the basis for Nozick is a set of basic rights, while it is prudent rationality for Rawls- 
individual’s role in the making of both Nozick’s and Rawls’ theory of justice is clearly 
prioritized over the impact of society.  
“Individuals are thus in both accounts primary and society secondary, and the 
identification of individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the 
construction of any moral or social bonds between them. But we have already 
seen that the notion desert is at home only in the context of a community whose 
primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and of the 
good of that community and where individuals identify their primary interests 
with reference to goods.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 250) 
 
MacIntyre states that individualism which is at the heart of liberal theories such as 
Nozick’s and Rawls’ theories of justice is carried out by an established tradition of 
thought, which dates back to Hobbes’, Locke’s and Machiavelli’s writings. This 
tradition is built on the refusal of ‘community’ and it is not only an intellectual but also 
a quite practical choice. Despite his strong criticisms to Marxism, MacIntyre agrees 
with Marx who argues that modern societies are built on conflict. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 
253) According to MacIntyre, rejection of ‘community’ in modern liberal theories and 
their contemporary successors has been an attempt to control the conflict between 
communities and their moral traditions. Liberal modern state, in line with these theories, 
is built on the idea of conflict and it adopts the function of appeasement, to reduce 
conflict. For instance, institutions like Supreme Court were implemented to sustain 
peace within the society, which may fall apart due to incompatible principles arising 
from disparate moral traditions.  
 
 MacIntyre, in his magnum opus Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, carries his 
critical analysis of liberalism one step further and asserts that although liberalism aims 
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at reducing social tension by replacing the value loaded traditions with its value neutral 
understanding of society, it turns itself into a tradition as well. (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 346) 
However the details of this critique will be elaborated in the last chapter, as they will 
provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the social justice claims in women’s 
civil society in Turkey.  
 
 
2.1.3.2 Michael Sandel 
 
 
 Sandel’s criticisms to ‘justice as fairness’ are in line with those of MacIntyre, 
and they can be read in his general analysis of liberalism. Although he believes that a 
serious critique of liberalism is necessary, he underlines that it is a vision that we all live 
by despite its philosophical failure. (Sandel, 1984a) In that sense, his critique on liberal 
justice theories is built on both accounts; on the one hand their theoretical drawbacks, 
on the other hand their compatibility with the present political system which leads to a 
paradoxical perception about daily politics.12 
 
 According to Sandel, Rawlsian theory of justice takes the question of justice out 
of emotional ties which are assumed to bind the individuals in a society and places it at 
the heart of Kantian deontological ethic. He argues that this is -at first sight- a 
‘liberating project’ which proposes a ‘disenchanted world’ devoid of inherent meanings 
which could possibly have decisive impact on the moral judgments of men. (Sandel, 
1984b, p. 168) In that universe, man is left free of any moral premises and he is 
expected to produce his moral principles by his own practical reason. In other words he 
is to determine the rules of social justice only by his own constitutive powers. As Sandel 
clearly puts, “the notion of a universe empty of intrinsic meaning does not, on the 
deontological view, imply a world wholly ungoverned by regulative principles, but 
rather a moral universe inhabited by subjects capable of constituting meaning on their 
own.” (Sandel, 1984b, p. 169) However, he argues that deontological self is not simply 
                                                 
12 “On the one hand, increasing number of citizens view the state as an overly intrusive 
presence, more likely to frustrate their purposes than advance them. And yet, despite 
its unprecendented role in the economy and society, the modern state seems itself 
disempowered, unable effectively to control the domestic economy,  to respond to 
persisting social ills, or to work America’s will in the world.” (Sandel, 1984a, p. 92) 
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liberated, but also disempowered to the point that it is no more able to construct or 
choose its moral premises.  
“What goes behind the veil of ignorance is not a contract or an agreement but if 
anything a kind of discovery; and what goes on in ‘purely preferential choice’ is 
less a choosing of ends than a matching of pre-existing desires, undifferentiated 
as to worth, with the best available means of satisfying them. For the parties of 
original position, as for the parties to ordinary deliberative rationality, the 
liberating moment fades before it arrives; the sovereign subject is left at sea in 
the circumstances it was thought to command.” (Sandel, 1984b, pp. 170-171) 
 
Deontological self, as described above, according to Sandel is left in a state of 
helplessness, which stems from a conception of self, devoid of constitutive attachments 
such as being members of a family or community or nation or people, bearers of a 
history, sons and daughters of a revolution, and citizens of a republic. “To imagine a 
person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally 
free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral 
depth.”  (Sandel, 1984b, p. 172)  
 
Sandel elucidates the crisis of deontological self, under the concept of 
‘unencumbered self’ as well. He denotes that individuals are considered to be members 
of community in the cooperative sense, which is more or less taken as a membership in 
a voluntary association. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 86) In that context, constitutive aspect of 
community is totally ignored for the sake of deontological liberation which seeks the 
complete control of rational individual during his choice-based decision of justice, 
prioritizing rights over any kind of good dictated by community itself. Sandel takes it as 
an exhilarating but improbable promise. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 87) Then he once again goes 
back to Rawls’ theory of justice. Sandel claims that difference principle which justifies 
the unequal distribution of wealth and income on the one hand, and asks for the 
maximum possible for the worst-off on the other hand, cannot be supported by a merely 
cooperative conception of community where unencumbered individuals hang together 
without any sense of identity. This problem which Rawlsian liberal justice faces leads to 
a dilemma, because; 
“What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some way of 
identifying those among whom the assets I bear are properly regarded as 
common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally 
engaged to begin with. But as we have seen, the constitutive alms and 
attachments that would save and situate the difference principle are precisely the 
ones denied to the liberal self; the moral encumbrances and antecedent 
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obligations they imply would undercut the priority of right.” (Sandel, 1984a, p. 
90) 
 
For Sandel, the liberal vision is not morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of 
community, namely its constitutive aspect, which it officially rejects. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 
91)  
 
Sandel wants to go one step further and claims that a similar problem can be 
observed in the practical extension of liberal vision as well. At that point Sandel 
analyzes American politics, which he considers to be the operationalization of liberal 
vision.  He underlines that the project of ‘national republic’, which united liberalism 
with the national idea, has failed and this failure can be traced back to the mid-twentieth 
century. Therefore, American public philosophy has shifted from the quest for common 
purposes at nation level, to a scheme of fair procedures; from a politics of good to a 
politics of right; in general to a ‘procedural republic’. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 93) Now 
American politics, Sandel argues, should be perceived as a vast machine run by 
judiciary and bureaucracy which focuses on the protection of rights of the citizens, 
whose choices are prioritized but cannot be reflected in political arena, due to the 
ineffectiveness of legislatures and political parties. In other words, institutions and 
mechanisms, which are responsible for the maintenance of individual rights, do not 
leave enough room for the exercise of political will generating from the bearers of these 
cherished rights.  
“As bearers of rights, where rights are trumps, we think of ourselves as freely 
choosing, individual selves, unbound by obligations antecedent to rights, or to 
the agreements we make. And yet, as citizens of the procedural republic that 
secures these rights, we find ourselves implicated willy-nilly in a formidable 
array of dependencies and expectations we did not choose and increasingly 
reject.” (Sandel, 1984a, p. 94) 
 
In that sense, Sandel claims that politics retreats from its major role which is the quest 
for good in common, (Sandel, 1984b, p. 176) due to disempowerment of citizens in 
procedural democracy, which can be read in line with the one which we observe in the 
main assumptions of liberal theory, fully adopted by Rawlsian theory of justice.  
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2.1.3.3 Michael Walzer: Reconsidering distribution with respect to communitarian 
criticisms 
 
 
 Walzer’s theory of justice bridges the gap between distributive justice concerns 
and communitarian critiques against them. In other words, Walzer’s “Spheres of 
Justice” is an attempt to converge the legitimate claims of both liberal and 
communitarian camp on question of distributive justice. Regarding our present effort, it 
is necessary to reveal how ‘community’ finds place in Walzer’s account of justice; and 
to present the major propositions of his distributive justice which is built on an equal 
concern for ‘equality’ and ‘plurality’. 
 
 Walzer’s theory of justice, which is to be called as ‘spherical justice’ from now 
on, takes communitarian critiques of liberalism although Walzer himself considers 
himself as a liberal theoretician. (Walzer, 1990) Therefore, claiming a liberal standpoint 
he wants to analyze communitarian arguments in order to foster a liberal response 
which is aware of the legitimate concerns that lead to these criticisms. To this end he 
builds the backbone of his analysis on two major arguments which seem to contradict 
with each other despite some plausible observations that they stem from. The first one 
emphasizes that liberalism due to its conception of society –aggregation of rational 
rights bearers having no common tradition or perception of good life- leads to a 
fragmentation, creating “an artificial and ahistorical union out of a multitude of isolated 
selves” in practice (Walzer, 1990, p. 9) The second one argues that society is not what 
liberal theory assumes at all, and it provides us with a false representation of reality.   
“Liberal theory distorts this reality and, insofar as we adopt the theory, deprives 
us of any ready access to our own experience of communal embeddedness.[...] 
The assumption here is that we are in fact persons and that we are in fact bound 
together.” (Walzer, 1990, p. 10) 
 
In order to elucidate these arguments, the question that Walzer directs to 
communitarians can be summarized as follows: Does liberalism succeed in representing 
the nature of social connections which he argues for, or does it misrepresent the way in 
which persons attain social connections among themselves in reality? According to 
Walzer, answering both questions in the affirmative would be inconsistent. However 
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Walzer argues that both criticisms are partially right and in case they are treated 
correctly they can extend the horizon of liberal vision. This is what he calls 
‘communitarian correction of liberalism’. 
“Liberalism is a self-subverting doctrine; for that reason, it really does require 
periodic communitarian correction. But it is not a particularly helpful form of 
correction to suggest that liberalism is literally incoherent or that it can be 
replaced by some preliberal or antiliberal community waiting somehow just 
beneath the surface or just beyond the horizon. Nothing is waiting; American 
communitarians have to recognize that there is no one out there but separated, 
rights-bearing, voluntarily associating, freely speaking, liberal selves. It would 
be a good thing, though, if we could teach those selves to know themselves as 
social beings, the historical products of, and in part the embodiments of, liberal 
values. For the communitarian correction of liberalism cannot be anything other 
than a selective reinforcement of those same values or, to appropriate the well-
known phrase of Michael Oakeshott, a pursuit of the intimations of community 
within them.” (Walzer, 1990, p. 15) 
 
As a result, Walzer aims to embrace legitimate claims for the notion of ‘community’ in 
a liberal context. How does then Walzer accommodate ‘community’ in liberal socities? 
There, he refers to Rawls’ account of ‘social union’. “At its best, the liberal society is 
the social union of social unions that John Rawls described: a pluralism of groups 
bonded by shared ideas of toleration and democracy.” (Walzer, 1990, p. 16) The idea of 
social unions, uniting individuals in a much stronger sense  than the liberal society does, 
in terms of loyalties and common conceptions of ‘good’, has a crucial importance for 
Walzer’s spherical justice. Because Walzer succeeds in bridging the gap between 
liberalism and communitarianism by revitalizing ‘communal embeddedness’ in a liberal 
context by referring to Rawlsian ‘social union.  
 
 According to Walzer, preceding distributive justice theories were built on some 
hypothetical scenarios in which people were taken as ideally rational men and they were 
forced to choose universal precepts of social justice. Nevertheless, this method, Walzer 
argues, is quite problematic, and it is not because this hypothetical deliberation which 
seeks a common charter of justice is inconceivable to ordinary people. What people are 
really interested is to find out what would individuals like them choose, who are 
situated as they are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing. (Walzer, 
1983, p. 5) In that sense Walzer, underlines that ‘justice’ is a human construction and it 
is not only conceived and applied differently from one social context to another, but 
also goods, values attributed to them, and mechanisms of distribution are various. As 
28 
 
Walzer’s perspective assumes a wide array of goods that differ from ‘land’ to ‘a 
beautiful sunset’, he reckons plurality of distribution mechanisms and criteria of 
distribution as well.  Given the circumstances of distribution, a realistic quest for justice 
should not be blind to plurality as a fact of social life. Thus, Walzer adopts pluralism as 
an intrinsic component of ‘spherical justice’. 
 
 Although goods are distributed, with respect to their significance in different 
social groups, and in accordance with rules anticipated by different mechanisms and 
criteria of distribution, that plurality has been violated systematically throughout 
history. (Walzer, 1983, p. 10) Violation occurs in two levels: on the one hand in goods 
to be distributed, on the other hand in agents of distribution. According to Walzer, if a 
good becomes convertible to many others, and if a group of individuals seizes the 
control of the distribution of this convertible good, that is to be perceived as a threat to 
plurality of agents of distribution. Under these circumstances, convertible good is a 
‘dominant good’, and the group which seized control of dominant good is a monopoly. 
Walzer, referring to Marx, stresses that distribution is what social conflict is all about; 
and a just society can be maintained if an only if these violations of plurality are 
avoided. (Walzer, 1983, p. 11) 
 
 ‘Spherical justice’ proposes ‘complex equality’13 as the surest way for the 
protection of plurality. (Walzer, 1983, p. 17) In that perspective, it is important to avoid 
dominance and keep plurality of good intact by reinforcing distinct spheres of justice 
where every good is distributed according to rules laid by particular social unions.  
History has been the scene of many attempts of monopoly and several groups managed 
to seize the control of fundamental distribution mechanisms illegitimately, albeit 
temporarily. For instance, in feudal era ‘land’ became the dominant good, hence 
landlords tried to perpetuate the dominance of ‘land’ in order to maintain their unjust 
power over other groups. Ideologies, which provide justification for the perseverance of 
particular patterns of unjust distribution, are the most important tools which monopolies 
having the control of dominant good use over those who cannot intervene to the process 
                                                 
13 Concept of complex equality is proposed by Walzer, in response to ‘simple equality’, 
which seeks equal distribution of goods among individuals, by avoiding monopolies. 
Walzer argues that in case ‘dominance’ is not impeded, any good is susceptible to 
become a dominant good, and any group is prone to acquire monopoly through 
imposition of some good as ‘the dominant good’. 
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of distribution. In other words, ideologies are legitimizers of dominance, which Walzer 
considers to be the source of distributive injustices. 
 
Walzer's fundamental thesis for distributive justice does not require the equal 
distribution of social goods within their respective spheres, but these spheres of 
distribution should be kept autonomous, so that the inequality that exists within each 
should not be allowed to translate itself into inequalities within the others. For instance, 
if we take academia as a sphere of distribution having its own rules of distribution, and 
its own criteria for distribution –such as desert or merit- its internal dynamics require 
non-intervention of another sphere, such as market built on free exchange. 
 
 To conclude, what we see in Walzer’s ‘spherical justice’ is a community-
sensitive distributive justice account. As presented previously ‘community-
sensitiveness’ of this theory is not the result of a solitary meditation performed by 
Walzer, the impact of communitarian criticisms against preceding liberal justice 
theories is decisive. Moreover, this impact is not limited to that. The following section, 
where the propositions about politics of recognition are presented, will show another 
contribution of the ‘community debate’ to mainstream justice literature.  
 
 
2.2.   Embracing ‘Recognition’ in  Mainstream Justice Literature 
 
 
 History of man is history of injustices; therefore it has also been a scene for 
various claims of justice. Different communities, uniting individuals sharing the same 
identities, were subject to perpetuated injustices bolstered by various practices of 
humiliation, exclusion or simply indifference either planned and executed by political 
authority, or justified and carried out by some other individuals who do not belong to 
these communities. However it is important to note that not all these injustices can be 
perceived or avoided by merely focusing on socioeconomic inequalities. In that sense, 
the burden of stigmatized identities has been critically evaluated in different disciplines 
such as philosophy, literature and psychoanalysis. As the scope of the present study 
requires us to focus on a particular literature, namely contemporary political theory on 
social justice, we will try to present the way in which ‘identity’ and ‘recognition’ is 
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initiated to the mainstream social justice literature. Given that purpose, forthcoming 
section is built on major ideas presented by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka who 
brought the concerns for ‘recognition’ to social justice debate. 
 
  
2.2.1 Politics of Recognition: Bringing ‘identity’ to mainstream political theory  
 
 
 Charles Taylor is one of the most influential thinkers who try to give a 
satisfactory meaning to identity question, with his analyses which do not only focus on 
the social dimension of the issue, but also consider intimate dimension of the identity or 
in other words of “self”. Taylor's magnum opus is ‘Sources of the Self’ where he 
presents evolution and formation of modern identity through major changes, which 
occurred -mostly- due to the impact of some great minds of Western civilization. 
According to Taylor, modern individual has acquired an independence from moral 
strains that tied people to the moral obligations of the medieval or antique society. Three 
sources of the modern self, namely inwardness, affirmation of ordinary life and voice of 
nature,14 point out on the one hand the collapse of the ancient system of transcendence, 
on the other hand the emergence of individual identity. (Taylor, 1989) 
 
 That great change, which Western societies underwent, had a significant 
outcome which made modern preoccupation with identity and recognition inevitable 
and that can be explained in two levels. First, social hierarchies of ancient regime, 
defining people’s status in society on the basis of honor, collapses; which means that 
ready-made identities which people born into have no intrinsic value anymore. The 
system of honor is replaced by the notion of ‘dignity’ which envisages equal recognition 
of human beings regardless of any hierarchical order. (Taylor, 1992, p. 26) Second, in 
line with the emergence of universal dignity, ‘individualized identity’ becomes an 
                                                 
14 ‘Inwardness’ refers to an introspection for finding out the meaning of life. 
Montaigne's and Descartes' works which underline the individuality are taken as the 
most significant examples for the emergence of the idea of inwardness. ‘Affirmation 
of ordinary life’ is about a significant shift within the society and it is closely related 
to the Christian Reformation, that emphasized the importance of profane dimensions 
of human life, such as work and marriage. Personal life, which was conceived as a 
fringe issue, became one of the most important concerns of modern individuals. 
‘Voice of nature’ is discovery of an internal voice that guides the acts of individuals. 
Individual's expressions and acts now have a value in themselves regardless of their 
contact with transcendence. 
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important asset. Individualized identity pushes modern individual to a quest for 
authenticity, to be understood as a search for an inner voice, which is expected to define 
and determine what the identity of each individual is to be. (Taylor, 1992, p. 31) 
Although this process seems to be a mere introspection, a solitary journey, which does 
not require any contact with the outside, more precisely ‘others’, Taylor underlines that 
identity itself has a dialogical character which does not leave the others outside at all. 
(Taylor, 1992, p. 32) He defends this idea of dialogue by considering even the most 
extreme cases: “In the case of the hermit, interlocutor is God.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 34) 
Then he concludes: 
“Thus my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in 
isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, 
with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated 
identity gives a new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially 
depends on my dialogical relations with others.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 34) 
 
  
As indicated above, ‘recognition’ is a question of great importance in the 
modern era of individualized identities, because individualized identities do not enjoy 
the recognition a priori. They have to win it through exchange, and they can fail. 
(Taylor, 1991, p. 48) However, on the social plane15, equal recognition is not only 
appropriate for a healthy democratic society, but necessary. 
“Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it, according to a 
widespread modern view [...] The projection of an inferior or demeaning image 
on another can actually distort and oppress, and to the extent the image is 
internalized. Not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and 
discussions of multiculturalism are undergirded by the premise that the 
withholding can be a form of oppression.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 36) 
 
Charles Taylor, elaborates further on the content and the scope of recognition claims. 
Social aspect of ‘recognition’ is built on a ‘principle of fairness’, in order to respond 
equally to demands for everyone to develop their own identity. In that sense, claims 
regarding gender, race, culture and sexual orientation can all be evaluated on the basis 
of universal recognition of difference. (Taylor, 1991, p. 50) Moreover, not only claims 
but also administrative practices responding to such claims are subject to theoretical 
                                                 
15 According to Charles Taylor, recognition takes place in two levels, on the one hand in 
‘intimate level’ which is characterized by interpersonal relations, more specifically 
love relations; on the other hand in ‘social level’ which gives recognition a social and 
political dimension.  
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debate. Especially administrative practices which show that these claims go beyond the 
writings of the critical or feminist writers trigger a lively debate in mainstream political 
theory as well. In order to analyze the ideas in opposition to the wave of recognition, 
Charles Taylor utilizes some real life examples such as the legislation for the survival of 
the French-speaking community in Quebec16, and the debates on multicultural 
curricula17. 
 According to Taylor, administrative measures taken by government of Quebec 
are not compatible at all with the assumptions of the liberal theory, which strictly 
prioritizes individual rights. In order to provide substantial evidence showing how 
mainstream liberalism –which he calls ‘difference-blind’ liberalism later on- would 
oppose to the decisions of government of Quebec, Taylor refers to Dworkin:  
“Dworkin claims that a liberal society is one that as a society adopts no 
particular substantive view about the ends of life. [...] A liberal society must 
remain neutral, on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they 
see things, citizens deal with each other and the state deals equally with all. [...] 
But a society with collective goals like Quebec’s violates this model. It is 
axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of French 
culture in Quebec is a good. [...] Policies aimed at survival actively seek to 
create members of the community, for instance, in their assuring that future 
generations continue to identify as French-speakers.” (Taylor, 1992, pp. 56-59) 
 
Taylor’s arguments against this neutralist liberalism can be gathered under three 
headings. First, a society with strong collective goals can be liberal in case it respects 
diversity, allowing those who do not share the common goals adequate safeguards for 
                                                 
16 “For instance, Quebec has passed a number of laws in the field of language. One 
regulates who can send their children to English-language schools (not francophones 
or immigrants); another requires that businesses with more than fifty employees be 
run in French; a third outlaws commercial signage in any language other than 
French. In other words, restrictions have been placed on Quebeckers by their 
government, in the name of their collective goal of survival, which in other Canadian 
communities might easily disallowed by the virtue of the Charter. [Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms]”  (Taylor, 1992, pp. 52-53) 
 
17 “The main locus of this debate is the world of education in a broad sense. One 
important focus is university humanities departments, where demands are made to 
alter, enlarge, or scrap the “canon” of accredited authors on the grounds the one 
presently favored consists almost entirely of “dead white males.” A greater place 
ought to be made for women, and for people of non-European races and cultures. A 
second focus is the secondary schools, where an attempt is being made, for instance, 
to develop Afrocentric curricula for pupils in mainly black schools.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 
65) 
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the enjoyment of basic rights. Even though pursuit of these objectives together, may 
cause tension, it is not impossible at all. (Taylor, 1992, p. 59) Second, neutrality of 
‘difference-blind’ liberalism can be contested on the one hand due to its limited capacity 
to accommodate diverse cultures, on the other hand its historical origins that are directly 
linked to Christian social heritage.18 Third, shortcomings of the purely procedural 
justice which liberalism finds sufficient for overcoming injustices require us to take 
supplementary measures. As the last argument about procedural justice is firmly related 
to our present inquiry, it is better to put an emphasis on it. 
 
 Taylor underlines that procedural justice is overrated by liberal theory, in order 
to build the whole liberal social system on the basis of rights, and to preclude the notion 
of common good. From a liberal perspective, existence of a common good itself is 
considered as a threat to equal recognition of individualized identities.  
“Indeed, it might even be argued that any political society based on some strong 
notion of the common good will of itself by this very fact endorse the lives of 
some people (those who support its notion of the common good) over others 
(those who seek other forms of good), and thereby deny equal recognition. 
Something like this, we saw, is the fundamental premiss of a liberalism of 
neutrality, which has many supporters today.” (Taylor, 1991, p. 51) 
 
However, what liberalism proposes by limiting its account of recognition within 
procedural justice fails to support the ‘equality’ aspect of ‘equal recognition’. 
Liberalism, even it gives up its insistence on difference-blindness, cannot fully provide 
necessary conditions for recognition. Neutrality of liberalism can only ‘accommodate’ 
or ‘tolerate’ differences. Therewith Taylor argues that uniting differences requires some 
properties which are of value, such as a horizon of significance shared by everyone.  
 
                                                 
18 “For mainstream Islam, there is no question of separating politics and religion the 
way we have come to expect in Western liberal society. Liberalism is not a possible 
meeting ground for all, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and 
quite incompatible with other ranges. Moreover, as many Muslims are well aware, 
Western liberalism is not so much an expression of the postreligious outlook that 
happens to be popular among liberal intellectuals as a more organic outgrowth of 
Christianity – at least as seen from the alternative vantage point of Islam. The 
division of church and state goes back to the earliest days of Christian civilization. 
The early forms of the separation were very different from ours, but the basis was 
laid for modern developments. The very term secular was originally part of the 
Christian vocabulary.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 62) 
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Apart from difference-blind liberalism or liberalism of neutrality, Charles Taylor 
tries to defend his proposition of ‘equal recognition’ from the ‘enemies of 
multiculturalism’. (Taylor, 1992, p. 71) The major question of the enemies of 
multiculturalism is the scope of equal recognition, more precisely, the limits of ‘equal 
recognition’ with respect to a yardstick according to which the cultures to be embraced 
are evaluated. This question becomes more concrete in terms of academic standards, 
while facing the debate on curricular changes in order to embrace cultural diversity and 
to overcome existing Eurocentrism. Taylor concludes that the only plausible solution is 
presumption of equal worth, because there can be no concrete measures independent of 
the standards of any culture. He emphasizes that this presumption can be morally 
justified, without need for any complementary reasoning. 
 
 Charles Taylor’s account on politics of recognition stems from a very rich 
philosophical analysis on modern identity. Taking recognition as a crucial need due to 
dialogical character of the identity, but not for the sake of ‘community’ itself, he adds a 
new dimension to intellectual debate between liberals and communitarians. According 
to Taylor merely procedural justice account of difference-blind liberalism, falls short of 
providing enough room for plausible recognition claims. In that sense, he argues that 
multiculturalism, which guarantees equal worth for every identity and community, and 
basic individual liberties provide a good alternative to Western liberal societies.  
 
  
2.2.2. Will Kymlicka: An inquiry into the liberal justification for recognition 
 
 
 Kymlicka’s theoretical account for the question of group rights is related to his 
discomfort about the divergence between communitarians and liberals. While the latter 
respond to claims about collective rights, indifferently or even hostilely, the former 
direct their criticisms to liberalism in general which, according to Kymlicka, can 
accommodate legitimate claims for recognition. In that sense, Kymlicka tries to stay 
within the liberal paradigm, by taking communitarian considerations for group rights 
into account. Therefore, on the one hand he seeks to attain a ‘rightly-understood’ 
liberalism; on the other hand he reformulates claims about group rights so as to be 
compatible with liberal perspective.  
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The groups which Kymlicka deal with the most are cultural groups, in the 
context of cultural diversity. He divides these groups into two, first those which arise 
from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures 
united in a larger society - which he calls ‘national minorities’, second those which arise 
from individual and familial immigration, which he calls ‘ethnic groups’. (Kymlicka, 
1995, p. 11) He clearly distinguishes these groups from ‘new social movements’, such 
as associations on movements of gays, women, the poor, the disabled, which are often 
marginalized by national societies or ethnic groups.19  
 
Given his aim to articulate claims for recognition in liberal paradigm, Kymlicka 
considers political aspect of the issue in terms of rights. As a result, he classifies group 
differentiated rights under three headings: self-government rights, polyethnic rights20, 
and special representations rights. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 31) Although claims of cultural 
groups can be accepted in a liberal society through their reformulation in the context of 
rights as indicated above, liberals mostly tend to ignore claims for group rights, as they 
think that individual rights provided by liberal societies, such as freedom to associate 
with others, suffice to overcome injustices related to group identity and leave enough 
room for the survival of cultural groups.21 Besides, they claim that any state intervention 
                                                 
19 Although he focuses on the rights of the ‘cultural groups’ in general, he is not blind to 
the demands of ‘new social movements’ in order to guarantee the freedom that they 
ask for and which is necessary for his liberal account of group rights. His concerns 
about ‘new social movements’ are related to the concept of ‘internal restrictions’ 
which is an indispensible component of his theory in order to accommodate group 
rights in a liberal setting. 
 
20 Kymlicka pays a particular attention to ‘polyethnic rights’ as he thinks that these 
rights are those which can be defended for majority of cultural groups without facing 
significant challenge from the champions of contemporary liberalism, because these 
rights usually intend to promote integration of cultural groups in liberal society. 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 31) 
 
21 “Many liberals believe that people’s interest in cultural membership is adequately 
protected by the common rights of citizenship, and that any further measures to 
protect this interest are illegitimate. They argue that a system of universal individual 
rights accommodates cultural differences, by allowing each person the freedom to 
associate with others in the pursuit of shared religious or ethnic practices. Freedom 
of association enables people from different backgrounds to pursue their distinctive 
ways of life without interference. Every individual is free to create, or join various 
associations, and to seek new adherents from them, in the ‘cultural marketplace’. 
Every way of life is free to attracte adherents, and if same ways of life are unable to 
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to ‘cultural marketplace” is illegitimate and it contradicts with the tenets of liberalism 
which do not give state any right to intervene to citizens’ cultural preferences or their 
views of good life. However Kymlicka argues that this view is not only mistaken but 
actually incoherent, because; 
“Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and 
state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating and supporting 
the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state 
unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages 
others.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 108) 
 
Besides, after claiming that individual autonomy and self identity are tied to 
membership in one’s societal culture, Kymlicka underlines the necessity for developing 
a theory of the rights of minority cultures as a task of any liberal theory. (Kymlicka, 
1995, p. 128) Then, how come liberals prefer to ignore claims of cultural groups? 
Kymlicka gives quite a number of explanations about this neglect. Nevertheless, it 
would suffice to mention the most critical ones under two headings.  
 
First, Kymlicka relates the liberal insularity towards group rights to a “recent 
illiberal deviation from long-established liberal practices”. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 50) 
According to Kymlicka, this deviation can be traced back to the World War II. Before 
the World War I and during the interwar period, minority rights topped the liberal 
agenda, but the “optimistic liberal view did not survive World War II” because of the 
security deficit that they provoke or might provoke in the future. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 
213) This deviation seems to be perpetuated since then and “when contemporary 
liberals have addressed these issues –often in brief pronouncements or parentheticals 
asides – they have tended to recite simplistic formulas about ‘non-discrimination’ or 
‘benign neglect’ that cannot do justice to the complexities involved.” (Kymlicka, 1995, 
p. 49)  
 
Second, criticisms against liberalism fostered a false image for liberalism, which 
depicted it as an inevitably difference-blind theory. Especially, communitarian criticisms 
                                                                                                                                               
maintain or gain the voluntary adherence of people that may be unfortunate, but it is 
not unfair. On this view, giving political recognition or support to particular cultural 
practices or associations is unnecessary and unfair. It is unnecessary, because a 
valuable way of life will have no difficulty attracting adherents. And it is unfair, 
because it subsidizes some people’s choices at the expense of others.” (Kymlicka, 
1995, p. 107) 
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of liberalism take the liberal tradition as the inheritor of a ‘hollow’ understanding of 
self, which does not pay attention to the role of community and culture which indeed 
have a decisive role in the formation of individuals’ identity. Kymlicka in order to argue 
against this critique, which he considers illegitimate, refers to Rawlsian justice theory. 
Rawls, with his emphasis on plurality of ‘good life’ opens up a horizon which does not 
only tolerate but also encourage different ways of acquiring it. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 34) 
Although Rawls' theory of justice does not really entail to minority rights immediately, 
Kymlicka does not consider Rawls' position as an intentional indifference. ‘Misplaced 
criticisms’ about the liberal account of neutrality fail to distinguish or obfuscate the 
hypothetical and normative aspects of liberal theories. Kymlicka once again refers to 
Rawls, and he tries to interpret Rawls' “original position” -which is a hypothetical 
condition of discussion and bargaining to find out basic principles of justice among 
individuals who leave all their intentions, identities, knowledge about their 
socioeconomic status…etc-  and points out the instrumental character of this concept. 
Kymlicka argues that Rawls’ need for leaving all self-knowledge aside, behind the veil 
of ignorance, proves that what is hidden behind does actually matter in determining 
one’s preferences and position on social issues. Liberal theories which seem to be 
mingling with impossible idealistic designs, do not actually trivialize individuals’ 
identities and cultures. On the contrary, they are well aware of their importance.  
 
  Apart from these reasons which indicate that liberalism –theoretically- can 
accommodate considerations for special group rights, Kymlicka emphasizes that a 
liberal minority rights approach provides liberal theory with two possible advantage 
against challenging paradigms: on the one hand, liberalism will prove that it is capable 
of producing a theoretical linkage between ‘individual’ and ‘community’, on the other 
hand it will avoid the risk of losing out in case of a trade-off between liberalism and 
minority rights. (Kymlicka, 1989)  
 
Kymlicka evaluates collective aspect of minority rights with respect to problem 
of justice. An individual's cultural membership is an arbitrary fact of birth. For instance, 
being an Inuit in Canada defines the circumstances into which a person is born, and if 
that person faces a set of socioeconomic inconveniences due to his cultural membership, 
which is often the case, liberalism should intervene to overcome these inconveniences 
through affirmative action programs. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 182) Thus, in order to 
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minimize the injustice that occurs due to being a member of a disadvantaged cultural 
group in the society, collective minority rights can be granted to the communities that 
are oppressed by the severe inequality.  
 
Kymlicka underlines that culture and wealth are not commensurable. (Kymlicka, 
1989, p. 193) Therefore an efficient intervention against severe inequality does not 
require a trade-off between culture and welfare. Collective cultural rights can be 
perceived as a kind of insurance to avoid culture-related injustices. In case of threat, 
minority communities can be authorized to impose limited restrictions on the 
individuals who are not members. For example, indigenous groups in Canada can 
impose restrictions on the free property right of ‘outsiders’ in their own territory,  in 
order to protect their traditional system of territory management which is officially 
recognized by the state of Canada, because this system is regarded as a legitimate 
mechanism enabling these groups against injustices which they suffer. However, these 
special rights, as given in the example, trigger a crucial question which requires an 
answer to determine their compatibility with liberalism. To what extent special group 
rights can override individual rights, which are indispensible to liberal theory? 
 
Kymlicka classifies special group rights with respect to duties they generate: 
those which bind the individuals within the group impose ‘internal restrictions’, those 
which seek the protection of cultural groups from the impact of external decisions of the 
larger society require ‘external protection’. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 35) According to 
Kymlicka, the former interest the liberal perspective the most, because they arouse 
concerns about the members of group whose role can be reduced to reluctant obedience 
by the impositions of group. At that point Kymlicka underlines that special group rights 
cannot be accommodated in a liberal theory unconditionally.  
“I have argued that they must respect two constraints: minority rights should not 
allow one group to dominate other groups; and they should not enable a group to 
oppress its own members. In other words, liberals should seek to ensure that 
there is equality between groups, and freedom and equality within groups. 
Within these limits, minority rights can play a valuable role within a broader 
theory of liberal justice.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 194) 
 
Kymlicka argues that his account on difference sensitive liberal justice does not only 
broaden the perspective of liberal theory, by embracing the justice claims of cultural 
groups, but also provides a large array of rights recognizing the individual freedoms for 
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all citizens in addition to cultural rights. According to Kymlicka a non-liberal account of 
multiculturalism, assuming that cultural communities are monolithic, such as the ‘millet 
system’ in Ottoman Empire, will fail to grasp the contemporary questions of justice. 
However in case a multicultural theory does not care about individual freedoms, it 
leaves individuals disadvantaged in intra-group controversies. Hence it is indispensable 
to guarantee the liberty rights of individuals within the groups which tend to 
marginalize22 those who do not adopt the ‘good life’ accepted by the majority of the 
members.  
 
 
2.3. Social Justice Reunited: 
Overcoming gender-blindness and dichotomy of redistribution and recognition 
 
 
In the preceding sections, I tried to present the development of mainstream social 
justice literature in two different dimensions, namely socioeconomic and symbolic or 
non-material justice. However, in order to evaluate this literature on women’s claims for 
justice, it is necessary to be aware of its limits and weaknesses in terms of gender 
question. Besides, the conceptual gap between socioeconomic and symbolic justice 
approaches which marked two decades of political theory, requires a reunification to be 
able to respond to gender-related injustices which occur both on socioeconomic and 
cultural planes. In that sense, first, I will briefly present feminist critiques on the 
inadequacy of social justice debate between liberals and communitarians regarding 
women’s oppression and I will continue with an overview of ‘socialist-feminist’ 
literature, which considers socioeconomic and symbolic injustices of equal importance.  
Then, I will present Nancy Fraser’s gender-sensitive attempt for bridging the gap 
between redistributive and symbolic justice claims, staying within the limits of 
mainstream literature. Finally, I will conclude with a crucial question which 
contemporary social justice literature leaves us with: the tension between conflicting 
                                                 
22 Kymlicka’s liberal account of cultural recognition, with an emphasis on internal 
restrictions, tries to protect the claims of ‘new social movements’, which struggle for 
freedom of the individuals who suffer injustices in their cultural groups due to their 
different preferences or life choices. 
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claims of symbolic justice, which mostly leads to a deadlock or a trade-off between 
cultural group rights and remedies against gender injustices.  
 
 
2.3.1. A Feminist Response to Mainstream Social Justice Debate 
 
 
As indicated above, feminist response to contemporary social justice debate can 
be presented under two headings, on the one hand critiques of mainstream justice 
literature; on the other hand genuine contributions from feminist perspective. It is 
important to note that there is no unique perspective that can be treated as the voice of 
feminism on social justice, and feminist literature actually offers a vast array of 
perspectives. (Tong, 1989) In that sense, the review of genuine contributions will be a 
quite selective one, and I will merely focus on ‘socialist feminism’ due to the purpose of 
this study. Socialist feminism, intends to hold both symbolic and socioeconomic aspects 
of gender injustice, thus it is well beyond the dichotomy of redistribution and 
recognition which divides the mainstream social justice literature into two camps.  
 
 
2.3.1.1. Social justice literature: an influential but gender-blind tradition 
 
 
 
According to Susan Moller Okin, major theories of social justice do not take the 
gender injustice into account, as they fail to discover the gendered character of the 
society, which can be followed into the patterns of familial relations. (Okin, 1989, p. 8) 
Okin underlines that this neglect occurs due to the fact that most theories assume the 
traditional gender structured family, without discussing it. Leaving family beyond the 
scope of justice theories is the direct outcome of social thought tradition which is built 
on the distinction between private and public. Although Okin criticizes the convention 
on private-public distinction as the major cause of gender-blind social justice theories, 
she emphasizes that one of the reasons for the neglect of gender was the fact that 
feminist energy in the 1980, to a great extent, argued that ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ were 
masculinist ways of thinking about the morality. (Okin, 1989, p. 15) Given these 
evaluations about the literature in general, Okin analyzes the major contributions in 
social justice and points out the severe problems that they face as well. 
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 Okin starts with Rawls’ theory of justice and argues that it –quite superficially- 
assumes that families are just, and they are ‘private institutions’, to which it is not 
appropriate to apply standards of justice. (Okin, 1989) However, Okin states that gender 
injustice takes place in family. Women are considered to be the only responsible for 
unpaid house works and child rearing, and this responsibility is justified with 
conventional gendered morality, which Rawls does not discover or question. Moreover, 
neglect of familial injustice impairs the whole theory. For instance, participants of 
‘original position’ are considered to be ‘stakeholders’ in income distribution, which is 
never the case in reality, due to gendered division of labor, which excludes women from 
the process of social distribution. (Okin, 1987, p. 50) 
 
 As previously shown in the communitarian critiques of liberal justice theories, 
Rawls has been severely criticized due to his idealistic approach which ignores the 
importance of social contexts, community, and moral significance. Therefore, 
communitarians formulate their theories of justice in response to liberalism, by 
interpreting traditions and values which are rooted in communities. Okin emphasizes 
that rediscovery of ‘context’ in social justice literature has interested many feminist 
theorists and attracted them to communitarian analysis, which later on turned into an 
alliance against masculinist abstraction of liberalism. (Okin, 1989, p. 43) However, for 
Okin, this alliance is merely built on a methodological affinity and political implications 
of a communitarian theory of justice that would not be to the advantage of women. 
(Okin, 1989, p. 44) Because, the traditions and myths which communitarians refer to are  
‘basic building blocks of male domination’. (Okin, 1989, p. 46) For instance; 
“Indeed as I shall show, the tradition that, according to MacIntyre, provides us 
with the best account of justice and rationality compounds the misogyny and 
sexism of the traditions in Western culture that have been most hostile to the full 
humanity of women.” (Okin, 1989, p. 46) 
 
 Just one year after Okin’s analysis of mainstream social justice literature, Iris 
Marion Young builds an elaborate theory of justice, which stems from the shortcomings 
of contemporary theories of justice. According to Young, social justice literature is 
dominated by the distributive paradigm, which tends to focus on the possession of 
material goods and social positions. However, this account of justice is quite 
problematic. On the one hand it often assumes particular institutions and practices as 
given, so accepts them as unavoidable and immutable. On the other hand, it extends the 
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distributive paradigm and intends to deal with non-material goods, such as self-respect, 
power, and honor in the way they do with material goods.23 As a result, theories of 
distribution fail to provide a satisfactory account of justice. Nevertheless, 
communitarian theories of justice built on the critics of the liberalism and welfare 
bureaucracy often associated with redistributive justice paradigm, do not succeed in 
avoiding the failures of distributive paradigm. That perspective, which stems from the 
ideal of community as an alternative vision of social life, argues for the need of mutual 
recognition and identification which can only be fulfilled by a public life with shared 
values. However, Young, in line with Kymlicka’s reserves on the community-based 
justifications of identity politics, emphasizes that the ideal of community also 
suppresses difference among subjects and groups, because “the impulse to community 
often coincides with a desire to preserve identity and in practice excludes others who 
threaten that sense of identity.” (Young, 1990 , pp. 12-13)  
 
 Given these criticisms, Young underlines that a full account of justice is possible 
neither in distributive paradigm, nor in communitarian perspective. Moreover, she 
builds an original theory of justice that seeks the elimination of institutionalized 
domination and oppression, by paying equal attention to the claims of socioeconomic 
and injustices relating to identity. (Young, 1990 , p. 15) However, she moves beyond the 
horizon of mainstream social justice theories, and associates herself with critical social 
theory.24 
                                                 
23 “But this, in my view, is the main problem with the distributive paradigm: it does not 
recognize the limits to the application of a logic of distribution[...] Applying a logic 
of distribution to such goods produces a misleading conception of the issues of 
justice involved. It reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as a 
function of rules and relations than as things.” (Young, 1990 , pp. 24-25)  
  
24 Briefly, a group is oppressed when one or more of the following conditions occurs to 
all or a large portion of its members: (1) the benefits of their work or energy go to 
others without those others reciprocally benefiting them (exploitation); (2) they are 
excluded from participation in major social activities , which in our society means 
primarily a workplace (mariginalization); (3) they live and work under the authority 
of others, and have little work autonomy and authority over others themselves 
(powerlessness): (4) as a group they are stereotyped at the same that their experience 
and situation is invisible in the society in general, and they have little opportunity 
and little audience for the expression of their experience and perspective on social 
events (cultural imperialism); (5) group members suffer random violence and 
harassment motivated by group hatred or fear.” (Young, 1997, p. 262) 
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 Okin and Young’s critiques against contemporary social justice literature overlap 
in terms of their point on its failure to provide a sustainable basis for a gender-sensitive 
theory of justice. Redistributive and communitarian justice paradigms, due to their 
theoretical divergence in general, and insensitivity towards the question of gender in 
particular fall short of realizing their initial purpose. As a result, an account of social 
justice, necessitates re-elaboration of mainstream justice literature. Nancy Fraser’s quest 
for bridging the gap between redistribution and recognition, which I will present 
towards the end of this chapter stems from this necessity pointed out by Okin and 
Young. 
  
 
2.3.1.2. Socialist feminism: gender division of labor and patriarchy 
 
 
 
Socialist feminism has mostly been accused of ambivalence by the champions of 
class struggle and feminists who ignore the impact of socioeconomic injustice in gender 
question.25 However, according to socialist feminists, this ‘ambivalence’ is not about the 
character of their perspective, but about the social reality itself; because women’s 
oppression stems from the combination of patriarchy and capitalism. (Hartmann, 1979, 
p. 165) In that sense combination of Marxist analysis and feminist analysis is considered 
to be inevitable. 
“While Marxist analysis provides essential insight into the laws of historical 
development, and those of capital in particular, the categories of Marxism sex-
blind. Only a specifically feminist analysis reveals the systemic character of 
relations between men and women.” (Hartmann, 1979, pp. 165-166) 
 
Although it is possible to talk about a consensus among socialist feminist theoreticians 
on the necessity of analyzing both socioeconomic and cultural aspects of women’s 
oppression, the ways in which they evaluate two dimensions of gender oppression differ 
                                                 
25 “It is possible to add up Marxism and feminism and call the sum "socialist feminism." 
In fact, this is probably how most socialist feminists most of the time--as a kind of 
hybrid, pushing our feminism in socialist circles, our socialism in feminist circles. 
One trouble with leaving things like that, though, is that it keeps people wondering 
"Well, what is she really?" or demanding of us "What is the principal contradiction." 
These kinds of questions, which sound so compelling and authoritative, often stop us 
in our tracks: "Make a choice!" "Be one or another!" But we know that there is a 
political consistency to socialist feminist. We are not hybrids or fencesitters.” 
(Ehrenreich, 1976) 
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drastically. While Juliette Mitchell underlines ideological character of patriarchy 
referring to psychoanalysis, Heidi Hartmann opposes to Mitchell’s attempt to take the 
question of patriarchy beyond the scope of Marxist materialism, which she thinks 
causes inconsistency.26 Hence, Hartmann insists on the necessity for the study of both 
patriarchy and capitalism with respect to social dynamics. 
“We can usefully define patriarchy as a set of social relations between men, 
which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish or create 
interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate 
women.” (Hartmann, 1979, p. 175)  
 
In that perspective, social aspect of patriarchy can be observed in two practices, first 
exclusion of women from ‘essential productive resources’, such as jobs that pay living 
wages, second restrictions of women’s sexuality. (Hartmann, 1979, p. 176) Even though 
Hartmann intends to keep the conceptual distinction between capitalism and patriarchy, 
she emphasizes that their partnership can be read in particular social practices, such as 
sexual division of labor, which is to the profit of male supremacy and capitalist 
economic sphere. For instance, both capitalism and patriarchy support the survival of 
the family, where women are primarily responsible for housework, and are dependent 
on family as an unavoidable income-pooling unit. In that sense, although capitalism and 
patriarchy require an analytical distinction, they are intertwined in the perpetuation of 
gendered injustice.  
 
 To sum up, socialist feminism claiming that women’s oppression has a 
multidimensional character regarding socioeconomic and social injustices, can be seen 
as the forerunner of Nancy Fraser’s point about the need for bridging the divide in 
social justice theory. However, it is important to note that Fraser’s account is not limited 
to the question of gender. 
 
 
2.3.2. Bridging the ‘Redistribution’ – ‘Recognition’ Gap 
 
 
 Nancy Fraser’s proposition about equal consideration for redistribution and 
recognition is built on two interrelated purposes; first, reuniting the contemporary 
                                                 
26 “Although Mitchell discusses their interpretation, her failure to give patriarchy a 
material base in the relation between women’s and men’s labor power, and her 
similar failure to note the material aspects of the process of personality formation and 
gender creation, limits the usefulness of her analysis.” (Hartmann, 1979, p. 173) 
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justice literature separately built on the socioeconomic and symbolic aspects of the 
issue, second, providing a better and fuller representation of social phenomena in 
political thought. Therefore, Fraser’s account on social justice on the one hand is tied to 
post-Rawlsian justice literature which I summarized in the previous sections; on the 
other hand connects this theoretical schism to the reality, in terms of justice perspectives 
present in contemporary societies.  
  
 
2.3.2.1. Dealing with the theoretical incompatibility 
 
 
 Fraser points out that theories of redistribution and recognition stem from two 
different orders of normativity. (Fraser, 2001) While the former can be traced back to 
Kantian morality, the latter usually refer to Hegelian ethics.27 Redistributive theories, 
seeking a more just allocation of resources, tend to promote equality; on the other hand 
recognition theories, aiming a world where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural 
norms is no longer the price of equal respect, intend to justify social differences. In that 
sense, redistributive theories observe status-related injustices and try to avoid 
inequalities generating from socioeconomic distribution; and recognition theories focus 
on identities or good life choices of different groups, and try to maintain the diversity. 
Given the incompatibility of these paradigms with respect to their philosophical heritage 
and focal points, Fraser intends to integrate socioeconomic and symbolic accounts of 
justice without succumbing to schizophrenia.  
 
 According to Fraser, recognition theories usually take recognition as a question 
of self-realization.  
 
“This is the view of both Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, the two most 
prominent contemporary theorists of recognition. For both Taylor and Honneth, 
being recognized by another subject is a necessary condition for attaining full, 
undistorted subjectivity. Thus, both these theorists construe misrecognition in 
terms of impaired subjectivity and damaged self-identity. And both understand 
the injury in ethical terms, as stunting the subject's capacity for achieving a 
                                                 
27 “I began by noting that, as philosophical categories, redistribution and recognition 
have widely divergent provenances. As we saw, distribution comes from the Anglo-
American liberal tradition and is often associatedwith Kantian Moraliät. 
Recognition, in contrast, comes from the phenomenological tradition and is usually 
associated with Hegelian Sittlichkeit. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two 
categories are often held to be conceptually incompatible.” (Fraser, 2003, p. 28)  
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"good life." For Taylor and Honneth, therefore, recognition concerns self-
realization.” (Fraser, 2003, p. 28) 
 
In that sense, Fraser underlines that ‘recognition’, in case it is interpreted merely as an 
issue of self-realization, does not fit in justice literature. Moreover, identity based 
recognition theories, taking group identity as the object of recognition, risk the 
weakening of trans-group interaction and denying in-group heterogeneity. As a result, 
these theories may well justify repressive forms of communitarianism.28  Fraser’s 
solution is to treat recognition as an issue of social status. (Fraser, 2003, p. 29) 
Therefore, she intends to carry ‘recognition’ away to a purely justice-centered context. 
In other words, Fraser’s ‘status model of recognition’, translates the question of 
recognition from the language of ethics to the language of morality.  
 
 
2.3.2.2. Traces of theoretical dichotomy in society 
 
 
 According to Fraser, dichotomy of redistribution and recognition is not only 
theoretical and it can be read in social analyses as well. Redistribution and recognition, 
as ‘folk paradigms’, are often associated with specific social movements. While the 
former is considered in line with class politics, the latter is considered within the limits 
of identity politics, such as struggles over gender, sexuality, nationality, ethnnicity, and 
race. Fraser summarizes that division on four essential points: first, redistribution claims 
focus on the injustices on the socio-economic plane and trace the roots of them in the 
economic structure of the society, whilst recognition claims deal with injustices on the 
cultural plane and seek the origins of these injustices in social patterns of representation, 
interpretation, and communication. Second, they are both in the quest of justice only in 
the dimension where they assume that the injustice takes place, in other words 
redistribution claims intend to find a remedy29 in economic structure and recognition 
claims search the remedy in cultural patterns of society. Third, groups that these 
paradigms consider as the victims of injustices differ in terms of their conceptual 
                                                 
28 It is important to note that Kymlicka’s liberal account of recognition, which I 
presented previously, is well aware of that risk, and that is the reason why Kymlicka 
evaluates group rights under the umbrella of liberalism. 
 
29 Fraser analyzes the remedies of each paradigm thoroughly, and makes a distinction 
between affirmative and transformative remedies. I will treat this distinction in the 
following section.  
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differences. The redistribution paradigm often refers to ‘classes’, and even though some 
claims are not directly formulated within Marxist terminology, they all converge in 
taking socioeconomic stratification as the indicator of injustice. On the other hand the 
recognition paradigm focuses on groups which suffer from lesser respect, esteem and 
prestige than other groups in the society enjoy. Lastly, they assume different 
conceptions of group differences. While the champions of socioeconomic justice 
paradigm intend to eradicate group differences, which they take as the socially 
constructed outcomes of ill-functioning economy; majority of the defenders of symbolic 
justice intend to ‘revalue’, therefore reinforce, devalued identities, which means the 
protection of group difference. (Fraser, 2001, pp. 13-15)  
 
According to Fraser, such a divided interpretation fails to grasp the question of 
justice fully, although these concerns seem to succeed in evaluating injustice which 
working class and gays suffer30. She argues that, some groups, especially those which 
are discriminated on the basis of gender and ‘race’ do face a two-dimensional injustice. 
Concepts such as ‘pink collar’ which represents ‘womanly work’ with a low income, 
and ‘feminine’ which signify gender stereotypes are evidences for the injustice which 
women suffer both in redistribution and recognition paradigms. 
“Gender, in sum, is a two-dimensional social differentiation. It combines a class-
like dimension, which brings it within the ambit of redistribution, with a status 
dimension, which brings it simultaneously within the ambit of recognition. It is 
an open question whether the two dimensions are of equal weight. But, 
redressing gender injustice, in any case, requires changing both the economic 
structure and the status order of society.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 21) 
 
As a result, bridging the gap between redistribution and recognition is necessary not 
only for overcoming the schism in the social justice literature, but also for a better 
understanding of social phenomena. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 “Matters are thus fairly straightforward at the two extremes of our conceptual 
spectrum. When we deal with social groups that approach the ideal type of the 
exploited working class,we face distributive injustices requiring redistributive 
remedies.What is needed is a politics of redistribution. When we deal with social 
groups that approach the ideal type of the despised sexuality, in contrast, we face 
injustices of misrecognition.What is needed here is a politics of recognition.” (Fraser, 
2001, p. 19) 
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2.3.2.3. Fraser’s vision of equal consideration: ‘Parity of participation’  
 
 
 Nancy Fraser’s account of equal consideration for socioeconomic and symbolic 
injustices produces the concept of ‘parity of participation’ and it represents the core 
requirement for a just society. The norm of ‘parity of participation’31 anticipates “social 
arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as 
peers”. (Fraser, 2001, p. 36) Fraser argues that this norm requires the satisfaction of two 
conditions. First one is about socioeconomic injustices, and it necessitates that 
distribution of material conditions should not hinder individuals’ participation to social 
interaction.32 Second one is directly linked to the status model of recognition which I 
summarized previously, and it is envisaged that institutionalized patterns of cultural 
value provide equal respect for every individual and guarantee equal opportunity for 
acquiring social esteem.33  
 
Fraser’s ‘parity of participation’ is a response to other theoreticians who face 
incompatibility of redistribution and recognition paradigms, but who proposed different 
                                                 
31 It is important to note that earlier contributions of Fraser, fall short of uniting her 
concerns for redistribution and recognition theoretically. (Fraser, 1997) In her 
previous articles, although she underlines that social justice literature fails to provide 
an account on equal consideration of socioeconomic and symbolic injustices, she 
maintains redistribution and recognition distinction analytically.   
 
32  “First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' 
independence and "voice." This I shall call the objective condition of participatory 
parity. It precludes forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality that 
impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that 
institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and 
leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact 
with others as peers.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 36) 
 
33 “In contrast, the second condition requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural 
value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for 
achieving social esteem. This I shall call the intersubjective condition of participatory 
parity. It precludes institutionalized norms that systematically depreciate some 
categories of people and the qualities associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are 
institutionalized value patterns that deny some people the status of full partners in 
interaction - whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed "difference" or by 
failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 36) 
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solutions to it. Taking recognition away from the limits of identity politics and relating it 
to a status-based view of morality is crucially important for gaining grounds against 
those who are skeptical about ‘recognition claims’34 and those who try to reformulate 
every quest for justice within the limits of a single paradigm35. First, Fraser shows that 
recognition claims are as important as redistributions claims and a full account on 
justice requires the inclusion of question of symbolic injustice as well, because some 
cases are invisible from a merely redistribution perspective. 
“To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of status over 
and above material well-being and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But 
the results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such theorists assume a reductive 
economistic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing that a just distribution of 
resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition. In fact, however, as 
we saw, not all misrecognition is a by-product of maldistribution, nor of 
maldistribution plus legal discrimination. Witness the case of the African-
American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle 
such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and 
goods to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value; it must ask whether 
such patterns impede parity of participation in social life.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 34) 
 
Regarding the example given above, it is obvious that theories which are limited with 
social justice claims on the socioeconomic plane, cause the neglect of symbolic 
injustices. Second, attempts at reformulating all claims of justice within cultural 
paradigm fail to provide grounds for purely socioeconomic injustices.  
“Witness the case of the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes 
unemployed due to a factory closing resulting from a speculative corporate 
merger. In that case, the injustice of maldistribution has little to do with 
misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order of 
specialized economic relations whose raison d'etre is the accumulation of 
                                                 
34 “I think that if the left had continued to try to eliminate prejudice by emphasising 
such commonalities, rather than emphasising cultural differences, it might have been 
able to effect the same cultural revolution as in fact occurred. I doubt that the term 
“culture” added much weight or force to efforts to get people to treat previously 
despised groups as fellow-humans.” (Rorty, 2000, p. 15) 
 
35 “In my view, rules of distribution cannot simply be derived from the relations of 
production, but are rather to be seen as the institutional expression of a sociocultural 
dispositive that determines in what esteem particular activities are held at a specific 
point in time; conflicts over distribution, as long as they are not merely concerned 
with just the application of institutionalized rules are always symbolic struggles over 
the legitimacy of the sociocultural dispositive that determines the value of activities, 
attributes and contributions. In this way, struggles over distribution, contrary to 
Nancy Fraser’s assumption are themselves locked into a struggle for recognition.” 
(Honneth, 2001, p. 54)  
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profits. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural 
value patterns to examine the structure of capitalism.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 35) 
 
After defending the need for a two-dimension justice view, Fraser argues that 
contemporary dilemma of social justice is not limited to a divergence  between theories 
which prioritize redistribution over recognition, or vice versa, and remedies that claims 
and theories of justice propose vary as well. She divides remedies of justice into two, 
namely ‘affirmation’ and ‘transformation’. (Fraser, 1997, p. 23) Affirmative remedies 
aim at correcting the outcomes of social arrangements, but they preserve the structure 
where the injustice originates from. On the other hand, transformative remedies deal 
with the unjust outcomes, by directly restructuring the underlying framework. In that 
sense, regarding symbolic injustices, affirmative remedies tend to ‘revalue’ unjustly 
‘devalued’ group identities, leaving intact the identities and the group differentiations 
which underlie them; whilst transformative remedies are associated with deconstruction 
of identities, categorizations and differences which unjust patterns are built on. As for 
socioeconomic injustices, affirmative remedies require redistribution in favor of 
disadvantaged groups, but they maintain the differences across socioeconomic strata. 
Fraser, finds affirmative redistribution remedies problematic, as they emphasize the fact 
that these disadvantaged groups are in need. Hence, they “can stigmatize the 
disadvantaged, adding the insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation.” (Fraser, 
1997, p. 26) As a result, affirmative redistribution remedies, despite the intention of 
avoiding socioeconomic injustice, generate symbolic injustice. Fraser elucidates how 
severe outcomes affirmative remedies generate in the context of gender.  
 
“This scenario is problematic. Affirmative redistribution fails to engage the deep 
level at which the political economy is gendered. Aimed primarily at combating 
attitudinal discrimination, it does not attack the gendered division of paid and 
unpaid labor, nor the gendered division of masculine and feminine occupations 
within paid labor. Leaving intact the deep structures that generate gender 
disadvantage, it must make surface reallocations again and again. The result is 
not only to underline gender differentiation. It is also to mark women as 
deficient and insatiable, as always needing more and more.” (Fraser, 1997, p. 29) 
 
Regarding this additional negative image that would affirmative redistribution give to 
women, recognition claims formulated in a gender-sensitive language risk rejection. 
Fraser underlines that these claims are more likely to “have the effect of pouring oil 
onto the flames of resentment against affirmative action”. (Fraser, 1997, p. 29) In that 
sense, Fraser underlines that she prefers transformative remedies to affirmative due to 
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critical problems that would latter cause. 
 
 Fraser’s endeavor, which I tried to summarize, is built on the awareness of the 
gap between redistribution and recognition not only in social justice literature, but also 
in the claims of justice within contemporary societies. Gender, as a two-dimensional 
social differentiation, requires remedies in both socioeconomic and cultural level. 
However, given the redistribution-recognition dichotomy, different social actors and 
activists can formulate their claims only in redistribution paradigm or recognition 
paradigm.  
 
  
2.3.3. Multiplicity of Differences: Claims of Gender Equality vs. Claims of Culture 
 
 
It is important to underline that plurality of differences shaping women’s claims 
for justice cannot be reflected on a two-by-two table, which only indicates the 
socioeconomic and gender aspects of the injustice. Culture, which communitarian ethics 
associate with ‘identity’ or ‘good life’, has a significant impact both in literature and 
society. Even from a feminist perspective, the role of culture matters, as it defines the 
context in which the gender injustice occurs.36 Moreover, in reality some women 
activists support or join movements struggling for full recognition of cultural rights, 
even if the latter would seem to limit the freedom which they enjoy as ‘individuals’ in a 
liberal society. In that sense, the trade-off between cultural rights and individual 
freedom is at the heart of gendered social justice literature. Cultural rights of Muslim 
immigrants in liberal Western societies are one of the most debated cases and two of the 
theoreticians whose contributions to the social justice literature were presented above, 
namely Okin and Fraser, attempted to interpret Islamic scarf controversy in France. 
 
 
2.3.3.1. Okin’s liberal account on cultural group rights 
 
 
 Before presenting Okin’s point on cultural group rights, it is important to 
underline that she finds gender as the most crucial factor on the injustice which women 
                                                 
36 “The wife of a Carrington (“Dynasty”) does not experience patriarchy in the same 
way as an Edith Bunker (“All in the Family”) or a Claire Huxtable (“The Bill Cosby 
Show”).” (Tong, 1989, p. 182) 
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face: 
“Some feminists have been criticized for theories of gender that do not take 
sufficient account of difference among women, especially race, class, religion 
and ethnicity. While such critiques should always inform our research and 
improve our arguments, it would be a mistake to allow them to detract our 
attention from gender itself as a factor of significance.” (Okin, 1989, p. 6) 
 
Besides, Okin is overtly skeptical about the ‘cultural group rights’ which she considers 
to be threatening the freedom which women can have in a liberal society. 
“Most cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender. 
Suppose, then, that a culture endorses and facilitates the control of men over 
women in various ways (even if informally, in the private sphere of domestic 
life). Suppose, too, that there are fairly clear disparities of power between the 
sexes, such that the more powerful, male members are those who are generally 
in a position to determine and articulate the group's beliefs, practices, and 
interests. Under such conditions, group rights are potentially, and in many cases 
actually, antifeminist. They substantially limit the capacities of women and girls 
of that culture to live with human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to 
live as freely chosen lives as they can.” (Okin, 1997) 
 
According to Okin, even defenders of group rights with quite liberal motives fail to take 
into account how recognition of cultural group rights would impair individual freedoms 
of women. Because, they tend to treat cultural groups as monoliths, and hence they fail 
to perceive that these groups are gendered as well and women are mostly oppressed or 
dominated by men within cultural community. Besides, even theoreticians such as 
Kymlicka, who intend to protect individuals at risk, facing pressure within the 
community, do not pay attention to private sphere, where woman sexuality is kept under 
control. Although Okin admits that women are dominated by men even in liberal 
Western societies, she emphasizes that they are legally guaranteed many of the same 
freedoms and opportunities as men. As a result, Okin opposes to cultural group rights 
for the sake of the preservation of individual rights.  
 
 
2.3.3.2. ‘Parity of participation’ and cultural rights 
 
 
 ‘Parity of participation’, as presented earlier in this chapter, is Fraser’s key 
criterion for evaluating legitimacy of cultural rights. Regarding the Islamic scarf 
controversy, which stems from the prohibition of Islamic scarf in French public schools, 
Fraser provides two justifications for the lift of the ban. (Fraser, 2001, p. 16) First, the 
ban on the scarf can be interpreted as an unjust majority communitarianism, which 
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denies educational parity to Muslim girls; second, an alternative application permitting 
headscarf would not exacerbate subordination in Muslim communities or in French 
society in general. At that point, Fraser proposes French state to treat Islamic scarf as ‘a 
symbol of Muslim identity in transition’. In that sense, permitting headscarf can be 
perceived as a catalyst for the integration of Muslim immigrants to French society, by 
maximizing the opportunities for education.   
 
 In this chapter, I tried to present a general overview of a vast literature on social 
justice which marked the last four decades of political theory. Although I attempted to 
cover major contributions of feminist theoreticians in the field as well, I preferred to 
keep the focus on the mainstream literature. It is necessary to note that this was a 
pragmatic selection. Because mainstream women’s civil society organizations which are 
analyzed in the present study, build their claims of justice neither on a strong critique of 
‘gender’, nor on a Marxist account of class struggle. Therefore, mainstream social 
justice literature, especially redistribution-recognition dichotomy and liberalism-
communitarianism divide will be key to understand the way in which their positions 
diverge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
REPUBLICA AD ISLAMIC WOME’S CSOs O SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
CLASH OF TWO COMPETIG TRADITIOS 
 
 
 
 
As presented in the previous chapter, contemporary social justice literature is 
shaped by two different paradigms, on the one hand theories of socioeconomic justice, 
on the other hand theories of symbolic justice. While the former seeks to overcome 
injustices related to existing welfare and income distribution, the latter copes with 
unjust evaluations of identities which cause injury to the bearers of these identities. 
However, as Nancy Fraser puts it frankly, such a theoretical schism fails to grasp the 
claims of justice completely and in reality, groups which are disadvantaged on the basis 
of race and gender, due to bilateral character of the injustice which they face are 
expected to formulate claims both in socioeconomic and symbolic level. The present 
chapter will be an empirical analysis regarding the double-character of claims of justice 
in mainstream women’s civil society in Turkey. Regarding the purpose and the 
characteristics of this study stated in the first chapter, I will focus on two women’s civil 
society platforms which dominate the mainstream women’s activism in Istanbul, namely 
Đstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği (ĐKKB) - Đstanbul Union of Women’s Organizations - 
and Gökkuşağı Đstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu (GĐKAP) - Rainbow Istanbul 
Women Organizations’ Platform. First, I will briefly present these two platforms in 
terms of their members, purposes, and major actions. Second, I will focus on the way in 
which they take the question of social justice regarding redistribution – recognition 
dichotomy. Finally, I will analyze the divergence between their positions regarding the 
crucial difference between Kemalist and Islamic traditions which has a significant 
impact on their present views of social justice. 
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3.1. ĐKKB and GĐKAP: Two Platforms to Represent Two Separate Communities  
 
 
ĐKKB and GĐKAP were both founded in 1995, in order to unite women’s 
organizations in Istanbul. It is important to note that foundation of provincial platforms 
was proposed by a public institution, Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü 
(KSSGM), General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women37 in 1993. 
According to the law 5253 enacted in 2004, platforms are defined as temporary 
associations which assemble civil society organizations, charitable foundations and 
trade unions with common purposes. However they are not legal entities. (Resmi 
Gazete, 2004) The underlying cause for the foundation of two separate platforms in 
Istanbul can be traced back to polarization between Kemalist/secular organizations and 
Islamic organizations, which I will elaborate as a decisive factor about their divergence 
on the question of social justice.    
  
 
3.1.1.  ĐKKB : Organizations Gathered Around Secularism, Equality, and 
Democracy 
 
 
Constitutive protocol of ĐKKB, which was signed by first member organizations 
on February 17, 1995 clearly states that secularism, equality, and democracy are the 
common principles which unite them. Majority of the member organizations, can be 
grouped under following headings:  
a. Women’s associations founded in the early republican era, such as 
Türk Kadınlar Birliği Đstanbul ve Adalar Şubeler, (TKB) Association 
of Turkish Women’s Union (Istanbul and Adalar Branches), Türk 
Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği (TÜKD) Association of Turkish 
University Women, and Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği (KHKD) 
Association for the Protection of Women’s Rights…etc  
                                                 
37 Since March 2004, this institution has been affiliated to the Prime Ministry as 
Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü (KSGM), Directorate General on the Status of 
Women. 
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b. Alumni associations such as 5otre Dame de Sion’lular Derneği -  
Association of Notre Dame de Sion French High School for Girls 
Alumni, Fatih Kız Liseliler Derneği – Association of Fatih High 
School for Girls Alumni;  
c. Women’s branches of political parties such as Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi (CHP) Republican People’s Party, Sosyal Demokrat Halk 
Partisi (SHP) Social Democratic People’s Party, Đşçi Partisi (ĐP) 
Worker’s Party. 
Although member organizations work and act according to their particular objectives 
and purposes separately, ĐKKB coordinates major activities which bring them together. 
These activities are mostly panels or conferences held on the anniversaries of historical 
events which they consider to be the major steps towards women’s emancipation in 
Turkey.38 Besides, ĐKKB serves as a channel for the transmission of joint messages 
which carry the common reaction of these organizations regarding major developments 
in politics. In that sense, ĐKKB’s agenda is shaped by daily politics as well.  
 
 Given the secular character of mainstream women’s movement which can be 
traced back to 1980s (Sirman, 1989) (Arat Y. , 1991) (Đlkkaracan, 1997), ĐKKB has 
become a significant stakeholder in republican civil society and has been the member of 
Ulusal Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Birliği (USTKB)39 National Civil Society 
Organizations Union since 2006. ĐKKB has a representative among the consultants of 
USTKB Executive Board. Apart from these partnerships, ĐKKB has been actively 
involved in major political debates in recent years. Çağlayan Rally in 2007 and 
                                                 
38 “For example, ratification of Republican civil law on February 17, which was a great 
achievement that extended women’s rights, our revolutionary law; March 8; two 
emblematic dates in Turkish secularization February 5 and April 10; signing of 
Treaty of Lausanne, July 24; Stop Violence against women, third week of November; 
and the week of October 29 for the proclamation of republic.” (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 
2010) 
 
39 USTKB is the union of republican civil society organizations, whose objective is “the 
protection and the betterment of Turkish Republic’s constitutive properties which 
define the existential philosophy of Turkish nation, and the formation of a public 
opinion and public consciousness in line with this purpose.” The motive of the union 
is stated in USTKB executive plan as “the need for building a civil movement, 
independent of political parties, in order to enable Turkish Republic with the means 
of self protection against global and regional threats.” (USTKB, 2006) 
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conferences against lift of ban on headscarf in 2008 have been the major recent actions 
of ĐKKB.  
 
 
3.1.1.1. Çağlayan rally: Republican women’s movement as the catalyst of anti-AKP 
protest 
 
 
 In spring 2007, presidential elections topped the political agenda in Turkey. 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) – Justice and Development Party was in power for 
four years and despite party’s self identification as ‘conservative democrat’, secular 
opinion leaders and politicians were questioning the Islamic roots of the party. Key 
figures of the party, party leader R. Tayyip Erdogan included, had become actively 
involved in politics in pro-Islamic Welfare Party, which was banned in 1998, in the 
aftermath of one-year government in coalition ended by a military memorandum 
emphasizing the constitutive principles and secular character of Turkish Republic. 
(Morris, 1998) Given the political roots of these actors, and the secular opposition 
calling for the protection of Kemalist republic against a possible Islamic threat, 
presidential elections were to be held under pressure which had started even before the 
nomination of AKP’s candidate for presidency. According to secular opposition, lead by 
CHP, nomination of a candidate with a political Islam past, would impair the secular 
character of Turkish Republic. Under these circumstances, civil society organizations 
with Kemalist, republican and social democratic tendencies organized a series of 
demonstrations in order to force AKP first to nominate a secular candidate, then to call 
for early elections, which would reflect people’s actual choices and which was expected 
to change the present distribution of seats in the parliament, where AKP had 351 seats 
of 550 in total. The first rally was held in Ankara on April 14, 2007, before the 
nomination of Abdullah Gül on April 20, 2007. The second rally, held in Đstanbul on 
April 27, was organized by a civil society initiative, headed by Necla Arat, director of 
Kadın Araştırmaları Derneği – Association of Women’s Studies, one of the members of 
ĐKKB. (Yetkin, 2009) (NTV, 2007) (Milliyet, 2007) One of the representatives of ĐKKB 
refers to Çağlayan Rally as follows: 
 
“Women’s movement grew in strength with its response to political incidents 
and it remade its agenda regarding political developments. I am talking about 
Republican protests. As you know, Republican rally in Çağlayan was organized 
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almost entirely by ĐKKB. As a result, our names are mentioned in indictments. 
We are accused of having dangerous views which threaten the integrity of 
Turkey […] As you know, women’s rights are not important at all in countries 
ruled by religious precepts. Such a change in Turkey obliged us to take these 
actions.” (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) 
 
Given the example of Çağlayan rally, ĐKKB does not refrain from shaping its agenda 
regarding political debates, and positions itself as a stakeholder in mainstream political 
debates as well.  
 
 
3.1.1.2. ĐKKB and the lift of ban on headscarf in universities 
 
 
 In 2008, another political debate marked ĐKKB’s agenda, lift of ban on headscarf 
in universities. Ruling AKP, securing the parliamentary majority in the elections held in 
2007, and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) Nationalist Movement Party agreed upon a 
package of constitutional amendments, which would pave the way for a regulation 
allowing the entrance of students wearing headscarf to universities. On February 11, 
2008, the amendment was accepted by more than the two-thirds of the members of the 
parliament, and sent to President Abdullah Gül, whose candidacy for presidency had 
aggravated the tension between AKP and secular-republicans. (NTV, 2008)  ĐKKB, in 
line with its reserves and sensitivity for the protection of Kemalist secular order, which 
united it with other republican political actors and civil organizations, struggled against 
the lift of the ban. Under these circumstances, ĐKKB’s response can be observed in three 
dimensions. First, it implemented its own agenda for arguing against the lift of the ban; 
second, it sought partnership with other republican CSOs; third, it tried to defend its 
pro-ban position with its partners in international arena.  
 
As previously indicated, March 8, International Women’s Day is one of the most 
important dates of ĐKKB’s agenda. In that sense, ĐKKB organized three conferences 
about the question of headscarf.40 Besides, it announced its rigorous opposition to the 
lift of ban in its regular press releases for the anniversary of appropriation of secularism 
                                                 
40 Türban Sarmalında Laik Hukuk ve Laik Eğitim, “Question of Turban, Secular Law 
and Secular Education”, held on March 1, 2008; Türklerde Örtüne, “Veiling in 
Turkish society”, held on March 6, 2008; Đslam ve Kadın, “Islam and Woman”, held 
on March 8, 2008.  
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(Moroğlu, N.; ĐKKB Koodinatörü, 2008a), and for the celebration of the ratification of 
the first civil law of republican era (Moroğlu, N.; ĐKKB Koordinatörü, 2008b). In the 
former, ĐKKB coordinator argued that the problem was not simply about ‘turban’41, but 
it was the politicization of religion in general. Moreover she invited all women, both 
those who cover-up and those who do not, to stand against the legislation which had to 
be understood as a step for the realization of a non-secular, ‘moderate’ Islamic regime. 
In the latter, she claimed that political parties were acting as if the turban was the only 
problem that women face; and avowed her discomfort about this amendment by 
reference to religion. She added that the reforms which government argued for seemed 
to pave the way to ancient regime, which would turn the bond of citizenship to serfdom.  
 
On March 2, ĐKKB presented a press release with USTKB and Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği (TBB) Union of Bar Associations of Turkey. (Özok, Moroğlu, & Tuskan, 2008) 
They argued that the major issues which should be topping the agenda of Turkish 
politics were sustainable growth, welfare and modernism, and the question of turban 
could only be the part of an artificial agenda. However they underlined that they were 
sure that Turkish people would not let the reenactment of religious rules, including the 
lift of ban on headscarf in university.   
 
On August 5, 2008 ĐKKB, as a member of USTKB, took part in the transmission 
of a message which aimed to justify the ban on headscarf in university in the eyes of 
Western intellectuals writing on Turkey.42 The backbone of the text was the peculiarity 
of the Turkish secularism, which stemmed from the special social circumstances. It was 
emphasized that secularism was a pre-requisite for democracy in Turkey, and once 
Turkey’s secular foundations were demolished, its democratic structure would soon 
collapse as well. Moreover it was argued that Islamic fundamentalism was not a home 
grown reality but it was imported from Middle Eastern countries, which tried to export 
their version of Islam. In that sense, headscarf issue was manufactured by Islamic 
movement in Turkey which was described as follows: 
“Religious publishing companies started popping up and Islamic publications 
                                                 
41 ‘Turban’ is a pejorative term widely used by Kemalist/republican actors who intend to 
underline the political character of veiling, in distinction with ‘örtü’ or ‘başörtüsü’ 
which refers to traditional headscarf of the elders and peasants.  
 
42 The complete text is available online on USTKB’s website. (USTKB, 2008) 
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multiplied.  Mosques began to be built everywhere and soon turned into centers 
for enforcing Islamic lifestyle. Women were trained in and sent to every 
household to influence and instruct other women.  Koranic courses were 
organized to brainwash children at an early age and high school and university 
students were financially and unconditionally supported.  Public demonstrations 
were staged demanding female students to enter university with Islamic attire, 
including the headscarves. The religious press stressed that women should  also 
cover up all of their body parts. Most of the militant female university students 
were well paid and insisted to attend classes dressed in chador (a dark traditional 
garment that covers head to toe.) They were  supported by Islamic extremist 
male school mates and lawyers.”  
 
According to that description, wearing headscarf in public institutions was neither a 
genuine problem of Turkish society, nor a sincere demand of Turkish women. It was 
merely an imposition of an Islamic way of living, which had nothing to see with the 
genuine interpretations of Turkish version of Islam. In that sense, the question of 
women’s status in Turkey was required to be removed from religious realm completely. 
As a result, the readers, EU representatives and opinion leaders in the West, were 
invited to acquire a deeper understanding of secularism, democracy and Islam in 
Turkey.  
 
 The constitutional amendment which envisioned the lift of ban on headscarf in 
universities, was discussed throughout spring 2008. The debate ended with Supreme 
Court’s decision to annul the amendment in June 2008. (BBC News, 2008) 
 
 As presented above, ĐKKB has taken part in recent political debates, as the 
common voice of republican women’s movements in Turkey. Given the sensitivity for 
the protection of Kemalist secular order, which is accepted to be the common feature of 
the member organizations, ĐKKB had close partnerships beyond the women’s 
movements. However in recent years, the focus of ĐKKB activities has been shifted 
from the protection of secularism to the question of violence against women. 
(Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) Regarding government’s emphasis on struggle against 
domestic violence, ĐKKB runs education programs for children and parents, with the 
partnership of Ministry of National Education.  
 
Moreover, ĐKKB continues its struggle for the empowerment of women in 
politics, and calls for the necessity of affirmative action. However, ĐKKB abstains from 
cooperation with Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği (KA-DER) Association for the 
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Support and Training of Women Candidates, which is the major civil society 
organization supporting the nomination of as many women candidates as possible by all 
political parties. KA-DER has a negative image on representatives of ĐKKB, due to, on 
the one hand the politics of neutrality regarding the support KA-DER provides for all 
women candidates, on the other hand the negative impact of EU fundings, which is 
considered to degenerate independent character of Turkish civil society.43 As a result, 
ĐKKB obviously seeks to cooperate with other CSOs, having a well-defined secular 
character, and progressivist political orientations, in line with its member political 
parties.  
  
 
3.1.2.  GĐKAP : Consensus on Essential Values, for the Protection of Family and 
Women 
 
 
GĐKAP members are required to sign an agreement contract which defines the 
principles of platform and the rules for the operation of the organization. Platform’s 
major objectives are empowerment of women in family, in economic, social and cultural 
life; proliferation of basic rights in society; supporting member CSO’s in order to 
improve their efficiency and extend the scope of projects and programs run by them. 
Besides, platform aims at the protection of ‘essential values’, and their promotion both 
at domestic and global level. In that sense, participants are expected to share these 
essential values. However, according to the contract, GĐKAP endorses the preservation 
of original and independent structures and identities of member organizations, and 
welcomes the diversity.   
 
The number of member organizations is 52, and the majority of the groups can 
be grouped as follows; 
a. Charitable organizations and foundations: Birlik Vakfı Kadın Komisyonu - 
Women’s Commission of Unity Foundation, Dayanışma Vakfı Kadın 
                                                 
43 “KA-DER was working quite well at the beginning. I have doubts about the European 
Union Fundings. I realized that they intend to reveal ethnic and religious differences. 
I think KA-DER is under the influence of that trend” (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) 
“For instance, there are those who state that they have equal distance to every 
political party, KA-DER is such an organization. For example they support AKP 
candidates as well. Therefore, if they do not share our precommitments –such as 
secularism- we do not cooperate with them.” (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) 
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Komisyonu - Women’s Commission of Solidarity Foundation, Hanımlar 
Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı (HEKVA) Ladies Education and Culture Foundation, 
Şefkat Vakfı – Compassion Foundation, Türk Gençlik Vakfı (TGV) Turkish 
Youth Foundation… 
b. Professional associations: Kadın Sağlıkçılar Derneği (KASAD-D) Woman 
Health Officials Solidarity Group, Sinema Televizyon Đletişim Mezunları 
Derneği (SĐTEMDER) Association of Cinema Television and 
Communication Graduates… 
c. Associations for the protection of family and children: Aileyi Koruma 
Derneği (AKODER) Association for the Protection of the Family, Başak 
Grubu,  Ev Kadınları Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (EVKAD) Housewives 
Culture and Solidarity Association… 
d. Associations on Education, Rights and Culture: Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın 
Hakları Derneği (AKDER) Women’s Rights Association Against 
Discrimination, Hazar Eğitim Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği – Hazar 
Education Culture and Solidarity Association… 
According to the rules indicated in the contract, political parties and their women’s 
branches are not admitted to membership. Representatives of GĐKAP emphasize that 
exclusion of political parties is more than necessary for preserving ‘civil society’ 
character of the initiative. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's 
CSO on Social Justice, 2010) In that sense, GĐKAP positions itself as a channel of 
communication among associations with common values, religious sensitivities; but it 
abstains from taking a political position due to the heterogeneity of the participants 
despite Islamic roots which define the common characteristics of GĐKAP members.44 
GĐKAP member AKDER’s campaign calling for the lift of ban on headscarf, which 
united many civil society organizations, political parties, and opinion leaders from a 
wide array of political affiliations is an example which demonstrates diversity within 
GĐKAP.  
                                                 
44 This heterogeneity will be elaborated later in the analysis of the ways in which the 
question of social justice is treated by different women’s civil society organizations, 
however it is important to note that the diversity within Islamic civil society was 
previously observed by Özdalga and Kadıoğlu. (Kadıoğlu, 2005) (Özdalga & 
Persson, 1999). According to Özdalga, this diversity causes a rope-pulling game 
between community orientation and liberalism within Islamic movement. (Özdalga 
& Persson, 1999, p. 102) 
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3.1.2.1. AKDER’s campaign for the lift of ban: ‘February 28 cannot last a 
thousand years’ 
 
 
 As previously mentioned, in 1997 pro-Islamic Welfare Party left power in the 
aftermath of a military memorandum on the secular character of Turkish Republic. 
However, the political, legal and social impacts of the military memorandum, dated 
February 28, have been discussed for years. Particularly, February 28 process has been 
considered as a trauma for Islamic civil society organizations and pro-Islamic politics. 
One of the interviewees comments that February 28 was a shock for Islamic women’s 
movements as well and many activists had to suspend their actions due to political 
unease and personal worries. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) Under these circumstances, 
Islamic women’s movements tried to argue for the unfairness of the measures taken 
during the process both in local and in international level. AKDER, as one of the major 
stakeholders of the question of headscarf ban in civil society, publishes many reports 
and argues that ban had no justification and aggravated the injustice that women in 
Turkey suffer. (Akbulut, 2008) (Benli, 2008) (Benli, 2010) In one of the reports which 
is prepared by a civil society initiative which unite 71 NGOs and presented to 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women affiliated to United 
Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, the process of February 28 is presented 
as a milestone for the ban on headscarf: 
“On 13 March 1997 a briefing was given by senior army officials and retired 
senior colonels of the National Security Council (MGK), to university rectors 
not to accept students with headscarf to study at the university to protect laicism. 
Afterwards, students with a headscarf were not allowed to enter their schools’ 
territories including cafes. The rectors who did not apply the ban were removed 
from their offices or forced to resign. The judges of the administrative court who 
decided that educational rights cannot be restricted without a law clearly relating 
to were sent exile. The bans swiftly multiplied following the 28 February 
military intervention, producing an entirely arbitrary designation of “public 
space” within which women with headscarf were not allowed to appear. This 
space supposedly includes all state-allied or state-regulated institutions, and 
requires that women with headscarf are excluded from all state and private 
training and education institutions. The ban applies not only to teaching staff or 
students, but also cleaning staff, and covers all the territory of such institutions. 
In order to ensure the prohibition is strictly applied, security officials, cabins and 
turnstiles were placed at the main entrances of the institutions.” (Benli, 2010, p. 
8) 
 
64 
 
In February 2010, AKDER implemented a nationwide campaign, called ‘February 28 
cannot last a thousand years’ arguing for the lift of the ban. The message of the 
campaign had no reference to Islamic precepts, and tried to justify the freedom of 
headscarf in terms of basic human rights. “We invite everyone who opposes the abuse, 
seizure of rights, and insults that women can face due to their attire to speak up and to 
struggle without reservations.” (AKDER, 2010) It was an open call which received a 
great support, including pop stars, liberal opinion leaders, pro-Kurdish politicians, 
dancers, scholars on the one hand; Islamic NGOs, a leftist party, an LGBT association 
and a feminist academy on the other hand. 45 Although AKDER could get the support of 
a diverse group, GĐKAP abstained from signing the declaration, due to the lack of the 
unanimous support of all members. The representative of GĐKAP explains the situation 
with reference to the diversity within the platform. She underlines that the religious 
sensitivities of the member organizations do not cause a monolithic Islamic civil society, 
both individuals and organizations taking part in GĐKAP diverge in terms of their 
humanitarian, political, and legal concerns. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) 
 
 As seen in the example of the campaign for the removal of ban on headscarf, 
GĐKAP stays away from becoming a prominent actor in political debates, due to both 
the diversity of the member organizations and preserving its own agenda insulated from 
the impact of political debates. In that sense, GĐKAP prefers to function as an 
information network among member organizations and works for the cooperation of 
common projects which are in line with common values of participants.  
 
 
3.1.2.2. GĐKAP’s agenda: Protection of family and youth, an alternative 
information channel for Islamic CSOs 
 
 
 Preservation of traditional family values has topped GĐKAP’s agenda since its 
foundation. Given that objective, GĐKAP is a member of Advisory Board of Directorate 
General for Family and Social Studies affiliated to the Prime Ministry (ASAGEM) and 
                                                 
45 Controversies of the participation of Kaos GL, one of the major LGBT associations in 
Turkey, will be elaborated in the following section on Islamic CSOs and symbolic 
justice. 
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ASAGEM’s Family Council46 is one of the major events for the presentation of 
GĐKAP’s views on the protection of family. The paper presented by GĐKAP’s founder 
Gülsen Ataseven in the Third Family Council held in 1998 argues that the protection of 
traditional family is necessary to avoid a ‘social breakdown’ which had a catastrophic 
impact on western societies. (Ataseven, 1998)  Ataseven relates the rise in contemporary 
diseases and divorce rate to the sexual revolution of 1960s, with reference to popular 
thinker Patrick Dixon’s study on the cost of sexual revolution to British economy and 
society. (Dixon, 1995) The remedy which Ataseven proposes is empowerment of family 
and reinterpretation of the traditions, which are impaired due to adoption of heretical 
practices such as honor killings and domestic violence, as a component of traditional 
Turkish family. However, traditional Turkish family, for Ataseven, is in need of the 
universal moral values proposed by Islam and according to genuine Turkish-Islamic 
tradition the relations between spouses are to be arranged on the basis of justice, but not 
on the basis of ‘democratic equality between sexes’. Ataseven claims that the norms of 
democracy and the family are not compatible at all, as “democracy, in its contemporary 
sense, is built on an assumption according to which society is made up of equal and free 
individuals, while family rests upon unequal relations among man, woman, children and 
servants.” (Ataseven, 1998) 
 
 Given that perspective which prioritizes the traditional family rightly 
understood, GĐKAP’s major activities can be grouped under two categories: education 
of women, children and youth to promote solidarity among them, struggle against 
threats to family and women such as drug addiction and poverty. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 
2010) For the first one, GĐKAP is actively involved in the formation of a commission 
for children which intends to generate a similar platform for civil society organizations 
working on children; and organizes education programs to disseminate the know-how 
which platform and member organizations has acquired in civil society. Regarding the 
second one, platform has organized a seminar series, called UYMA! Project for the 
Protection of Family and Youth from Substance Dependence- on drug addiction in 
2007, and ran a project for the foundation of a marketplace for women’s handicrafts 
with the cooperation of Municipality of Üsküdar.  
 
                                                 
46 ASAGEM Advisory Board meets every year and ASAGEM Aile Şurası is held every 
four years. 
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 Apart from common projects, GĐKAP serves as an alternative communication 
channel for Islamic women’s organizations, which enables participants to disseminate 
their own voices, which they consider to be dominated in larger platforms uniting 
women with different concerns, such as Kemalist and feminist women. Moreover they 
think that GĐKAP is a means for the preservation of an original agenda shaped by their 
common values and sensitivities. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-AKDER, 
2010)  
 
 
 
3.2. Republican and Islamic Women’s Civil Society on Social Justice:  
Empirical Findings 
 
 
   It is important to note that neither ĐKKB nor GĐKAP have a particular interest on 
the question of social justice, however the representatives of both platforms emphasized 
that it is one of the major problems which should be topping the political agenda in 
Turkey. Despite differences47 in terms of the evaluation of the question of social justice 
by member organizations and interviewees, women are considered to be among the 
major victims of social injustice. Besides, as foreseen in the introduction, none of the 
participants referred to a class based approach or to gender division of labor which had 
a significant impact on Marxist, socialist or liberal feminists whose main ideas were 
summarized in the previous chapter.  
 
In this section, I will elaborate the views and propositions of the activists and 
organizations. As previously indicated in the introduction, the data on which the 
analysis is based is driven from the interviews performed with the representatives of 
civil society and publications of civil society organizations. The empirical findings of 
the study will be presented with two major headings, in line with theoretical framework 
summarized in the preceding chapter. In that sense, I will analyze the position of ĐKKB 
and GĐKAP first on socioeconomic justice; then on symbolic justice. AKDER’s 
standpoint, despite its membership to GĐKAP, will be presented separately in both parts, 
due to its distinct position vis-à-vis question of social justice.   
                                                 
47 The origin of the sharp divergence between republican and Islamic CSOs will be 
interpreted in the following section.   
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3.2.1.  Republican and Islamic Women’s Organizations on Socioeconomic Justice  
 
 
Although republican and Islamic women’s organizations agree upon the view 
that women suffer from poverty a lot more than men, the way in which they interpret 
the question of socioeconomic justice diverge since they usually use different units of 
analysis in their activities and projects. While republican women affiliated to ĐKKB 
usually treat the question of socioeconomic justice in individual level, Islamic women 
organizations united under GĐKAP tend to observe and struggle with poverty in 
household level. Moreover, apart from common strategies such as giving scholarships, 
and charity, they diverge in the priorities considered in large-scale projects. Therefore, I 
will focus on large-scale projects in the evaluation of difference between republican and 
Islamic CSOs.  
 
 
3.2.1.1. Republican women’s CSOs on socioeconomic justice 
 
 
All of the representatives of republican CSOs focused on active participation of 
women in economy, while evaluating feminine poverty. (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) 
(Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) In 
that perspective, they emphasize that they worry about the fall in women’s employment 
in recent economic crisis. Besides, they argue that women’s presence in professional life 
is not only necessary to avoid the socioeconomic injustice that women face, but also to 
give women an active role in modern society. In that sense, they prefer women to work 
out-of-home. Under these circumstances, republican CSOs and activists intend to run 
projects which encourage women to take part in formal sector.  
 
In 1997, Association of Women’s Studies, an active member of ĐKKB, initiated a 
project in order to provide professional education for women who are not qualified for 
working out-of-home. Moreover, the project aimed to foster ‘citizenship consciousness’ 
and to accelerate the integration of the participants to urban life. The education program 
was shaped regarding the demands of employment market, and professional training 
was given on the utilization of machinery in textile. Besides, participants were informed 
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on hygiene, nutrition, marriage, birth control, human rights, women’s rights and 
acquisitions of citizens from republican revolution. (Đstanbul Üniversitesi Kadın 
Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, 2008) The courses were held at Đstanbul 
Üniversitesi, in order to take women out of their homes and give them a chance to 
experience the university atmosphere. However, as Rectorate of Đstanbul University did 
not permit the entrance of participants wearing headscarf, enlarging the scope of the ban 
on headscarf for the students, the program has been moved to disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. The project is still active in Avcılar. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010)  
 
Republican CSOs keep their focus on the need of professional education. For 
instance, another member of ĐKKB, TÜKD Kadıköy Branch has been working on a 
project for educating women on textile production in the poor settlements in the 
outskirts of Ataşehir. At the end of the basic education, participants will be encouraged 
for sewing fabric bags, which will be commercialized in marketplaces in Kadıköy, 
where the utilization of nylon bags is prohibited by the municipality. The project is 
planned to be executed in 2011, regarding the decision on the funding request of 
TÜKD.48 
 
  As a result, although republican CSOs keep giving scholarships and working on 
charity campaigns49 as well, they perceive their efforts on providing professional 
education for unqualified women as their major contribution for the struggle against 
socioeconomic justice which women suffer. Besides, they support nationwide 
campaigns which intend to increase and bolster schooling for girls, and argue for the 
                                                 
48 It is important to note that ĐKKB has decided to urge its members not to apply for 
European Union fundings, which are considered to bring in external interventions 
from EU advisory board. Some of the interviewees underlined that it is necessary to 
question the essential purpose of EU support in Turkish CSO’s projects. 
(Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010)  
 
49 Although they keep working on charity campaigns, some of the participants tend to 
question the efficiency of charity as a way of coping with poverty. “I think, charity 
perpetuates the culture of dependence. Particularly in the eastern territories, people 
were accustomed to sit and wait for the arrival of aid. However, I feel that things are 
changing, we receive tons of messages from women who cry out loud that they want 
to work.” (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) 
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benefit of them for avoiding socioeconomic in justice in long term.50  
 
 
3.2.1.2 Islamic women’s CSOs on socioeconomic justice 
 
 
 As indicated in the previous section, charitable organizations constitute a great 
group among the members of GĐKAP. In that sense, one of the major projects of GĐKAP 
is about the fair and efficient distribution of social aids and charities. Besides, GĐKAP 
intends to create alternative opportunities for evaluating women’s household production. 
In that perspective, they cooperate with municipalities for opening handicraft markets, 
where women sell accessories, garments, laces, patchworks which they produce at home 
by traditional methods. It is important to emphasize that activists, organizations and 
projects mostly refer to familial poverty in their analyses on social justice. The emphasis 
on familial poverty is common to all Islamic CSOs51, and regarding GĐKAP, 
significance of ‘family’ is reflected in both the agenda of member associations as shown 
in the preceding section, and the cooperation between government and GĐKAP on the 
basis of ASAGEM, which does not focus on particularly on women but on family in 
                                                 
50 Some of the participants argued that Kurdish question can be solved in 
socioeconomic plane as well, therefore in case these remedies which are proposed for 
struggle against socioeconomic justice are applied intensively in eastern provinces 
where Kurdish population is high, Kurd’s claims for group rights would diminish. In 
that sense they tend to reinterpret a question of symbolic justice in terms of 
socioeconomic injustice. (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) 
(Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) 
 
51 Islamic organizations which do not work on women are beyond the scope of the 
present study, however it is necessary to note that familial poverty has a key 
importance in the activity of Islamic charity organizations in general. Besides, some 
of the participants, who I contacted with, referred to the campaigns of these 
organizations, such as Kimse Yok Mu?, which means ‘Is anybody there?’ in Turkish. 
(Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSOs on Social Justice, 2010) (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 
2010) Apart from pooling financial support for aids, ‘Kimse Yok Mu?’ establishes 
solidarity bonds between poor and affluent families. The campaign is presented by 
the organization as follows: “We invite you to have a sister family to feel the purest 
love. We invite you to be the mother of a child you haven’t met before, to be the 
father of a girl and take her to school. We invite you to become a sister family, 
because we know that nobody can bear his/her sister/brother being in difficulty. S/he 
immediately wants to help him/her. So, do you have a sister/brother?” (Kimse Yok 
Mu? Dayanışma ve Yardım Derneği, 2006) 
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general. 52 
 
 Given the importance of charity for the members of GĐKAP, fair distribution of 
charity and social aids is a question of social justice and this is not possible unless 
public institutions and CSOs cooperate on the definition, and determination of poverty 
in national scale. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) Hence, GĐKAP proposes a scheme of 
cooperation which includes developing a poverty map, according to which both actors 
will support the disadvantaged.  
“As an economic and social problem, poverty can be defined in several different 
ways, however, as the most general definition, it can be described as the 
condition in which individuals and families cannot afford   the basic needs of 
life. According to the statistics by TUIK, in 2005, 14.681000 people cannot 
afford food and other basic needs. While the struggle against poverty is defined 
as the duty of the state, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carry out very 
important activities in the field. Being charity oriented and with the starting 
point of benevolence, these organizations have contributed a great deal of raising 
social consciousness and empathy for charity work. However, it is not possible 
to mention about any coordination among NGOs and governmental 
organizations serving for the same purpose. In order to have effective fight 
against poverty, it is necessary to develop a strategic approach leading to 
integration and coordination among the organizations and institutions. In this 
context, 'A National Database Study' under public control and responsibility 
will be an important step to cover this need. This database will contribute to 
effective planning in the field of social service activities, preventing double or 
repeated charity aids, building and accountable and sustainable, result oriented 
work basis and sharing knowledge, experience and information.” (Çitil & Akyol, 
2010) 
 
The principal motive for handicraft marketplaces stemmed from the assumption 
that the formal sector does not prefer to employ women. Besides, selling homemade 
products was a challenge for women at home. As indicated in the presentation of 
project, “providing women an income in return for their household production, does not 
improve only women’s status but also supports families in poverty.” The project intends 
to create not only chances for retail sales in markets, but also opportunities for receiving 
wholesale demands from formal sector which increase the volume of household 
                                                 
52 The motives of GĐKAP for preparing a database of poverty for the fair distribution of 
social aids and charity and for the establishent of handicraft marketplaces are in line 
with the ASAGEM Family Council Commission Reports prepared in the aftermath of 
4th Family Council held under the heading of ‘Poverty and Family’ in 2004. (T.C. 
Başbakanlık Aile ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2004)  
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production, hence enhance the revenue of women who work at home. The project, 
called KÜP, was implemented in 2004, with the cooperation of the Municipality of 
Üsküdar. A similar project is about to be launched in Çekmeköy, in summer 2010. 
(Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 
2010) (HEKVA, 2008) 
 
 
3.2.1.3. AKDER and feminine poverty: Impact of ban on headscarf on 
socioeconomic injustice 
 
 
Although AKDER is a member of GĐKAP, it diverges from it in terms of the 
evaluation of socioeconomic injustice which women face. As I have tried to show 
above, KÜP is an attempt to bypass the unwillingness of formal sector to employ 
women, by promoting household production and creating opportunities for marketing. 
On the other hand, AKDER claims that the question does not simply generate from the 
‘unwillingness’. AKDER argues that low level of women’s employment in Turkey is 
partially related to the ban on headscarf. Despite the fact that AKDER published a 
report on the negative impact of the ban on Turkey’s performance in the Gender Gap 
Index of World Economic Forum53, the magnitude of the impact is not analyzed and 
explained with significant statistical evidence.54 However, it is indicated that 15 
thousand women lost their jobs in public institutions between 1998 and 2002, due to the 
strict application of ban in the aftermath of February 28 and thousands of others were 
discriminated or exposed to a trade off between their headscarf and jobs in private 
sector. (Benli, 2008, pp. 7-9) Despite the lack of statistical support for the phenomenon, 
AKDER’s claims about the socioeconomic injustice which women wearing headscarf 
face will require a particular evaluation in the following section where the differences 
between the position of republican and Islamic women’s CSOs will be interpreted in 
regards to social justice literature.  
                                                 
53 In 2007, Turkey was ranked number 121 out of 128 countries in total. The index is 
built on the difference between sexes in terms of economic participation and 
opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. 
(World Economic Forum, 2007) 
 
54 In AKDER’s report it is argued that the number of cases regarding the discharge of 
employees in private sector due to headscarf cannot be calculated as the employees 
abstain from reporting the incidents to human rights organizations.  
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3.2.2.  Republican and Islamic Women’s Organizations on Symbolic Justice  
 
 
The question of symbolic justice is of controversy for both republican and Islamic 
civil society organizations. However the nature of controversy is different for each 
group. Republican civil society organizations seem to have a significant unease 
regarding the claims of recognition generating from religious and ethnic groups in 
general, and they try to provide as much justification as possible to back up their 
concerns. In particular, all of the interviewees converge on the socioeconomic solutions 
for the Kurdish question. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) 
(Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) Although Islamic women’s organizations take the ban on 
headscarf as symbolic injustice, they do not have precise and common diagnosis or 
remedies regarding the demands of other religious and ethnic groups. In terms of 
symbolic injustice, they seem to have a strong reserve on claims of gays and lesbians – 
which is similar to Republican participants’ standpoint vis-à-vis ethnic group rights. 
(Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) 
Once again AKDER seems to be an outlier within GĐKAP, due to its contacts with other 
groups who feel stigmatized in terms of symbolic injustices.  (AKDER, 2010) 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Symbolic Justice from the Perspective of Republican CSOs:  Approval of 
women’s claims as ‘individuals’ and denial of groups’ claims  
 
 
In general, participants from republican CSOs tend to support the need for 
symbolic justice on women’s questions. In case they are expected to respond to the 
claims of ethnic and religious groups they argue that the claims of the parties should be 
limited only to non-discrimination (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010), and further demands 
should be disregarded in order to protect women within ethnic and religious 
communities. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) Particularly, they 
tend to evaluate Kurdish question at socioeconomic level, and propose redistributive 
remedies as the best solution. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) 
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All of the participants agree that an effective response require a lot more than 
socioeconomic equality with men and empowerment of women in politics is a 
prerequisite. It is necessary to underline that ĐKKB has been one of the major supporters 
of affirmative action in politics, and place it at the top of their agenda. In many 
occasions they call for the need of women’s quota55 in national and regional 
parliaments, and contact with political parties directly, in the eve of party congresses to 
pressure them on a significant change to reinforce women’s representation in their 
parties.56 Although the representative of ĐKKB underlined that it is too early for an 
affirmative action request in employment57, the participant of TÜKD emphasized the 
need for and the difficulty of a large scale survey to show the way in which women 
employees are treated in both private and public sector. Moreover she argued that being 
educated and active in professional life is not enough for changing people’s perception 
of women, in that sense she stated that the impact of the rise in socioeconomic status of 
women on the question of gender in Turkish society is limited. (Interviewee-TÜKD, 
2010) 
 
Despite the fact that republican CSOs are fierce defenders of gender equality in 
politics and society, it is necessary to underline that they do not share a common horizon 
on the gender relations within family. They emphasize that spouses must share every 
responsibility and benefits equally58 but they do not converge on radical transformation 
                                                 
55 They argue that political parties should reserve at least 30% of their seats in both 
political party organs and in their representations at regional and national levels. 
(Moroğlu, N.-ĐKKB Koordinatörü, 2008c) 
 
56 On December 16, 2008, ĐKKB Coordinator sent a message to the leader of 
Republican People’s Party to change party regulations in a way that they guarantee 
33% of women’s representation in party commissions, and 50% in the parliament. 
(Moroğlu, N. -ĐKKB Koordinatörü, 2008d) 
 
57 “This is something still debated even in Norway, so it seems that we will keep waiting 
for a while.” (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) 
 
58 All of the participants from republican CSOs referred to the new Civil Law enacted in 
2001, which changed marital property regime from ‘division of property’ to 
‘community property’, which requires equal division of most property aquired during 
marriage between spouses upon divorce or annulment. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) 
(Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) 
(Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 2001) 
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of marital roles. For instance while one of the major opinion leaders in CKD argues that 
women should have a precise role within the family, as a housewife and a child bearer, 
due to ‘innate properties’ of women; another participant from the very same CSO 
defended that the younger generations –fortunately, she added- do not accept the burden 
of traditional roles on women which were adopted by earlier generations without 
hesitation. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) In line with the divergence within the same 
organization, republican CSOs do have a limited agenda in terms of gender-based 
symbolic injustice in private sphere59 and focus on the empowerment of women in 
public sphere and especially in politics, as they think that an increase in women’s 
participation would lead to the betterment of women’s status in general.  
 
Although republican CSOs tend to agree on the fact that women in Turkey need 
remedies in terms of symbolic justice, they oppose the claims of symbolic justice 
originating from ethnic and religious groups. In order to defend their position they 
provide as many justifications as possible. 
Argument 1: 
In many occasions, ĐKKB has emphasized that both the ban on headscarf and the 
claims on Kurdish identity are overrated by politicians, in order to change the political 
agenda which require urgent attention such as economic development and welfare.60 In 
that sense, ĐKKB has commented that such claims were trivial in comparison to ‘real 
problems’. 
Argument 2: 
                                                 
59 Major topic on women’s problem in private sphere which tops the agenda of ĐKKB is 
violence against women. ĐKKB has an extensive informative campaign on domestic 
violence, which seeks to generate a public consciousness on the issue.  
 
60 As presented in the previous section, ĐKKB has opposed to the constitutional 
amendments which intend to lift of ban on headscarf. ĐKKB coordinator used the 
following expression in two different press releases which revealed general tendency 
of member organizations regarding the debate on the lift of the ban.  “Headscarf is 
treated as if it is the only problem of women.” (Moroğlu, N.; ĐKKB Koodinatörü, 
2008a) (Moroğlu, N.; ĐKKB Koordinatörü, 2008b) On the other hand, ĐKKB 
coordinator joined the debate on the Kurdish opening, which government tried to 
meet some of the claims of Kurds with a similar objection. “Democratic openings are 
topping the political agenda, but noone is talking about the genuine 
opening...Women’s equal representation is a question of democracy above all.” (BĐA 
Haber Merkezi, 2009) 
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Extending the impact of religion and ethnic cultures in social life will exacerbate 
the status of women living in communities where ethnicity and religion matter. Because 
women can never be free under the pressure of such communities. In line with these 
arguments, some of the participants have referred to honor killings (Interviewee-TÜKD, 
2010) and the hardships of being a woman in a Kurdish community in the southeastern 
provinces of Turkey. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) In that sense, one of the participants 
argued that women should be emancipated from impositions of misinterpreted religion61 
and oppressive communities. 
Argument 3: 
Positive responses to these claims will threaten the secular republican system. 
According to republican CSOs, precepts of Atatürk’s principles –secularism in 
particular- and republican values which generate from them are the guarantee of 
women’s rights, and compromises such as the lift of ban on headscarf  may entail 
further claims asking for more compromise. (Moroğlu, N.; ĐKKB Koordinatörü, 2008b) 
For some participants, claims on ethnic identities are equally dangerous for the national 
unity which is necessary for the integrity of the country.62 (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) 
(Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) In line with that argument, republican women’s CSOs prefer 
to cooperate with other republican CSOs, as shown in the case of republican rallies 
which I presented in the previous section.  
 
 
3.2.2.2 Symbolic justice from the perspective of Islamic CSOs: Claims of 
headscarf, reserve on gay and lesbian rights 
 
 
Limitation on headscarf in public sphere is the major question for Islamic CSOs 
regarding symbolic injustice, and they take the ban as a question of human rights at 
                                                 
61 She emphasized that Islam rightly understood does not oblige women to wear 
headscarf and Turkish society is in need of the enlightened interpretation of Islam, 
which will clear away such heresies. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) 
 
62  “We are the successor of a huge empire. Now we say that we have a republic which 
changed our conception of society, from ummah to nation. We have to prioritize 
national identity and respect them. If not we fall apart. However, for instance the man 
in Black Sea provinces speak his local language. I travelled along Anatolia and have 
never seen any pressure on them. Their ethnic identities have already been respected. 
I feel that this trend generates under the influence of European Union.” 
(Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) 
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individual level. In that sense they argue that, ‘headscarf’ as a matter of personal 
preference cannot be banned with reference to liberal precepts. However, apart from 
these liberal justifications they tend to support their claims on the basis of religious rules 
and conventions as well. Although they tend to underline the headscarf issue as an 
injury on Muslim women in Turkey, they have strong reserves on gay and lesbian rights. 
These reserves can be traced both in the process of AKDER’s campaign - February 28 
process cannot last a thousand years- which I summarized earlier in this chapter, and in 
the interviews performed for the present study. AKDER, despite its membership to 
GĐKAP, holds an exceptional position regarding the reserves of other member 
organizations vis-à-vis LGBT people which can be read as a conservative homophobia, 
generating from the major purpose of these CSOs, which is the protection of traditional 
family. 
 
All of the participants converge on the view that headscarf ban is a limitation on 
individual’s personal decisions about what to wear and the lift of ban can be taken as a 
question of individual liberty. (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, 
Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) Moreover, they 
argue that their preference for wearing headscarf causes not only exclusion from public 
institutions and services – due to the strict application of legal framework and 
institutional regulations, but also discrimination in public sphere. For the latter, every 
participant gave examples of how members of republican CSOs react to the 
representatives of Islamic CSOs wearing headscarf. 63 Besides, the representative of 
GĐKAP who does not wear headscarf argued that they suffer from the ossified images 
and stereotypes which intensify the discrimination, for instance she stated that she was 
questioned about her role in GĐKAP by the representatives of Republican CSOs several 
times.64 Although they all claim that women wearing headscarf are stigmatized, none of 
                                                 
63 “In nationwide meetings and women’s councils, there were even women who left the 
meeting rooms after we entered in.” (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) “Many of my 
friends were refused to enter the meeting halls due to their attire. And some of these 
meetings were not held in public institution.” (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSOs on 
Social Justice, 2010)  
 
64 “There were even those who questioned me about my existence in GĐKAP. What do 
you do with them? You do not even wear headscarf and so on.” (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 
2010) 
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the interviewees referred to a particular Muslim woman identity65 and preferred to 
defend their position on the basis of individual rights and preferences. The 
representative of GĐKAP repeated their concerns about the claims of identity on the 
question of affirmative action: 
“Our view on affirmative action, as a platform, is that it is dangerous. Receiving 
extra rights on an identity which we did not choose is meaningless. However, we 
argue that women should be supported in areas where we are disadvantaged.”   
(Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) 
 
Although they defend the headscarf as an individual right, they do not hide the religious 
bases of wearing headscarf. In that perspective they often refer to the Islamic 
scripture.66 One of the representatives even argued that her preference of wearing 
headscarf is actually a choice despite her corporal desires. 
“I put on headscarf and wear dresses which cover my body. Even during 
summer. Don’t I have a desire to expose my body to sun and enjoy the breeze? 
But I decided not to. This is what my belief requires.” (Interviewee-Başak, 2010) 
 
 Despite their struggle for the freedom of headscarf, Islamic CSOs are not 
tolerant to the demands of other groups and in particular, they tend to oppose gay rights. 
A recent debate triggered by a member of the present government is an indicator of the 
intolerance for homosexuals among some of the Islamic CSOs. In March 2010, the state 
minister responsible for the affairs of women and families Aliye Kavaf declared that she 
did not have a positive opinion for gay marriage, as she believed that homosexuality is a 
biological disorder or a disease which needs to be treated. (Daily News, 2010) After 
Kavaf’s avowal, Turkish public opinion was divided into two and another member of 
the the cabinet, minister of health was obliged to express a counter opinion regarding 
the lack of scientific evidence which indicates that homosexuality has a biological 
disorder, in order to end the debate by showing that Kavaf’s comment was not the 
official view of the government. A group of Islamic CSOs, including the members of 
GĐKAP such as Birlik Vakfı, AKODER and Hayat Vakfı, announced their support to 
Aliye Kavaf with a common press release. (Mazlumder ve Destekçi STK'lar, 2010) 
                                                 
65 However, some Islamic CSOs which were not included in the present study, refer to a 
particular Muslim woman identity which is rendered visible by headscarf. e.g. 
“Headscarf is our identity” (Özgür-Der, 2007) 
 
66 AKDER and Hazar Group, both members of GĐKAP, refer to Quran and the 
interpretations of Islamic scholars, such as the fatwa of the General Directorate of 
Religious Affairs of Turkish Republic. (Demirci, 2009) (Öğüt, 2010) 
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Although they emphasize that Islam is a religion of tolerance, they argued that any 
attempt to legalize or legitimize homosexuality should be avoided. 
 
 In sum, it is important to note that the arguments of Islamic CSOs, to oppose the 
rights of homosexuals are formulated in a similar way as the arguments of republican 
CSOs for the denial of ethnic and religious groups’ rights.  
Argument 1: 
Some of the representatives of CSOs claim that the question of gender, gay 
rights included, are trivial issues. One of the representatives argued that claims of 
gender are not as important as other questions, such as the ban on headscarf, which 
require urgent solutions. 
“I see your point, gender… Such claims, including gay and lesbian marriage, in 
contrast to legitimate and more important demands, I do not agree with them. It 
is as if some is asking for raspberry cheesecake, while the others are starving. I 
think homosexuality might be generating from a lack of information before 
marriage.” (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) 
 
  Argument 2: 
Emphasizing gay rights can threaten the family and future generation. This 
argument was one of the major ideas provided in the press release transmitted for 
supporting Aliye Kavaf’s negative views on homosexuality.  
“Legitimization of this abnormal situation in various forms and media, pervades 
these practices, and degenerates family values and leads to annihilation of future 
generations.” (Mazlumder ve Destekçi STK'lar, 2010) 
 
In line with this comment, one of the participants argued that she has the right to protect 
her children from the ‘overemphasized’ and ‘overpublicized’ image of gays and 
transsexuals. However she argued that she could only tolerate private practices of 
homosexuality, in case they are not publicly visible. She added that images of overt and 
exaggerated homosexuality provoke moral contamination. (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) 
Argument 3: 
Positive responses to these claims are in conflict with religious precepts and 
morality. Prohibition of homosexuality by Islam and all other monotheistic religions is 
one of the major causes for the denial of gay and lesbian rights. 
“All of the monotheistic religions consider homosexuality as a corrupted, erratic 
and immoral practice and condemn it as a sinful activity which conflicts with the 
law of nature. In many Islamic countries homosexuality is forbidden in order to 
protect the future generations of human race and to avoid the proliferation of 
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homosexuality. According to holy books, societies where such perversions are 
widespread perished on account of their sins.” (Mazlumder ve Destekçi STK'lar, 
2010) 
 
 As presented above, majority of Islamic CSOs tend to protest against the claims 
of gays and lesbians. Although they try to demarcate their opposition vis-à-vis gay 
rights from discrimination, participation of an LGBT association, Kaos GL, to 
AKDER’s ‘February 28 cannot last a thousand years’ campaign, generated tension 
within the Islamic civil society.  Some of the signatories of the campaign informed 
AKDER about their unease for having their names on the same page with an LGBT 
organization. Although AKDER did not ask Kaos GL to retract from the campaign, 
Kaos GL decided to retract its name from the list of supporting organizations and 
participated to the campaign at individual level. This question was made publicly 
known by Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, one of the major opinion leaders of Islamic women’s 
movement and the stepback forced by the conservative Islamic organizations was 
confirmed by both AKDER and Kaos GL. However, Kaos GL announced that they 
agreed upon to cooperate with AKDER on a future project. (Tuksal, 2010a) (Tuksal, 
2010b) (Kaos GL, 2010)  
 
This campaign was one of the major events which I referred to during the 
interviews. While GĐKAP participant explained their reason for not participating to the 
campaign by referring to humane and legal concerns of some member organization, 
participant of AKDER stated in the interview that they try to cooperate with everyone 
without discrimination in case they find a common horizon.67 (Interviewee-AKDER, 
2010) (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) 
 
Before starting the theoretical analysis of the empirical findings presented in this 
chapter, it is better to summarize the position of republican and Islamic women’s civil 
society organizations as follows: 
- In terms of socioeconomic injustice, republican CSOs try to focus on 
                                                 
67 Participant of AKDER emphasized that they are ready to cooperate with other 
women’s organizations as well. For instance, she argued that they try to back up 
affirmative action claims of feminist and republican CSOs during common councils. 
In that sense, they established close relationships with KADER. Regarding their 
support for affirmative action, they clearly diverge from GĐKAP’s reserves on 
affirmative action. (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) 
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individuals as unit of analysis and emphasize that women are those who suffer the most. 
They evaluate their projects of professional education as an efficient way of dealing 
with feminine poverty and they utilize these projects for generating a citizenship 
consciousness and for the betterment of women’s status in society. On the other hand 
Islamic CSOs are more prone to take the question of socioeconomic injustice in terms of 
familial poverty. In that sense they try to provide housewives with means to trade the 
goods generating from household production. Besides, due to the significant number of 
charitable organizations within Islamic movement, they aim at the fair and efficient 
organization of social aids and charities. 
- Regarding symbolic injustice, republican CSOs underline that women’s 
problems cannot be limited to socioeconomic injustice. In that sense, they claim that 
they try to struggle with gender discrimination. However, as they do not have a common 
incentive to interrogate gender roles in private sphere their efforts mostly focus on 
public sphere. Islamic CSOs particularly focus on ban the on headscarf, and they tend to 
formulate their claims regarding the lift of ban on the basis of individual rights, 
although they do not hesitate to use essentialist arguments which refer to religious 
precepts either.  
 
Despite both republican CSOs and Islamic CSOs underline the need of symbolic 
justice vis-à-vis the key issues topping their agenda, gender equality for the former and 
freedom for wearing headscarf in public, they tend to undermine some other claims. 
While republican CSOs have reserves regarding claims generating from ethnic and 
religious groups, Islamic CSOs strongly oppose to gay and lesbian rights. In general 
they use common strategies while refuting the claims they disapprove: 
1. They try to trivialize them by arguing that there are many other problems 
waiting for solution. 
2. They claim that the rights which these groups are asking for would raise 
crucial problems –related to ‘women’ for republicans, and ‘family’ for 
Islamic organizations. 
3. They strongly assert that responding to these claims would contradict with or 
violate the precepts of a pre-existing system, which is secular republic for 
republicans, and religious morality for Islamic organizations. 
 
However, one of the CSOs analyzed in that study, AKDER does not fit in the 
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empirical analysis summarized above, hence it should be considered as an outlier within 
GĐKAP, the platform which unites Islamic women’s CSOs in Istanbul. Theoretical 
analysis of these findings will provide us with the end result of the present study.  
 
 
 
 
3.3. Diverging Social Justice Views: Impact of Kemalism and Islam(ism) on 
Republican and Islamic CSOs as Competing Traditions  
 
 
 
   When I asked one of the participants of Islamic CSOs about ĐKKB, she told me 
that despite her limited knowledge about that platform, she already knew that AKDER 
could have no place there. Then she added that GĐKAP actually was founded with a 
motivation which generated from the sense of exclusion from such ‘mainstream’ civil 
society organizations. (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) On the other hand, when I posed a 
similar question to a republican CSO about GĐKAP, she preferred to respond ‘off the 
record’. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) These experiences do not seem to fit in Şirin 
Tekeli’s following remarks about civil society in Turkey.  
“While we were approaching the end of the decade it appeared that, perhaps for 
the first time in history, a ‘civil society’ was coming into existence, made out of 
divergent groups of conflicting interests which nonetheless formed a common 
block opposed to the state. Though all of these divergent groups aimed at 
influencing the state, there was a growing consensus of mutual recognition of 
their co-existence. Hence interest groups which barely accepted the legitimacy 
of their counterparts came onto common ground where they valued ‘recognition 
and consensus’ and acquired democratic guarantees from the state.” (Tekeli, 
1995, p. 7) 
 
  Regarding the position of the analyzed civil society organizations on the 
question of social justice, it can be asserted that the deep divergence, which can be read 
in their preference for founding distinct platforms for republican and Islamic civil 
society organizations, is reflected both on their propositions and activities to avoid the 
injustices which they struggle against and on their objections to the claims of others. In 
the final step of this study, I will try to interpret the difference which avoids them from 
having a common horizon –or at least a broader cooperation for struggling against 
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injustices inflicting damage on them as ‘women”.68 
 
 
3.3.1.   Ambivalent Claims of ‘Social Justice’: Between Liberalism and Tradition   
 
Although participants from both republican and Islamic CSOs tend to justify 
their claims on the basis of ‘individual rights’ and ‘preferences’ in line with the liberal 
understanding of social justice, they do not abstain from referring to the values which 
they borrow from a particular interpretation of ‘good’. Moreover, the impact of the 
intellectual and valuational framework on their understanding of justice becomes more 
overt and decisive when they oppose to the claims of groups which they consider to be 
threatening. The reference points of each group, which tie both of them to a ‘tradition’, 
are mentioned even in the constitutive protocols of the platforms; while republican 
women united under ĐKKB refer to the triad of ‘secularism, equality, and democracy’, 
Islamic women who got together under GĐKAP emphasize the ‘essential values’ as their 
moral cement. Before starting the analysis of the relation between the social justice 
views and intellectual traditions which these groups adopt, it is necessary to refer to 
MacIntyre’s account of ‘tradition’ for a better understanding of the linkage between 
‘tradition’ and social justice: 
“A living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument, 
and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition. 
Hence the individual’s search for his or her good is generally and 
characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of 
which the individual’s life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which 
are internal to practices and of the goods of a single life.” (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 
144-145) 
 
 Despite this reference to MacIntyre’s proposition -about the impact of tradition 
on  social justice views of individuals or groups-  which opens a horizon for the present 
evaluation regarding the social justice views of republican and Islamic CSOs, I abstain 
from furthering this analysis to provide a reality check aiming at the justification of 
MacIntyre’s criticisms against liberalism and ‘constructive enterprises of justice’ which 
try to arrive at a universal understanding of justice independent of the impact of pre-
                                                 
68 In some occasions republican and Islamic women’s organizations come together, such 
as large scale meetings of the advisory boards of governmental institutions.(e.g. 
ASAGEM and KSGM meetings) In these meetings, they agree upon some basic 
principles such as ‘denial of domestic violence’, and ‘the condemnation of separatist 
terrorism”. (Milliyet, 2007) (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) 
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existing moralities.69 However, it is an effective key to interpret the divergence between 
republican and Islamic women’s groups. Regarding the scope of the present study, I will 
not try to argue for the idiosyncracy or universal validity of a theoretical account which 
prioritizes and emphasizes the effect of tradition and community on the social justice 
views of individuals. 
 
 Apart from this limitation about the theoretical aspect of the analysis, I want to 
underline that the empirical aspect of this analysis will be built on the major 
characteristics of each group, and an extensive analysis regarding the differences within 
both republican and Islamic civil societies will be avoided, since this would require a 
much more detailed, extensive fieldwork which would take a number of years. Hence, 
this thesis aims at revealing certain tips of the iceberg-like topic of study. 
 
 
3.3.2.   Republican CSOs : Kemalist Revolution and Identity Construction 
 
The impact of Kemalism on women’s movements has been one of the curious 
subjects since 1980s. The connection between Kemalism and women’s activism can be 
examined with reference to two different stages of republican history. First, after the 
proclamation of Republic in 1923, Kemalist elites implemented a series of reforms 
which aimed at the westernization of Turkish society. Some of these reforms, in 
particular70, changed women’s legal status, and a new identity of ‘Turkish woman’ was 
constructed71. (Arat Z. F., 1994) (Durakbaşa, 2000) (Arat Z. F., 2000) Second, in the 
                                                 
69 “The evidence for the failure of Kant’s heirs in these constructive enterprises is 
contained in the reviews of the books expounding them in the professional 
philosophical journals. The book review pages of these journals are the graveyards of 
constructive academic philosophy.” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 334) 
 
70 A new civil code which prohibited polygamy and introduced civil marriage was 
enacted in 1926. State secularism was proclaimed in 1928. Women’s suffrage was 
adopted in 1934. 
 
71 In line with the ideals of Westernization of Kemalism, women were emancipated and 
transformed into socially active citizens and they were encouraged to have education 
and to participate in economy. However, Kemalist revolution did not seek at a 
complete revolution of women, and proposed an ecclectic formula for the solution of 
woman question. Modernizing ideology was combined with a conservative puritan 
morality, which envisaged the protection of woman not by Islamic veiling, but by the 
creation of a new women’s identity which recommended the ‘daughters of republic’ 
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aftermath of 1980 military coup, a brand new feminist movement independent of any 
existing male dominated political ideologies emerged. At the beginning, new feminist 
movement had a close partnership with republican women’s civil society organizations 
which can be traced back to the early years of Republican era, due to their common 
belief in the need for a secular system for women’s emancipation. (Sirman, 1989) In 
that sense, although Kemalism has never been an ideology which anticipates a gender 
revolution, has a significant impact on women’s movements due to its strong emphasis 
on state secularism and its desire to attain a westernized liberal society where women 
are socially active, even after a real feminist movement was born in 1980s. (Arat Y. , 
1991) Despite the fact that feminist women’s movement had a completely distinct 
character from 1990s onwards, as focusing on ‘gender’ has never been a concern for 
Kemalism72, the impact of the latter on women’s activism remained. For instance, the 
majority of the members of ĐKKB and ĐKKB as a platform in general express their 
devotion to Kemalism.  
 
The empirical analysis in the previous section clearly shows that social justice 
views of republican women’s CSOs tend to generate from Kemalism, both as a tradition 
which gave birth to a particular women’s identity and as a state doctrine which is 
considered to guarantee the enjoyment of women’s rights. In order to show how 
Kemalism shapes the general outline of republican women’s account of social justice, I 
will follow the same order as in the empirical analysis and begin with socioeconomic 
justice. 
 
In many analyses, Kemalist movement is considered to be an effort for changing 
superstructure independent of the economic structure. (Göle, 1996, p. 73) However, as 
Şerif Mardin states that Kemalism triggered a change in socioeconomic system, which 
he describes as follows: 
                                                                                                                                               
to preserve their modesty. (Durakbaşa, 2000) 
 
72 Although some of the scholars such as Deniz Kandiyoti and Şirin Tekeli interpret 
women’s emancipation in the early years of Kemalist revolution as a ‘state 
feminism’, Zehra Arat underlines that she abstains from calling any ideology with no 
reference to ‘gender’ as ‘feminism’. In line with Arat’s concerns, and the need for 
demarcating republican women’s movements from feminist organizations, I will not 
use the expressions of ‘state feminism’ or ‘Kemalist feminism’. (Tekeli, 1988, p. 
315) (Kandiyoti, 1991) (Arat Z. F., 1994, p. 74) 
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“The concept of ‘opportunity space’ as the totality of the areas that one may use 
to improve or raise one’s economic status is used here because many economic 
areas that were ‘open’ in Western Europe were ‘closed’ in the Ottoman Empire. 
An example may be provided from property relations. In many ways private 
property was controlled and restricted in the Ottoman Empire. Granting full 
property rights as they appeared in Western law codes opened up a whole new 
area of economic transactions to Turks. This expansion of new opportunities 
occurred in a number of economic spheres, beginning with the nineteenth 
century, even though the income distribution pattern might not have changed. 
When this expansion occurred, the expansion itself was a positive move that 
deflected the attention of some economic strata from their situation of economic 
subordination to the brand-new opportunities that had been opened up for them.” 
(Mardin, 2006, p. 65)  
 
Yeşim Arat, with reference to Mardin’s concept of ‘opportunity space’, emphasizes that 
Kemalist socioeconomic system was enabling individuals with the chance to raise their 
socioeconomic status, and women were given the opportunity to take part in economic 
activity as well. Regarding the rise of ‘a group of well-educated, urban and rights bearer 
women’, education was considered to be the catalyst of socioeconomic growth at 
individual level. (Arat Y. , 1991, p. 9) Besides, the link between economy and education 
was underlined at the Economic Congress, held in Izmir. (Arat Z. F., 2000) In that 
sense, education was at the top of the Kemalist agenda both for socioeconomic 
betterment of individuals, and for the development of the country. Republican women’s 
emphasis on the triad of education, development, and social justice little differ from the 
Kemalist perspective of the early years of the republican era. 
 
 Although Kemalism created room for a ‘socially active woman’, it is important 
to note that Kemalism established a modern gendered society in place of the ancient one 
which was built on the strict separation of men and women in both public and private.    
(Durakbaşa, 2000) (Arat Z. F., 2000) However, due to the fact that Kemalism left intact 
the gender division of labor within the family73, it did not provide the contemporary 
republican women’s movement with a common horizon for formulating an extensive 
                                                 
73 “Although women’s social recognition in the public domain did not challenge the 
direct male/female relations in the private domain and even narrowed their power 
there, women’s domestic duties took on a new character with the ‘rationalization’ of 
housework and the advent of the science of home-economics. Information about 
hygiene, scientific upbringing of children, housework technology, and homemaking 
were instructed through the family and women’s magazines and courses taught at 
schools, and adult education programs offered courses on those subjects.” 
(Durakbaşa, 2000, p. 144) 
86 
 
interrogation of gender. As presented in the previous section, symbolic justice claims of 
republican women’s CSOs are still mostly interested in attaining the gender equality in 
the public sphere, and in terms of a gender justice within family they are far from 
having a consensus on the transformation of women’s role in present as ‘the housewife’ 
and ‘the child bearer’. In that sense, major claims of these groups for overcoming the 
symbolic injustice which women face are about the furthering of women’s rights and 
the protection of women’s gains generating from legal and social reforms of Kemalist 
revolution. In line with the empirical findings presented in the previous section, Zehra 
F. Arat defines republican women’s position as a legalistic approach, due to their 
emphasis on the legal rights of women. Besides, the answers of the participants to the 
question about women’s history in Turkey show that republican women in Turkey tend 
to think that Kemalist revolution is the milestone which changed the destiny of Turkish 
women completely. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) 
(Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) 
 
 Finally, when we look at the concerns of republican CSOs vis-à-vis claims of 
religious and ethnic groups, it is quite clear that they formulate their arguments in line 
with the Kemalist state doctrine, which is built on immutable pillars such as state 
secularism and nation state. In particular, they put an accent on the preservation of 
Kemalist republic during their partnerships with other republican CSOs under the 
umbrella of USTKB. (USTKB, 2008) However, it is important to note that during the 
interviews majority of the participants expressed their sensitivity about the protection of 
woman who they consider to be suffering under the authoritarian rules of male-
dominated ethnic and religious groups. In that sense, they get close to Okin’s liberal 
feminist point of view which argues that women are prone to be oppressed in case the 
ethnic and religious groups’ rights are recognized due to the patriarchal character of 
these cultures. (Okin, 1997)   
 
 
3.3.3.   Islamic CSOs : Revival of Religious Morality as the Precursor of Society 
 
Although Kemalist revolution aimed at the gradual secularization of society by 
adopting state secularism, from 1980s onwards, in urban Turkey, Islam gained a new 
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visibility with the covering of women.74 As Göle, Đlyasoğlu and Saktanber show, this 
phenomenon was about the identity construction of an alternative normativity, which 
stemmed from the regeneration of Islam accelerated by a political movement. (Göle, 
1996) (Đlyasoğlu, 1994) (Saktanber, 1994) Later on in 1990s, the representative of the 
political Islam, pro-Islamic Welfare Party had a nationwide success, thanks to its 
grassroots organizations where women were actively involved in the dissemination of 
party’s message. (Arat Y. , 1999) (Arat Y. , 2005) However, women who were 
considered to be the bearers of new Islamic woman identity, did not limit their activity 
by staying in the women’s branches of pro-Islamic parties. For some, revitalization of 
Islam was assumed to be an ideology appropriate for generating a women’s activism, 
which was arguing for an alternative woman identity in contrast to the new Turkish 
woman image fostered by Kemalism as a part of its ideals for building a westernized 
liberal society. For instance, in the mid-1980s, Cihan Aktaş, one of the most prominent 
Islamist woman critics in Turkey, argued for a gender sensitive interpretation of the new 
Islamic message.75   In that sense, the impact of the revitalized Islam was not limited to 
the politics and it had a decisive influence on the formation of an Islamic women’s civil 
society. (Đlkkaracan, 1997) 
 
Although that history, which I summarized quite shortly with reference to the 
common findings of earlier studies carried out in the field, it is important to underline 
that we actually do not face a monolithic Islamic women’s society. While Göle explains 
the diversity within Islamic women’s movement by the tension between traditionalism 
and radicalism, Kadıoğlu and Özdalga refer to a tradeoff between liberalism and 
community orientation. (Göle, 1996, pp. 88-89) (Kadıoğlu, 2005, p. 26) However, due 
to the limited scope of the present study, I will refer to Islamic tradition as a common 
horizon of normativity which affects the basic ideas of Islamic CSOs on the question of 
                                                 
74 “Women wearing long, loose overcoats and headscarves tightly framimg their faces 
and covering their necks and bosoms are now a familiar part of the urban scene, as 
well as of university campuses.” (Saktanber, 1994, p. 99) 
 
75 “Cihan Aktaş, perhaps the most prominent Islamist woman critic, believed that 
westernization meant adoption of superficial, if not immoral modes of behavior that 
were accompanied with women’s victimization through demeaning, low-paying jobs 
in the labor market. Aktaş argued that ‘some privileges granted to some women as 
rights, could mean injustice to others’.” (Arat Y. , 2005, s. 22)  
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social justice. 
 
As indicated in the empirical analysis, Islamic women’s movements aim to 
organize social aids and charities in a way that the distribution of them provides a 
contribution to everyone who struggle with poverty. However, it is necessary to 
underline the distinction between liberal justifications of redistribution and the efficient 
distribution of aids and charity. As shown at the beginning of this chapter, charitable 
organizations constitute a significant number of members of GĐKAP, and they are 
mostly Islamic vakıfs,76 which do not merely focus on what and how much the 
supported people receive. The position of the giver, who has the duty to help people in 
need as a believer, is equally important. In that sense helping those who really suffer is 
essential. Regarding the handicraft markets which intend to provide housewives with an 
alternative channel for evaluating their household production, the impact of ban on 
headscarf which avoids the employment of a large group of women in formal sector 
cannot be underestimated. However, as previously referred to Aktaş’s criticisms 
regarding the victimization of women in professional life, it is necessary to underline 
the influence of an ideal Islamic way of life which preserves the traditional gender 
division of labor. (Hazar, Eğitim, Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, 2004) In that sense, 
promotion of household production by Islamic women’s CSOs stems from on the one 
hand legal and social restrictions which they cannot control, on the other hand gender 
division of labor which is an important component of Islamic way of life. 
 
Lift of the ban on headscarf is the major claim of Islamic women’s CSOs 
regarding symbolic justice. This claim should be read in line with Saktanber’s analysis 
about the ambivalence of Muslim women identity, dialogically constructed by the sense 
of pride born out of being close to ‘traditional’ and ‘unspoiled’ on the one hand, and the 
sense of injury which stems from not receiving full recognition in the public realm on 
the other.77 (Saktanber, 1994, p. 105) As shown in the empirical analysis, this 
                                                 
76 One of the member CSOs of GĐKAP, Birlik Vakfı explains their mission as a vakıf as 
follows: “We aim to serve humankind and perform our duties as servants of God, to 
bring everyone the goods generating from him, and in line with man’s natural 
dispositions put him on the right way of goodness, as he is inclined to badness as 
well.” (Birlik Vakfı, 2005) 
 
77 Kenan Çayır refers to an old pamphlet of GĐKAP  in his master’s thesis on GĐKAP 
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ambivalence generates two different sorts of arguments for the lift of ban on headscarf, 
while the first one intends to take the ban as a question of human rights –in line with the 
sense of injury; the second one emphasizes the religious precepts and the requirements 
of Muslim identity –in line with the sense of pride. As a result, claims for the ban on 
headscarf are ambivalent: its connection to human rights gives it a liberal character; 
while its emphasis on the Islamic tradition reveals its communitarian basis. 
 
In particular, the opposition of Islamic women’s CSOs towards gay and lesbian 
rights has an overtly illiberal character, as their arguments78 do not refer to liberty of 
individuals or the protection of them. In that sense, Islam is still the prominent tradition 
which defines the normativity under which Islamic women’s movement tends to 
formulate its own claims of justice and its opposition about the ‘controversial’ claims of 
other groups.  
 
At the end of the analysis, it is important to note that both republican and Islamic 
women’s CSOs tend to stay within liberal paradigm, if and only if the liberalism is 
capable of defending their particular position which is shaped by the tradition which 
provides them with a system of normativity. Especially, the primacy of Kemalism and 
Islam for republican and Islamic CSOs consecutively is obvious in their arguments for 
opposing the ‘inconvenient’ claims of other groups. While the republican CSOs do not 
refrain from emphasizing the preservation of the Kemalist system, in order to protect it 
from the future damages which might occur in case claims of ethnic and religious 
groups are accepted; Islamic CSOs refer to scriptures about the exhaustion of sinful 
communities, in their arguments against gay and lesbian rights. In that sense, liberalism 
and concepts which born out of it, do only accompany social justice views of both 
group, but fall short of guiding them. 
                                                                                                                                               
“After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim women in Turkey kept 
themselves on the periphery since they were told that they had no place in modern 
life. When they rarely entered public places they were confronted with the possibility 
of legal proceedings. They kept themselves out of sight because they were told that 
everything which symbolized their identity was in conflict with social progress.” 
(Çayır, 1997) 
 
78 As shown in the previous section, their major motive for opposing the gay rights is 
the preservation of the family and the religious morality which they consider to be 
prohibiting homosexual practices.  
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But then, how are we to understand the dialogue between AKDER and Kaos 
GL? A complete explanation of this cooperation is well beyond the scope of the present 
study, however I will try to seek a limited and tentative explanation in the concluding 
remarks which will be presented in the last chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
COCLUSIO 
 
 
 
 
The major purpose of this study was to examine the way in which republican 
and Islamic women’s movements assess the question of social justice. Arguing that the 
mainstream social justice literature would provide a firm grounding for the evaluation of 
diverging claims of social justice generated by both groups, on the one hand the 
propositions of each movement were analyzed with respect to the socioeconomic justice 
– symbolic justice dichotomy; on the other hand despite their sharp divergence in terms 
of arguments and claims, republican and Islamic groups’ social justice views were 
explained with reference to MacIntyre’s theory of justice, which emphasize the impact 
of tradition on justice views of individuals and groups. However, as previously 
indicated in the last section, this study does not intend to justify MacIntyre’s criticisms 
against liberalism, which he argues to be a misleading ideology which overshadows the 
effect of community and tradition on the formation of social justice claims of 
individuals. 
 
   The findings of the study suggest that Kemalism and Islam are preeminent 
traditions which define the contours of social justice views supported by republican and 
Islamic CSOs consecutively, although both republican and Islamic women’s movements 
tend to refer to a liberal account of justice which assumes the priority of liberties and 
aims at the extension of rights in their own claims of justice. However, the impact of 
Kemalism and Islam on these movements is quite evident in their opposition against the 
rights of other groups. While republican women’s CSOs tend to oppose the claims of 
ethnic and religious groups with reference to Kemalist state doctrine, especially when 
they cooperate with other male-dominated republican CSOs; Islamic women’s CSOs 
refer to scriptures while they protest against the gay rights. In that sense, in line with 
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Karacan’s evaluation about the impact of political ideologies on the fragmentation in 
women’s civil society in Turkey, this study argues that the impact of Kemalist and 
Islamic traditions are not limited to the determination of priorities vis-à-vis women’s 
questions, but they are decisive for the formation of diverging views of social justice 
which stem from conflicting traditions. 79 
  
 Given the evolution of social justice literature, it might seem inappropriate to use 
MacIntyre’s theory for the explanation of contemporary women’s movements’ positions 
on the question of social justice. However, tradition is still the major factor which shape 
Islamic and republican women’s CSOs’ social justice views. In that sense these views 
fall short of embracing recent debates and theories which focus on gender and class 
related oppression, or those which intend to justify the concerns of justice with respect 
to the assumptions and objectives of liberalism. Neither Fraser’s nor Young’s critical 
contributions, nor Kymlicka’s liberal intervention help to understand the way in which 
Islamic and republican women’s CSOs treat the question of social justice. In both of 
these movements, where the influence of male-dominated traditions is still intact, major 
categories of social justice question, such as gender and class, are overshadowed. 
  
General findings of this study lead us to two interrelated questions which require 
further research. How can women activists with distinct traditions can communicate and 
cooperate? How can we interpret AKDER’s position when it establishes a dialogue with 
Kaos GL despite the other Islamic associations’ strong opposition against gay rights?  
 
MacIntyre has a quite pessimistic interpretation about mutually exclusive 
traditions, and argues that even dialogue between the bearers of rival tradition is not 
quite possible: 
A social universe composed exclusively of rival traditions, so it may seem, will 
be one in which there are a number of contending, incompatible, but only 
                                                 
79 “At the beginning of the 90’s, the women’s movement in Turkey appeared to have 
lost its initial power of activism and influence in the restructuring of Turkish society. 
This is the result of several factors. For a start, the main discourses of the nineteenth 
century, namely Modernism, which formed the foundation of Kemalism during the 
twentieth century, Islamism and Nationalism are still present. The women’s 
movement has not yet managed to free itself from these discourses and to form its 
own discourse. Hence, it has been unable to develop a critical approach to all of them 
as elements of the patriarchal system.” (Đlkkaracan, 1997, p. 8) 
93 
 
partially and inadequately communicating, overall views of that universe, each 
tradition within which is unable to justify its claims over against those of its 
rivals except to those who already accept them. (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 348) 
 
For instance, in line with that statement, some of the participants admitted that they do 
not think that any sort of dialogue between republican and Islamic CSOs would change 
anything regarding the headscarf controversy; neither about the present position of each 
group, nor about the solution of the issue at the political level. (Interviewee-ĐKKB, 
2010) (Interviewee-GĐKAP, 2010) On the other hand, if the situation is so desperate 
how come an LGBT organization could give public support to the campaign run by an 
Islamic women’s CSO, which aims at the lift of ban on headscarf? 
 
 The representative of Kaos GL, stated that they participated in the campaign 
although they think that Islamic veiling is an external control mechanism over women’s 
body and it would never be supported by them. However, their major motive was 
responding to the discrimination and exclusion which women face after they decide to 
wear the headscarf. Besides, they argued that they could have the chance to get to know 
each other with the members of AKDER in common projects and conferences, and they 
found out that some of the members of AKDER –as individuals- act against the 
discrimination of homosexuals, although their attitude has not provoke a change in the 
institutional policy of AKDER yet. On the other hand, a representative of AKDER 
emphasized in the interview that they are trying to extend their cooperation as much as 
possible. She added that although they are aware of the fact that they cannot have 
complete agreement on any issue with anyone, making coalitions with sharing common 
concerns is crucial for them. (Kaos GL, 2010) (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) 
 
Similar endeavors seem to require a thorough analysis in order to find out what 
really makes people from so different communities, who actually do not share the 
values of each other at all, come together, in an effort to understand the power of 
contending and incompatible traditions generating fragmented social universes such as 
the women’s civil society in Turkey. Is it the ‘similitude’ beyond differences as Göle 
argues80, or knowing differences better by the experience of diversity as Young claims? 
(Young, 1997, pp. 264-265) 
                                                 
80 “There exists a possibility for recognition of difference only when one finds 
similitude with the other.” (Göle, 2003, p. 28) 
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APPEDIX A 
 
ITERVIEW QUESTIOS 
 
1. Kısaca kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? / Could you present yourself briefly?  
2. Kişisel sivil toplum geçmişinizden bahseder misiniz? / Could you please present 
your personal history in civil society? 
3. Dernek/Platform/Birlik olarak başlıca amaç ve etkinlikleriniz nelerdir? / What 
are the major objectives and activities of your association/platform/union?  
4. Sizce, Türkiye’de sosyal adaletsizlik sorununda mağdur olan başlıca gruplar 
hangileridir? / According to you, what are the major groups which are 
victimized by social injustice? 
5. Sizce, özellikle hangi kadınlar mağdur oluyor? / According to you, which 
women are victimized particularly? 
6. Sizce, kadınların sosyal adalet ekseninde karşılaştığı başlıca sorunlar nelerdir? / 
According to you, what are the major problems which women face in terms of 
social justice? 
7. Genel olarak, kadınların sosyal adalet sorununa dair ne gibi önerilerde 
bulunabilirsiniz? / In general, what are your propositions on the question of 
social justice? 
8. Kadınlar içinde özellikle mağdur olduğunu söylediğiniz gruplar için ne gibi 
önerilerde bulunabilirsiniz? / What are your propositions, regarding the women 
who you consider to be victimized in particular? 
9. ‘Dağılımsal adalet’ hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? / What do you think about 
distributive justice? (Đlgili kavramlar: Sosyal devlet, eşitsiz gelir dağılımı, sosyal 
hizmetler, tam istihdam...vs / Related concepts: Welfare state,  unequal income 
distribution, social services, full employment...etc) 
10. ‘Sembolik adalet’ hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? / What do you think about 
symbolic justice? (Đlgili kavramlar: Ayrımcılık, önyargı, etnik ve dinsel 
kimlikler, cinsiyet, cinsel yönelim...vs / Related concepts: Discrimination, 
prejudice, ethnic and religious identities, sex-gender, sexual orientation...etc) 
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11. Haklar ve sosyal adalet sorunu arasında nasıl bir bağlantı görüyorsunuz? / In 
your opinion, what is the relationship between rights and social justice? 
12. Türkiye tarihine baktığınızda kadınların karşılaştığı toplumsal adaletsizliğin 
giderilmesine yönelik en önemli adım/olay nedir? / What was the major step / 
event against the social injustice which women face in Turkey? 
13. Derneğinizin sosyal adalet sorununa dair yürüttüğü faaliyetler nelerdir? / What 
sort of activities does ....... Organization engage in, regarding the question of 
social justice?  
14. Derneğinizin/platformunuzun ilişki içinde bulunduğu diğer 
dernekler/sendikalar/siyasi partiler hangileri? / What other CSOs / trade unions 
/ political parties do you cooperate with? 
15. Diğer organizasyonlarla birlikte sosyal adalet sorununa dair ortak çalışmalarda 
bulundunuz mu? / Have you ever realized any activity or project with other 
organizations which you cooperate with? 
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APPEDIX B 
 
 
 
ĐSTABUL KADI KURULUŞLARI BĐRLĐĞĐ (ĐKKB) 
Kuruluşu: 17 Şubat 1995 
PROTOKOLU 
 
Biz, aşağıda imzası bulunan kuruluşlar, 1990 yılından beri Đstanbul Kadın 
Kuruluşları adı altında birlikte çeşitli eylem ve etkinlikler gerçekleştirdik. 
Kadın erkek eşitliği konusundaki duyarlılığımızı topluma yansıtmaya çalıştık. 
Laiklik, eşitlik ve demokrasi ortak paydamız oldu. Kadının insan haklarının çiğnendiği 
her durumda tepkimizi büyük bir uyum içinde medyaya ve ilgililere ulaştırdık. 
Bu işbirliğini, bundan böyle (17 Şubat 1995) daha da yoğun biçimde “Đstanbul 
Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği (ĐKKB)” adı altında sürdürmeye kararlıyız. 
Đstanbul’daki tüm kadın kuruluşları ve kadın ağırlıklı sivil toplum örgütleriyle 
şubeleri bu Birliğin doğal üyeleridir. 
Birliğin Yürütme Kurulu her yıl dönüşümlü olarak değişen yedi veya dokuz 
kuruluş başkanından oluşur. Birliğin yürütme kurulu, iletişimi ve etkinlikleri tüm 
derneklerle, vakıflarla işbirliği içinde sürdürmek üzere görevli ve yetkilidir. Birliğin 
işleyişini kolaylaştırmak üzere bir koordinatör (başkan) seçilir. 
Đstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği partiler üstü bir topluluktur. Ancak, kadın 
politikası yapar ve siyasi partilerin kadın komisyonları başkanlarını da doğal üye olarak 
içerir. 
 
Kuruluş adı: 
 
Başkan: 
Temsilci: 
Adres: 
Tel-faks: 
e-posta:  
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APPEDIX C 
 
 
GÖKKUŞAĞI ĐSTABUL KADI KURULUŞLARI PLATFORMU 
(GĐKAP) MUTABAKAT TUTAAĞI  
 
 
Madde 1. Kuruluşun Adı ve Merkezi 
Kuruluşun Adı: Gökkuşağı Đstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu  
Kısa Adı: GĐKAP 
Đngilizce Adı: Rainbow Istanbul Women Organizations’ Platform 
Kuruluş Tarihi: 5 Mayıs 1995 
Merkezi: Đstanbul  
 
Madde 2. GĐKAP’ın Dayanağı  
5253 sayılı Dernekler Kanununun 25. maddesinde “Dernekler, amaçları ile ilgisi 
bulunan ve kanunlarla yasaklanmayan alanlarda, kendi aralarında veya vakıf, sendika ve 
benzeri sivil toplum kuruluşlarıyla ortak bir amacı gerçekleştirmek üzere ve yetkili 
organlarının kararı ile platformlar oluşturabilirler” ifadesi yer almaktadır.  
T.C.Başbakanlık Kadın Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü (K.S.G.M) “Đl ve Bölge Danışma 
Platformlarını, kadın örgütlemesinde “yeni bir örgüt kimliği’’ olarak tanımlamaktadır. 
“Bu yapılanmayı, resmi olmayan ama gerçek gücünü bağımsız birimlerin bir araya 
gelme isteğinden alan yerel/toplumsal bir potansiyeli temsil eden açık bir örgütlenme 
düzeyidir, ara örgütlenme birimidir’’şeklinde tarif etmektedir.81  
 
Madde 3. GĐKAP’ın Vizyonu   
Toplumsal değişim süreci çerçevesinde, ülkemizde ve dünyada etkileri açısından yaygın 
ve önemli sosyal problemler yaşanmaktadır.  
Vizyonumuz; gönüllü kadın kuruluşlarının öncelikle kadın ve aile eksenli olmak 
üzere ortak paydalar çerçevesinde, proje ve politikaların üretim süreçlerinde aktif rol 
oynamalarını sağlamak, kadından topluma kadın bakış açısıyla küresel düşünüp yerel 
ve özgün çözümler üretmektir.   
                                                 
81 Đl ve Bölge Danışma Platformlarının kuruluş amacı, T.C.Hükümeti ile B.M. 
Kalkınma Programı çerçevesinde imzalanan bir anlaşma gereği 18.02.1993 tarihli 
Resmi Gazetede yayınlanmıştır.  
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Madde 4. GĐKAP’ın Misyonu ve Stratejisi  
Platformumuzun misyonu; kadın, aile ve GĐKAP katılımcısı gönüllü kadın 
kuruluşlarının statüsünü yükseltmektir. Bu amaçla farklı sahalarda çalışan ve farklı 
birikimlere sahip gönüllü kadın kuruluşlarını periyodik süreçlerde bir araya 
getirerek;  
a. Kadınların aile içinde, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel hayatta üretken bireyler 
olmalarını desteklemek,  
b. Temel hak ve özgürlüklerin toplumda yaygınlaşmasını sağlamak,  
c. Yaşam boyu eğitimi teşvik etmek,  
d. Çeşitli sebeplerle aile kurumu dışında kalmış bireylerin (huzurevi, yetiştirme 
yurdu, sığınma evi vb.) yaşam koşullarını iyileştirmek,  
e. Aile destek hizmetlerini toplumda yaygınlaştırmak,  
f. Kadın ve aileyle ilgili olarak hayatı anlamlandıran her konuyu (sağlık, hukuk, 
çevre, sanat, spor, medya, etik değerler vb.) çalışma sahası içinde kabul etmek,  
g. Kadın STK’ları desteklemek ve verimliliği artırmaya yönelik proje ve 
programlar uygulamak,   
h. Özdeğerlerlerimizi muhafaza etmek, ulusal ve uluslararası platformlarda 
tanıtmak amacıyla çalışmalar yürütmektir.  
 
Madde 5. GĐKAP’ın Yapılanma Đlkeleri  
a. Platform çalışmalarını, Mutabakat Tutanağı ve Đçyönetmelik çerçevesinde 
yapmak, 
b. Katılımcıları arzuları dışında herhangi bir göreve zorlamamak,  
c. Katılımcıların bağımsız, özgün yapılarını ve kimliklerini zenginlik kaynağı 
olarak kabul etmek, 
d. Bireysel ve kurumsal dayatmalardan, otoriter tutumlardan uzak durmak, 
katılımcılar arasında eşitlik prensibiyle hareket etmek, demokratik kurallarla 
çalışmak, 
e. Sevgi, saygı ve hoşgörü ortamını muhafaza etmek. 
 
Madde 6. GĐKAP’ın Çalışma Biçimi:  
Vizyonu ve misyonu doğrultusunda,  
a. Katılımcı kuruluş temsilcilerini aylık düzenli toplantılarla bir araya getirerek 
istişare zemini hazırlamak,  yurt içi ve yurt dışı iletişim ve bilgi akışı sağlamak,  
b. Ortak çalışmalar kapsamında Alt Çalışma Grupları, Komisyonlar ve 
Koordinasyon Kurulları oluşturmak,  
c. Programlar (eğitim programları, konferans, panel, sergi, gezi, sempozyum vb.) 
düzenlemek, 
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d. Bilgi ve belge arşivi oluşturmak, çalışmalarını bülten, yıllık katalog, internet vb. 
aracılığı ile ilgililere duyurmak, 
e. Ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde,  
- Platformun “Ortak Görüş” belgelerini temsilciler veya iletişim kanalları 
aracılığıyla sunmak,  
- Yönetim Grubu’nun GĐKAP adına destek kararı aldığı ve ortak çalışma 
kabul ettiği projeleri, sorumluluk alan kuruluşları belirterek ulusal ve 
uluslararası düzeye taşımak,  
- Mutabakat Tutanağında belirlenmiş ilkeler çerçevesinde çatı örgütlerde 
yer almak, 
- Düzenlenen etkinliklere katılmak,  
- Savunuculuk yapmak. 
 
Madde 7.  GĐKAP’a Katılım  
Amaç ve ilkeleri GĐKAP’ın vizyon ve misyonuna uygun kadın sivil toplum 
kuruluşları (dernek, vakıf, girişim grubu, meslek grupları, dernek ve vakıfların kadın 
kol, komite ve komisyonları, federasyon, konfederasyon, platform, sendika, kooperatif 
vb.), GĐKAP katılımcıları arasında yer alabilirler. 
GĐKAP Katılımcısı Olma Prosedürü 
a. Kuruluşlar “GĐKAP Katılımcı Başvuru Formu”nu doldurur. Formda belirtilen 
belgeleri GĐKAP sekreterine teslim eder. Eksiklikler tamamlanıncaya kadar 
katılım başvurusu Yönetim Grubunun gündemine girmez. 
b. Belgelerin tamamlanmasını takiben ilk Platform Meclisi toplantısında katılımcı 
başvurusu görüşülür, Yönetim Grubunun ¾ oyçokluğu ile karara bağlanır. 
Başvuru talebi en geç üç ay içinde cevaplanır. Bu cevap, olumlu veya olumsuz 
olabileceği gibi, katılım talebinde bulunan kuruluşun tanınmasına yönelik bir 
süreci de kapsayabilir. 
 
Madde 8. GĐKAP Yapılanması/Organları     
1) GĐKAP Katılımcıları/Katılımcı Temsilcileri/Platform Meclisi 
i. Yönetim Grubu  
ii. Haber Ağı Grubu 
2) Alt Çalışma Grubu  
3) Komisyon  
4) Koordinasyon Kurulu   
 
Madde 8.1. GĐKAP Katılımcıları/GĐKAP Katılımcı Kuruluş Temsilcileri/Platform 
Meclisi  
GĐKAP Katılımcıları, katılım prosedürünü yerine getirmiş olan gönüllü kadın 
kuruluşlarıdır. Bu kuruluşlar tarafından belirlenen kişiler, kurumlarını GĐKAP’ta 
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Yönetim Grubu veya Haber Ağı Grubu statüsünde temsil ederler. Platform Meclisi, 
katılımcı temsilcilerinin tümünden oluşur.  
GĐKAP Katılımcı Kuruluşlarının Görev ve Sorumlulukları: 
a. Katılımcı statüsü devam ettiği sürece GĐKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı ve içtüzüğünü 
dikkate almak,  
b. Temsilcilerinin, “Yönetim Grubu” veya “Haber Ağı Grubu”nda yer almasına 
karar vermek,  
c. Katılım prosedürünü eksiksiz yerine getirmek,  
d. GĐKAP Katılımcısı olmanın kadın STK’lara kazandırdığı ulusal ve uluslararası 
statünün bilinciyle temsilcilerini seçmek, katılımda devamlılığı sağlamak, 
temsilci değişikliğini bildirmek,  
e. GĐKAP’tan gelen rapor ve belgeleri gelen evrak statüsünde kaydetmek, 
kuruluşunun yetkili ve ilgili organlarını bilgilendirmek,   
f. Đçinde yer aldığı ulusal ve uluslararası GĐKAP ortak etkinliklerini -talep ettiği 
takdirde- kendi kuruluşunun faaliyetleri arasında zikretmek, 
g. GĐKAP’ın düzenlediği faaliyetleri kurumsal olarak desteklemek, 
h. GĐKAP web sayfasında iletişim bilgileri ve faaliyetleriyle yer almak,  
i. GĐKAP adı zikredilerek yapılması planlanan ve katılımcı kuruluşlardan onay82 
istenen konularda (bildiri, yürüyüş, basın toplantısı vb. kritik etkinlikler), yetkili 
kurulunun görüşünü güncelliği kaybetmeden ivedilikle GĐKAP’a bildirmek,  
j. Yetki verildiği konular dışında GĐKAP adına sözlü-yazılı beyanat vermemek, 
etkinlik düzenlememek.  
Katılımcı Kuruluş Temsilcilerinin Görev ve Sorumlulukları:  
a. Aylık Platform Meclisi toplantılarına temsilcisi olduğu kuruluş adına düzenli 
olarak katılmak83,   
b. GĐKAP’ta sunulan rapor ve belgeleri gelen evrak statüsünde kuruluşuna iletmek, 
GĐKAP çalışmaları hakkında kurumunu düzenli olarak bilgilendirmek,   
c. Yönetim Grubu tarafından verilen ve kendisinin de onayladığı görevleri yerine 
getirmek,  
d. Platform giderlerine Yönetim Grubu kararları doğrultusunda katkıda bulunmak,  
e. GĐKAP’ı yazılı ve ortak metinler üzerinden tanıtmak, GĐKAP ortak etkinliklerini 
desteklemek ve duyurmak, 
f. GĐKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı veya Đçyönetmeliğine aykırı davranışlarda 
bulunmamak ve yetki verilmediği konularda GĐKAP adının zikredildiği sözlü-
yazılı beyanat vermemek ve etkinlik düzenlememek,  
g. GĐKAP merkezinde bulunan “STK Kütüphanesinden” ve “GĐKAP Arşivinden” 
belirlenmiş ilkeler çerçevesinde yararlanmak.   
 
                                                 
82 Bkz Mutabakat Tutanağı Madde 10 
83 Temsilcilerin –mazeretleri dışında- bir yılda gerçekleşen Platform Meclisi 
Toplantılarının 2/3’ne katılması gerekir. Ayrıca bkz Madde 8.1.b.f 
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Madde 8.1.i. GĐKAP Yönetim Grubu   
GĐKAP’ın en yetkili karar organıdır. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve Đçyönetmelik çerçevesinde 
çalışır. Yönetim Grubuna katılma talebi onaylanan kadın kuruluşlarının temsilcilerinden 
(bir asil ve bir yedek) oluşur. Asil ve yedek iki temsilci Platform Meclisine birlikte 
veya tek olarak yer alabilirler, ancak asil üyelerin oy hakkı bulunur.  
Yönetim Grubunda Karar Alma  
a. Yönetim Grubu, kararın niteliğine göre salt çoğunluk, oyçokluğu veya oy birliği 
ile karar alır.  
o Salt Çoğunluk: Yönetim Grubu hazirununun84 yarıdan bir fazlasının 
oylarını ifade eder. Platform Meclisi toplantısı (gündeminin onayı, 
toplantı gün, yer ve saatinin değişimi vb.), Platform Meclisi binası, 
sekretaryanın işleyişi, sosyo-kültürel etkinlikler vb. konularda salt 
çoğunluk aranır. 
o Oyçokluğu: Yönetim Grubunun ¾ ünün onayını ifade eder. “Genel 
Koordinatör”,  “Genel Koordinatör Vekili”, “Genel Koordinatörlük 
Đstişare Grubu”,  GĐKAP Danışmanları, temsilci belirlenmesi, yeni 
katılımcı kabulü, projelerin GĐKAP adına desteklenmesi ve işbirliği 
kararı, disiplin ve prosedür ihlalleri vb. durumlarda oyçokluğu aranır.  
o Oy birliği: Hem Yönetim Grubunda yer alan üyelerin hem de 
temsilcisi oldukları kurumların yetkili organlarının tümünün onayını 
ifade eder. GĐKAP adı zikredilerek yapılacak, bildiri yayınlama, basın 
toplantısı düzenleme gibi çok önemli kritik kararların oylanmasında 
aranır. 
b. Aksine bir karar alınmadıkça oylamalar açık usulle yapılır.  
c. Kararlarda çekimser kalanlar veya kararları onaylamayanlar muhalefet şerhlerini 
belirtirler. 
d. Arka arkaya iki toplantıya mazeretsiz olarak katılmayan Yönetim Grubu 
üyelerinin alınan kararları onaylandığı kabul edilir.  
 
Madde 8.1.ii. GĐKAP Haber Ağı Grubu 
Haber Ağı Grubuna katılma talebi onaylanan kadın kuruluşlarının temsilcilerinden (bir 
asil ve bir yedek) oluşur. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve Đçyönetmelik çerçevesinde çalışır. Asil 
ve yedek iki temsilci Platform Meclisine birlikte veya tek olarak katılabilirler. Haber 
Ağı Grubu, tüm GĐKAP çalışmalarında Yönetim Grubu ile eşit söz hakkına 
sahiptir, ancak oylamalara katılmazlar.  
Haber Ağı Grubu statüsündeki Girişim Grupları, “GĐKAP Girişim Grupları Merkez 
(GĐKAP GGM)’ini adres olarak kullanabilir;  telefon ve faksını iletişim bilgileri olarak 
gösterebilirler. Bu durumda giderlere katkı sağlarlar. Talep ettikleri durumda 
prosedür doğrultusunda GĐKAP Yönetim Grubuna geçiş yapabilirler.   
 
                                                 
84 Platform Meclisi Toplantı gününde hazır olanlar 
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Madde 8.2. Alt Çalışma Grupları85  
Yönetim Grubu tarafından GĐKAP adına desteklenmesi kararı alınmış bir proje 
veya konu çerçevesinde en az iki GĐKAP katılımcısının bir araya gelerek 
sorumluluk almasıyla oluşur.  
 
Madde 8.3. Komisyonlar86 
GĐKAP Ana Komisyonları: 
a. Aile Komisyonu 
b. Kadın Komisyonu 
c. Çocuk Komisyonu  
d. Genç Komisyonu 
e. Yaşlı Komisyonu 
f. Özürlü Komisyonu  
g. Sosyo-Kültürel Etkinlikler Komisyonu 
h. Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Komisyonu 
i. Uluslararası Đlişkiler Komisyonu’dur.  
Gereği halinde Yönetim Grubu kararı ile farklı konu başlıklarında geçici veya devamlı 
komisyonlar oluşturulabilir.87  
 
Madde 8.4.  Koordinasyon Kurulu  
Koordinasyon Kurulları makro projelerde, GĐKAP katılımcıları ile GĐKAP dışı 
kurum ve kişiler (kamu kurum ve kuruluşları, yerel yönetimler, üniversiteler, 
akademisyenler, uzmanlar, aynı sahada çalışan STK’lar vb.) arasında işbirliği ve 
koordinasyon sağlar. Gereği halinde Yönetim Grubu kararı ile geçici veya devamlı 
Koordinasyon Kurulları oluşturulabilir.  
 
Madde 9. GĐKAP’ da Görev Alan Yetkililer 
1) Genel Koordinatör/Vekili 
2) Genel Koordinatörlük Đstişare Grubu 
3) Sekreter 
4) GĐKAP Gözlemcisi 
5) GĐKAP Temsilcisi 
6) Danışman 
 
 
                                                 
85 Bkz Đçyönetmelik Madde 4 
86 Bkz Đçyöneymelik Madde 5 
87 Đçyönetmelik, Madde 5 
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Madde 9.1. Genel Koordinatör/Vekili88 
GĐKAP’ı temsil eden en yetkili kişidir. Ulusal ve uluslararası etkinliklerde başkanlık 
statüsü arandığında GĐKAP’ı bu konumda temsil eder. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve 
Đçyönetmeliğe bağlı olarak çalışır. Yönetim Grubuna karşı sorumludur. GĐKAP 
Organları arasında koordinasyonu sağlar.  Kamu kurumları, üniversiteler, yerel 
yönetimler, STK’lar vb. kurum ve kişilerle GĐKAP arasındaki bağlantıyı kurar. Yönetim 
Grubunun ¾ oyçokluğu ile iki yıl süre için seçilir. Genel Koordinatör olmadığı 
durumlarda Genel Koordinatör Vekili aynı yetki ve sorumlulukla görev yapar.  
  
Madde 9.2. Genel Koordinatörlük Đstişare Grubu  
“Genel Koordinatörlük Đstişare Grubu”; GĐKAP çalışmalarında bilgi ve tecrübe sahibi 
üç kişiden oluşur. Đhtiyaç duyulan durumlarda Genel Koordinatörün istişare edeceği 
gruptur. Yönetim Grubu tarafından bir yıl süre için seçilir. Đstişare edilecek konular; 
Mutabakat Tutanağı ve Đçtüzük bağlamında veya Yönetim Grubunun belirleyeceği 
spesifik başlıklar çerçevesinde gerçekleşir. Grubun önerileri tavsiye niteliğindedir.  
 
Madde 9.3. Sekreter89  
GĐKAP Sekreteri Genel Koordinatörün teklifi ve/veya Platform Meclisi hazirununun 
salt çoğunluğunun onayı ile görevlendirilir. Sekreter, Genel Koordinatöre bağlı olarak 
çalışır. Görevlendirme doğrultusunda kayıt, dosyalama, iletişim vb. çalışmaları yürütür, 
GĐKAP etkinliklerinde aktif görev alır.  
 
Madde 9.4 GĐKAP Gözlemcisi  
Yönetim Grubu veya Genel Koordinatör tarafından görevlendirilir. Etkinliklere, GĐKAP 
adına gözlemci/dinleyici olarak iştirak eder, raporlarını Genel Koordinatöre iletir. 
GĐKAP Katılımcısı olma şartı yoktur Platformun onaylanmış metinleri dışında fikir 
beyan edemez.  
 
Madde 9.5. GĐKAP Temsilcisi 
GĐKAP Mutabakat Tutanağında doğrultusunda Platform Meclisi’nin ‘ortak metinleri’ ve 
ortak görüşünden hareketle, temsil görevi yapar. GĐKAP Katılımcısı olma şartı yoktur. 
GĐKAP Yönetim Grubu hazirunun oyçokluğu ile seçilir. Üstlendiği göreve ait bilgileri 
Genel Koordinatöre raporlar. Görevi GĐKAP Yönetim Grubu kararları doğrultusunda 
sürekli veya konu/zamanla sınırlıdır.  
 
Madde 9.6. GĐKAP Danışmanı 
Gerekli görülen konu başlıklarında GĐKAP çalışmalarına danışmanlık hizmeti veren 
uzman kişidir. GĐKAP Yönetim Grubunun ¾ oyçokluğuyla belirlenir. Danışmanlık 
hizmeti kapsamında yapılan görüşme ve çalışmalar Genel Koordinatör tarafından aylık 
raporlarla sunulur. Görevi GĐKAP Yönetim Grubu kararları doğrultusunda sürekli veya 
                                                 
88 Đçyönetmelik Madde 6 
89 Bkz Đçyönetmelik Madde 7 
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konu/zamanla sınırlıdır. 
 
Madde 10. GĐKAP Adına Bildiri Yayınlanması/Basın Toplantısı Düzenlenmesi 
GĐKAP adı zikredilerek yapılması düşünülen ve katılımcıları olumsuz yönde etkileme 
ihtimali olan faaliyetlerde (bildiri yayınlamak, basın toplantısı, yürüyüş vb.)  tüm 
Yönetim Grubunun mensup olduğu STK’ların yetkili organlarının onayı gerekir. Ortak 
metin veya faaliyetin hazırlanması ve onaylanması sürecinde GĐKAP ve GĐKAP 
katılımcılarının güncelliği kaybetmeden hızlı hareket etmeleri beklenir. Bu etkinliklerde 
onay vermeyen tek bir katılımcı kuruluş bile olsa GĐKAP adı kullanılamaz ve yapılan 
etkinlik yalnızca onaylayan kuruluşların isimleriyle gerçekleşir.  
 
Madde 11. GĐKAP Giderlerinin Karşılanması ve Gelir Kaynakları 
Giderler; sponsorlar tarafından karşılanır. Gerektiğinde Yönetim Grubu kararıyla 
temsilcilerin katkı payı belirlenir.  
 
Madde 12. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve Đçyönetmeliğinin Değiştirilmesi   
Değişiklikler, Yönetim Grubunun ¾ oyçokluğuyla yapılır.   
 
Madde 13. GĐKAP’tan Çıkma/Çıkarılma/Uyarı  
Her Katılımcı kuruluş; bağlı bulunduğu Yönetim Kurulu veya yetkili organının yazılı 
bildirimi ile GĐKAP’tan ayrılma hakkına sahiptir. Dilekçesi Genel Koordinatöre ulaştığı 
anda çıkış işlemleri sonuçlanmış sayılır.  
GĐKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı/Đçyönetmeliğe aykırı davranışlarda bulunan, yetki 
verilmediği halde GĐKAP adına sözlü-yazılı beyanat veren, bir yıl içinde görev ve 
sorumluluğunu yerine getirmeyen katılımcı temsilcileri ve kuruluşları; Yönetim 
Grubunun ¾ oyçokluğu ile sözlü/yazılı uyarılır veya GĐKAP’tan çıkarılma kararı 
alınabilir.  
Ayrıca mevcut yöneticileri/atadıkları temsilciler kanun dışı, ayırımcı, bölücü, yıkıcı 
vb. faaliyetlerden hüküm giymiş STK’ların ve temsilcilerinin GĐKAP’la ilişiği 
kesilir.  
 
Madde14. Platformun Feshi 
GĐKAP Yönetim Grubunun ¾ oyçokluğunun kararı ile Platform feshedilir.    
 
Madde 15. Yürürlüğe Girme Tarihi 
GĐKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı Mart 2009 itibariyle yürürlüğe girmiştir.  
Geçici Madde 
Mutabakat Tutanağı yürürlüğe girmeden önce GĐKAP’ta katılımcı statüsünde bulunlar, 
Mart 2009’dan itibaren Yönetim veya Haber Ağı Grubuna dâhil olmadıkları 
durumlarda, aylık Platform Meclisi toplantılarına dinleyici olarak katılabilirler.   
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